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Dissertation 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is nothing more practical than a good theory. This thesis is a compilation 
of  essays  that  seek  to  improve  our  understanding  of  law  by  building  on  new  
developments in economic theory, focusing on the role of psychology and 
morality in economic analysis of law. Essay 1 applies behavioral economics to 
financial regulation, challenging the notion that bounded rationality of investors 
implies more regulation. It argues that debiasing regulations need not be 
intrusive; that faulty market perceptions are best corrected through market-
based solutions; that overregulation tends to cause lack of market discipline, 
pricing inefficiencies and problematic innovations; that regulators are also 
subject to imperfect rationality; and that regulatory complexity exacerbates the 
harmful effects of bounded rationality. Essay 2 elaborates the notion of 
behavioral paternalism in the context of consumer credit regulation. It finds that 
many aspects  of  existing regulations in  the EU and the US are  best  understood 
through the lens of behavioral paternalism, and that there are many possibilities 
for further regulation along these lines. Essay 3 explores the role of social norms 
and moral motivation in legal and regulatory policy. It demonstrates that there 
are  several  practical  ways  in  which  these  non-legal  norms  can  be  taken  into  
account in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of lawmaking. Essay 4 
develops a novel theory of economics based on the classical theory of virtues. It 
finds that virtues play a major role in the functioning of economic systems, and 
that optimal legal design depends on the level of virtue of the citizens. 
 
Keywords: behavioral economics, behavioral law and economics, financial 
regulation, paternalism, social norms, ethics and economics, virtue ethics 
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Väitöskirja 
 
ABSTRAKTI 
Ei ole mitään käytännöllisempää kuin hyvä teoria. Tämä esseekokoelma pyrkii 
parantamaan ymmärrystämme oikeudesta hyödyntämällä taloustieteen uusia 
virtauksia, keskittyen psykologian ja moraalin rooliin oikeustaloustieteessä. 
Essee 1 soveltaa psykologista taloustiedettä rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntelyyn 
haastaen käsityksen, jonka mukaan sijoittajien rajoitettu rationaalisuus 
edellyttää sääntelyn lisäämistä. Psykologisia vääristymiä korjaava sääntely voi 
olla luonteeltaan kevyttä; virheelliset markkinakäsitykset korjautuvat parhaiten 
markkinapohjaisilla ratkaisuilla; ylisääntely johtaa usein markkinakurin 
heikkenemiseen, epätäydelliseen hinnoitteluun ja ongelmallisiin 
rahoitusinnovaatioihin; sääntelijät ovat myös epätäydellisesti rationaalisia; ja 
sääntelyn monimutkaistuminen pahentaa rajoitetun rationaalisuuden 
aiheuttamia haittoja. Essee 2 kehittää psykologiseen taloustieteeseen perustuvaa 
paternalismin teoriaa kuluttajaluottomarkkinoiden sääntelyssä. Sen mukaan 
monet nykyisen sääntelyn ominaisuudet Euroopassa ja Yhdysvalloissa selittyvät 
parhaiten psykologisella paternalismilla; näkökulma tarjoaa myös runsaasti 
mahdollisuuksia sääntelyn kehittämiseen. Essee 3 selvittää sosiaalisten normien 
ja moraalisen motivaation merkitystä oikeuspolitiikassa. Se osoittaa, että nämä 
ei-oikeudelliset normit voitaisiin ottaa monin tavoin huomioon lainsäädännön 
kehittämiseksi. Essee 4 kehittelee uutta, hyveisiin perustuvaa taloustiedettä. 
Hyveet osoittautuvat tärkeiksi talouden toiminnan kannalta, ja optimaalinen 
oikeuspolitiikka riippuu kansalaisten hyveellisyydestä. 
 
Asiasanat: psykologinen taloustiede, psykologinen oikeustaloustiede, 
rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntely, paternalismi, sosiaaliset normit, moraali ja 
talous, hyve-etiikka 
 
 
   
 
Foreword 
Life  tends  to  be  funny.  Even  when  it  is  not,  it  is  an  adventure.  I  had  serious  
doubts about starting a PhD, but I ended up enjoying it tremendously. 
This thesis was inspired by the conviction, phrased by the psychologist Kurt 
Lewin, that there is nothing as practical as a good theory. Economists also know 
that there are few things as dangerous as bad theories. 
I am especially grateful to Samuel Gregg (for encouraging me to pursue the 
academic vocation, despite everything), Jason Lepojärvi and Varro Vooglaid (for 
reigniting my faith in the power of ideas), Jude Chua Soo Meng (for his childlike 
ability  to  take  delight  in  truth  for  its  own  sake),  and  my  supervisor  and  dear  
friend Kalle Määttä (for his unfailing guidance and enthusiasm; and for insisting 
– I will never forget that phone call). 
From the University of Helsinki, I wish to thank especially Pia Letto-Vanamo 
(for welcoming me so warmly to the research community at KATTI) and Raimo 
Siltala (for teaching me to read and think scientifically). For helpful 
conversations  along  the  way,  I  am  also  grateful  to  Lauri  Ahokallio,  Klaus  
Alholm,  Niclas  Berggren,  Thomas  Brand,  Peter  Boettke,  Philip  Booth,  Eric  
Crampton, Martin Estlander, Matias Forss, Joshua Hall, Ilkka Harju, Sakari 
Huovinen, Klaus Ilmonen, Esa Jokivuolle, Teemu Juutilainen, Ville Kaikkonen, 
Nils Karlsson, Eero Kasanen, Jussi Kivistö, Antti Kuusterä, Carl Löfberg, Jaakko 
Mikkilä, Kalle Mikkola, Tomas Munzi, Jukka Mähönen, Sami Napari, Kristian 
Niemietz, Sakari Puisto, Pertti Pylkkönen, Luis Ravina, Juha-Pekka Rentto, 
Cornelius Schaub, Daniel Schwarcz, Alejo Sison, Jussi Syrjänen, Juhani Vaivio, 
Martti  Vihanto,  Seppo  Villa  and  Charles  Whitehead.  There  are  many  others  I  
must have forgotten to mention. 
A special thanks goes to Vesa Kanniainen and Matti Heimonen for their swift 
and excellent work as pre-examiners. 
For financial assistance, I also wish to acknowledge the generous support of 
Emil Aaltonen Foundation, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, Suomen 
arvopaperimarkkinoiden edistämissäätiö, Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, 
Liikesivistysrahasto, Acton Institute, and the University of Helsinki. 
The last  and the biggest  thanks goes  to  my love and my all.  Without  you,  I  
would be nothing. Without your love, I would cease to be. (Quite literally.) 
 
Helsinki, 26 March 2012 
 
Oskari Juurikkala 
  
   
 
Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 9 
1.1 Economics in Turmoil ........................................................................................... 9 
1.2 Models vs. Realism ............................................................................................... 10 
1.3 Rationality and Rational Behavior ....................................................................... 11 
1.4 Freedom vs. Paternalism ...................................................................................... 11 
1.5 Individual, State, and Society ............................................................................... 12 
2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................... 13 
2.1 The Big Picture ...................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.1 The Challenge of Normativity ..................................................................... 14 
2.2.2 Evaluating Models and Theories ................................................................. 16 
2.2.3 Theory Development: Inductive and Deductive ........................................ 20 
2.2.4 Technique and Precision .............................................................................. 21 
3 RESULTS AND REFLECTION .................................................................... 23 
3.1 Essay 1: Behavioral Economics and Financial Markets ...................................... 23 
3.1.1 Objectives and Exclusions ............................................................................ 23 
3.1.2 Contributions ................................................................................................ 24 
3.1.3 Limitations and Further Research ............................................................... 26 
3.2 Essay 2: Behavioral Paternalism in Consumer Credit Regulation ..................... 28 
3.2.1 Objectives and Exclusions ............................................................................ 28 
3.2.2 Contributions ................................................................................................ 29 
3.2.3 Limitations and Further Research ............................................................... 30 
3.3 Essay 3: Social Norms, Morality, and the Law .................................................... 31 
3.3.1 Objectives and Exclusions ............................................................................ 31 
3.3.2 Contributions ................................................................................................ 31 
3.3.3 Limitations and Further Research ............................................................... 32 
3.4 Essay 4: Law and Virtue ....................................................................................... 32 
3.4.1 Objectives and Exclusions ............................................................................ 32 
3.4.2 Contributions ................................................................................................ 33 
3.4.3 Limitations and Further Research ............................................................... 34 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 35 
ESSAYS .............................................................................................................. 38 
 
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
“To regulate or not to regulate, and if to regulate, how? These are the questions.” – 
These  were  the  first  words  of  one  doctoral  dissertation  some  15  years  ago  
(Määttä, 1997: 1). They provide an excellent summary of one of the principal 
questions of normative economic analysis of law, and they crystallize the basic 
question of the present dissertation, too: How can we improve law and regulation?1  
Those  are,  of  course,  huge  questions.  Any  piece  of  research  can  only  try  to  
give a very partial answer to them (in fact, Määttä’s dissertation was concerned 
with environmental taxes). In this overview, I discuss the broader motivation, 
objectives and methodology of the present dissertation, and outline its principal 
results. 
The essays contained in this dissertation were motivated by a wide range of 
observations  and  concerns.  These  are  discussed  next  in  order  to  draw  out  the  
common themes reflected in the essays. The essay topics were chosen in such a 
way as to highlight different yet closely related facets of the broader normative 
question. 
 
 
1.1 ECONOMICS IN TURMOIL 
 
One of the leading motivators of the research project was the state of modern 
economics. While economics, like any field of science, has always been subject to 
methodological debates, it seems to be accurate to say that economics has rarely 
undergone such lively discussions on its very foundations as it is doing today. 
There are numerous reasons for this, many of which I cannot go into here, but 
there  is  one  which  was  especially  pertinent  during  the  making  of  the  
dissertation, namely the so-called Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
The GFC started in summer 2007 and became increasingly dangerous 
through 2008 and 2009. According to some views, the present macroeconomic 
instability  is  just  another  phase  in  the  unfolding  of  the  same,  larger  chain  of  
events. The crisis was a practical, real-world event, but it raised numerous 
questions about the theory of economics, finance, law, and regulation. 
In  terms  of  economic  theory,  one  of  the  big  questions  was:  Is economics to 
blame for the crisis? Many commentators both inside and outside academia 
argued  that  the  crisis  had  been  caused  by  bad  economics,  although  others  
                                                   
1 I  am using the terms “law” and “regulation” broadly synonymously, not limiting the latter to so-
called regulatory law. There is, however, at least a difference of nuance. See Baldwin and Cave (1999: 
chapter 1) for an extended discussion, with which I concur. 
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defended the role of economics and attacked faulty government regulation and 
monetary policy instead (see  essay 1).  It  may be that  both were partly  right,  as  
one argument does not necessarily exclude the other. Regardless of what the 
ultimate truth is, the crisis certainly provoked a lively debate on the foundations 
of economic science as well as its implications for financial law and regulation. 
Some argued that our macroeconomic theories were unsound and needed to be 
replaced by better ones (see Balzli and Schiessl, 2009; White, 2006, 2008, 2009). 
Others pointed their finger at microeconomics, which of course is of more direct 
relevance to economic analysis of law; in particular, the followers of behavioral 
economics argued out that the crisis proves their claims of investor irrationality 
(see essay 1). Still others critiqued the simplifying assumptions of modern 
financial theory which they held to be dangerously misleading and a root cause 
of faulty regulations (see Hutchinson and Dowd, 2010; Turner Review, 2009). 
Due to  confirmation bias,  however,  “the lesson most  people  have learnt  is  that  
they were right all along” (Kay, 2011a: 7). 
The essays contained here are not an attempt to provide an answer to the 
theoretical concerns raised by the financial crisis. Rather, they are (especially 
essays  1  and  2)  studies  on  the  legal and regulatory implications of the novel 
challenges to the standard models of neoclassical economics. The first two 
essays discuss financial regulation in light of behavioral economics, and many of 
the  examples  used  in  these  essays  are  inspired  by  the  financial  crisis  and  its  
aftermath. 
 
 
1.2 MODELS VS. REALISM 
 
The ongoing debate on the foundations of economics reflects a broader concern, 
which is the role and realism of scientific models and, more generally, of 
analytic frameworks. The word model is sometimes used to refer to 
mathematically represented models, but it is equally applicable to abstract, 
conceptual or graphical models. One of the classical problems of the philosophy 
of science is what role models play in science and how they relate to reality (see 
generally Frigg and Hartmann, 2009). 
In economics, the notion of models is especially important, because the object 
of economic science is extremely complex and there is an obvious necessity for 
simplifying assumptions. The interesting and challenging question is, what are 
the most appropriate assumptions, and what difference does it make if the 
assumptions are altered? Perhaps more importantly, should economics always 
adopt  a  deductive  approach  based  on  logical  and  consistent  –  yet  evidently  
unrealistic – axioms, as opposed to an inductive approach that in all likelihood 
cannot be formalized into a self-contained model but which is better able to 
reflect and explain what we see happening around us (Kay, 2011b)? 
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The issue of models-versus-realism is an important motivating question for 
all  the  essays  in  this  dissertation.  In  the  first  two  essays  (which  focus  on  
behavioral economics and financial regulation), the question is about the realism 
of  the  assumptions  that  we  make  with  respect  to  economic  agents  and  what  it  
implies  for  regulation  if  we  change  those  assumptions.  The  third  essay  is  
concerned  with  the  broadening  of  the  analytic  framework  used  in  economic  
analysis of law, and challenging the “legal centrism” so typical of legal (and Law 
and Economics) scholarship. The last essay is an original study that attempts to 
bring  further  realism  to  economic  models  by  incorporating  the  insights  of  
classical virtue theory into the behavioral assumptions. 
 
 
1.3 RATIONALITY AND RATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
 
One of the principal assumptions in economics is that concerning the rationality 
of economic actors (see Sen, 1977, 2008). The first two essays draw explicitly 
from the literature on behavioral economics, which challenges the ordinary 
neoclassical assumption of perfect rationality and replace it with the notion of 
bounded rationality.  The findings of behavioral economics can be summarized as 
follows: (1) there are proven and empirically significant departures from the 
simplistic  rational  choice  model  of  behavior,  and  (2)  these  departures  are  
systematic in the sense that they are non-arbitrary and hence predictable and 
conformable to economic analysis (see Rabin, 1998). 
The  other  two  essays  are  also  concerned  with  rationality,  but  from  a  
different perspective. Whereas the behavioral economic school takes a different 
view of the cognitive abilities of economic agents, the rationality postulate of 
modern economics can be challenged in other ways, too. One of the classical 
issues concerns practical rationality, which is closely linked to philosophical 
questions on ethics and morality (see generally MacIntyre, 1987). Essays 3 and 4 
reflect these concerns, the first drawing from the insights of research into 
intrinsic and moral motivation, and the second building on the notion of 
rationality embedded in classical virtue theory. 
 
 
1.4 FREEDOM VS. PATERNALISM 
 
A fourth common theme and motivation of the essays is the age-old challenge of 
freedom and autonomy versus paternalism. The notion of paternalism is 
discussed more explicitly in the second essay, but the theme is relevant for all 
the four essays, which provide different perspectives to this question. 
Essay 1 presents arguments that are highly critical of the benefits of 
paternalism, at least in the context of financial markets. Essay 2 offers a 
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complementary perspective, showing that a special type of paternalism may be 
reasonable in the area of consumer finance. The last two essays look at the issue 
from  the  wider  viewpoint  of  moral  behavior:  essay  3  argues  that  there  is  an  
argument for legal paternalism when this is necessary to uphold positive social 
norms and moral attitudes. Essay 4 presents a detailed examination of the 
dilemma faced by lawmakers when trying to “legislate morality”. 
 
 
1.5 INDIVIDUAL, STATE, AND SOCIETY 
 
The fifth broad consideration is an upshot of the previous theme: the question is 
not merely that of whether, when and to what extent individual freedom should 
be limited,  but  also that  of  the role  of  the different  social  institutions and their  
interactions with each other. Sometimes political philosophy is debated in an 
analytical  framework  that  reduces  the  issue  to  the  dichotomy  between  the 
individual and the state,  but  a  more realistic  model  has  to  take into account  the 
broader reality called society,  which is not reducible to the political authority. A 
realistic  picture  of  society also acknowledges the fact  that  the notion of  markets 
cannot be reduced to interactions among autonomous individuals, but it has to 
be understood in a wider context that includes law, social norms and morality 
(see Kay, 2004, and the references cited in essays 3 and 4). 
In the first two essays, these issues are discussed only cursorily, with special 
reference to the role of markets and civil society in complementing state-made 
financial regulation, the interaction between markets and civil society is also 
emphasized. The last two essays are more directly concerned with the notions of 
morality and civil society, as they attempt to develop a theory of the role of law 
in building up valuable informal social institutions; they also highlight the role 
of civil society in influencing moral culture and moral development, ultimately 
influencing the law too. 
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2 Objectives and 
Methodology 
2.1 THE BIG PICTURE 
 
Given the wide nature of  the fundamental  questions of  this  dissertation,  it  has  
been  necessary  to  narrow  down  the  scope  and  focus  on  specific  issues  and  
perspectives. In the previous section I have already explained some of the many 
complementarities between the essays. 
In a sense, the essays can be seen as forming two pairs. The first two essays 
examine  the  implications  of  behavioral  economics  for  the  theory  of  Law  and  
Economics, with special reference to financial markets regulation. The last two 
essays discuss the role and importance of non-legal, and especially moral, forms 
of  influence  on  behavior,  while  also  trying  to  assess  the  role  of  law  in  
influencing the same non-legal institutions and norms. On the other hand, it 
should be emphasized that, with respect to each other, these two pairs provide 
complementary insights to the broader questions of economic analysis of law. 
More concretely, the essays advance two broad research objectives: theory 
development, and the making of policy proposals. 
First, all the essays are principally concerned with theory development. The 
first  two  essays  develop  the  theory  of  economic  analysis  of  law  from  the  
viewpoint of behavioral economics. Financial market regulation serves as a 
limiting context, which helps to narrow down the discussion and focus on 
specific issues. Nevertheless, the objective is to yield results that might be 
generalized and applied in other contexts also (I will discuss the challenges of 
generalization  later).  The  last  two  essays  develop  the  theory  of  Law  and  
Economics from the viewpoint of morals and intrinsic motivation; in these 
essays, the examples are taken from a wider range of contexts. 
Second, in addition to developing the theory of Law and Economics, the 
essays seek to provide policy proposals related to the design of law and regulation. 
This is naturally related to the objective of theory development, because 
normative economic analysis of law is concerned with providing law-makers 
and  other  social  actors  with  new  ideas  to  the  normative  challenge  of  how  to  
improve the law. 
I  will  return to  essay-specific  research objectives  later.  Before  that,  I  wish to  
address some general methodological issues that are relevant to all the essays. 
 
14   
 
 
2.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
Given the research objectives of the dissertation (theory development and policy 
advice), various methodological questions can be raised. I will refrain from 
sticking  my  head  into  the  bigger  haystack  of  economic  methodology,  but  will  
instead  focus  on  four  concerns  of  more  immediate  relevance:  the  challenge  of  
normative research, the problem of how to evaluate competing models and 
theories,  the  mode  of  argumentation,  and  the  difficulties  and  choices  with  
respect to precision. 
 
2.2.1 The Challenge of Normativity 
I said earlier that the basic question of the dissertation is normative (“To regulate 
or not to regulate, and if to regulate, how? or  “How can we improve law and 
regulation?”). What I mean by that calls for a clarification. 
By normative research I mean something quite specific, which is not 
necessarily the same as what it means in economic analysis of law. Normative 
Law and Economics, generally speaking, refers to the making of legal policy 
advice  based on the economic analysis  of  the question,  but  more specifically,  it  
means policy advice based on the notion of efficiency, and in particular, allocative 
efficiency (Kerkmeester, 2000: 386). As is well known, that seemingly simply and 
intuitive term is full of ambiguity, which is why thousands of pages have been 
written on different efficiency concepts, principally Pareto efficiency or Pareto 
optimality (a  state  in  which  no  one  can  be  made  better  off  without  making  
someone else  worse off)  and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (an outcome in which those 
that  are  made  better  off  could  in  theory  pay  compensation  to  those  that  are  
made worse off). There are general difficulties such as that Pareto-improving 
policy changes are practically non-existent, because all (or almost all) policy 
changes  imply  some  disadvantage  to  someone  somewhere;  and  that  Kaldor-
Hicks improvements are not necessarily in fact compensated, which implies that 
sometimes they may be manifestly unjust. Further, there is the all-the-more-
fundamental difficulty of how we are to make interpersonal utility-comparisons 
if such utilities cannot be observed and their interpersonal comparability is in 
any case doubtful (Kerkmeester, 2000: 387). 
One  simple  solution  to  the  endless  debates  on  efficiency  is  the  principle of 
wealth maximization adopted by Posner in his magnum opus (2011: chapter 1). 
According  to  this  approach,  preferences  are  expressed  by  willingness to pay, so 
that the normative objective of legal policy is the promotion of wealth 
maximization. However, the philosophical problems with Posner’s solution 
have been well analyzed by Dworkin (1980) in his famous article “Is Wealth a 
Value?” as well as by numerous other commentators. 
For present purposes, suffice it to say that I do not consider Posner’s solution 
entirely satisfactory. It will be evident from the arguments contained in this 
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study that I tend to disagree with the standard rationality postulate, which 
claims that economic agents act merely so as to maximize their utility; I believe 
that both “maximization” and “utility” are problematic notions in the context of 
human choosing and acting. Moreover, I decidedly disagree with the principle 
of pragmatic economism according to which people act merely so as to maximize 
their wealth. It should be no surprise, then, that I do not think that the normative 
objective of legal policy should be wealth maximization as such. 
It is neither possible nor desirable for me to explain in detail my legal and 
political philosophy here, so a brief sketch will be enough to clarify the matter 
(for  a  longer  exposition of  likeminded ideas,  see  for  example Finnis,  1980).  The 
primary goal of law is not efficiency, but justice. The notion of justice includes 
many different dimensions, which classically are categorized as commutative, 
distributive and general justice (Finnis, 1980: 161-193). From the viewpoint of 
law and legislation, the principal objective is general justice (also called “legal” 
justice by Aristotle), which essentially boils down to favoring and fostering the 
common good of the community (Finnis, 1980: 164). The common good is defined 
not as some kind of collectivized good, but as the set of conditions that enables the 
members of a community to lead good and fulfilling human lives both individually and 
in collaboration and communion with others (Finnis, 1980: 154-156). What these 
conditions  are  in  practice  is  a  vast  question,  but  at  the  most  basic  level  they  
certainly include such factors as a functioning market, access to justice, 
transparent political institutions, a healthy natural environment, respect for life 
and bodily integrity, right to private property, freedom of association, a positive 
moral  ecology,  and  so  on.  It  is  the  common  good,  not  mere  private  interests,  
which forms the principal normative objective of both the general legal institutions 
and specific regulatory policies, even if these may in fact also advance private 
interests. 
According this understanding of law and justice, considerations of efficiency 
form part of the common good and therefore of general justice; the economic 
perspective  is  not  outside  the  realm  of  justice,  but  is  included  within  in.  This  
means, on the one hand, that Pareto optimality is too restrictive as  a  universal  
criterion  of  law  and  justice,  because  it  treats  all  established  private  interests  as  
trumps,  i.e.  overriding  rights.  On  the  other  hand,  efficiency  is  not  an  absolute  
value, but is subject to the wider considerations of justice, including certain 
fundamental rights of individual persons (Finnis, 1980: 111-118); in other words, 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is too expansive as  a  universal  criterion  of  law  and  justice,  
because it gives efficiency undue importance to the exclusion of other values. 
Now, as far the present dissertation is concerned, it should be emphasized 
that nothing fundamental hinges on the acceptance of this broad normative 
framework. The argumentation does reflect this framework, but in general, it is 
regulatory-theoretical in  the  sense  that  it  leans  more  on  specific legislative and 
regulatory objectives than the Posnerian-type Law and Economics,  which tries  to  
offer an all-encompassing descriptive and prescriptive account of all law based 
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on economic efficiency (see Baldwin and Cave, 1999, for a representative 
example of “regulation theory” in this sense). 
In other words, the essays do not propose legal policy prescriptions based on 
efficiency considerations or other normative theories, but they analyze 
regulation on the basis objectives taken as given, and determined ultimately by 
political choice; these objectives may and should be discussed critically, but they 
are not the principal focus of the present study. This is quite explicit in essays 1 
and 2, which work in the context of financial regulation as commonly defined, 
i.e., taking as given such policy objectives as macroeconomic stability, efficient 
risk allocation, and consumer protection. The purpose of these essays is not the 
challenge these widely accepted objectives of financial regulation, but to 
contribute to the discussion of the most apt policies for achieving those 
objectives. 
The  other  two  essays  are  slightly  more  open-ended  in  terms  of  their  
normative basis. Essay 3 does not specify concrete policies other than by way of 
illustrative examples, so that ultimately the prescriptive content of the proposals 
requires further concretization. However, there are also references to broader 
considerations  of  a  good  society  along  the  lines  of  the  common good as defined 
earlier.  Essay  4  is  similar  to  the  previous  essay,  except  for  the  fact  that  it  also  
proposes  virtues  as  an  objective  of  legal  policy,  and  provides  some  normative  
arguments in support of that objective. Those normative arguments are, again, 
along the lines of the notion of common good, placing however special 
importance to considerations of economic efficiency. 
 
2.2.2 Evaluating Models and Theories 
The previous section implies that, although the basic research questions of the 
dissertation are essentially normative, most of the actual analysis focuses on the 
descriptive theories and analytical frameworks that form the basis of normative 
conclusions  in  the  context  of  legal  policymaking.  It  follows  that  an  important  
methodological challenge is that of evaluating different theories and proposing 
new frameworks that might be better than the alternatives. 
There is a fundamental question, which cannot be entirely avoided: How are 
scientific models and theories evaluated?2 And more specifically: How are the models 
and theories of economic analysis of law evaluated in this dissertation? The first 
question, which forms the heart of the philosophy of science, can only be 
touched upon cursorily here, that is, by way of addressing the second question.  
                                                   
2 I am using the terms model and theory broadly interchangeably, although I think that theory should 
refer to more expanded totalities, whereas models form part of theories. In this I concur with Uskali 
Mäki: “The linguistic practice of economists often does not distinguish between ‘theory’ and ‘model’ 
but for many purposes it is useful to think of models not only are representing the world but also as 
representing theories, as their reduced or enlarged representatives. Models in this sense ‘mediate’ 
between theories and the world or the data.” (Mäki, 2005: footnote 1). 
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In his famous Methodology of Economics (1992), Mark Blaug discusses the near-
impossibility of finding any single universally accepted philosophy of science 
today. Whereas a certain type of logical positivism was broadly accepted in the 
early 20th century  and  classical  physics  was  seen  as  “the  prototype  science  to  
which  all  other  disciplines  must  sooner  or  later  conform”,  today  things  are  
difference,  because  “the  works  of  Poppe,  Polanyi,  Hanson,  Toulmin,  Kuhn,  
Lakatos, and Feyerabend […] have largely destroyed this received view without, 
however, putting any generally accepted alternative conception in its place” 
(Blaug, 1992: 3). 
That  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no  agreement  at  all  on  what  sort  of  criteria  
should  be  used  to  evaluate  models  and  theories.  Ultimately,  those  criteria  are  
commonsensical factors that simply eschew the sophisticated debates of 
philosophy  of  science:  one  asks,  if  facts  are  correctly  stated;  if  other  facts  are  
omitted;  if  the  generalizations  are  subject  to  counter-examples;  and  if  one  can  
find competing models or theories that will fit the facts (see Blaug, 1986: 279). 
Ideally, this process – which in fact reflects the so-called hypothetico-deductive 
model of  scientific  knowledge  –  should  be  done  as  rigorously  and  carefully  as  
possible. 
Even if no standard method science is available, it is useful to reflect briefly 
on the methodological suppositions of the present dissertation in light of 
different methodological theories. Importantly, it is evident that the study does 
not follow Milton Friedman’s famous “instrumentalist” proposal, according to 
which theories are assessed solely on the basis of their predictive power 
(Friedman, 1953). Friedman’s approach, and especially its irrelevance-of-
assumptions thesis,  is  both  ingenious  and,  frankly,  laughable  (see  Blaug,  1986:  
273-278, and Blaug, 1992: 91-99, for a critique). This is especially true of its 
extreme form, dubbed humorously the F-twist by Paul Samuelson. Firstly, while 
assumptions are – without doubt – necessary for scientific theory, their realism 
and conformity to the object of study is one factor in the evaluation of the 
plausibility of the theory (Kerkmeester, 2000: 394). Samuelson opts for harsher 
words: 
 
“[Friedman] is fundamentally wrong in thinking that unrealism in the 
sense of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is 
anything  but  a  demerit  for  a  theory  or  hypothesis.”  (Samuelson,  1966:  
1774; quoted in Blaug, 1992: 97) 
 
Secondly, as behavioral economists have demonstrated, unrealistic 
assumptions often fail to yield good predictions about the empirical world 
(Kerkmeester, 2000: 392). Thirdly, as Coase (1994) has pointed out, the 
methodological importance of predictive power greatly depends on the nature 
of  the  research  and  the  type of knowledge one  is  aiming  at;  in  the  summarizing  
words of Kerkmeester (2000: 394): 
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“If  [the  goal  of  research]  is  only  prediction  and  control,  the  use  of  
unrealistic assumptions is fine, as long as they indeed predict well. If, 
however, the goal is explanation, an approach based on unrealistic 
assumptions is not really helpful in providing insight in what really 
moves a person and in how legal rules really have effects.” 
 
If the present study avoids the philosophically floppy logical positivism or 
“instrumentalism” of Friedman and company, it also shuns the apriorism of 
some earlier forms of economics, including British 19th century  economics  and  
later Austrian economics (see Blaug, 1992: 51-82). While I do not entirely rule out 
the possibility and fruitfulness of classical-style “armchair economics”, I am 
convinced  that  it,  too,  in  fact  relies  on  empirical  input,  or  otherwise  it  is  quite  
useless. And if so, it is necessary to recognize the role of observation and to be 
more accurate about the nature of the reasoning process. 
The foregoing implies that the methodological position of the present work 
differs somewhat from the current mainstream in economics, which has been 
well summarized by Blaug (1992: 110-111): 
 
“Despite the embarrassment of the F-twist, Friedman and Machlup do 
seem to have persuaded most of their colleagues that direct verification of 
the postulates or assumptions of economic theory is both unnecessary and 
misleading; economic theories should be judged in the final analysis by 
their implications for the phenomena that they are designed to explain. At 
the same time, economics is held to be only a ‘box of tools’, and empirical 
testing can show, not so much whether particular models are true or false, 
but whether or not they are applicable in a given situation. The prevailing 
methodological mood is not only highly protective of received economic 
theory, it is also ultrapermissive within the limits of the ‘rules of the 
game’: almost any model will do provided it is rigorously formulated, 
elegantly constructed, and promising of potential relevance of real-world 
situations.” 
 
Where does that leave the present study, then? I am intent on avoiding any 
firm commitments, because it seems to me that the lack of any widely accepted 
methodological  theory  is  a  reflection  of  the  fact  that  most  of  the  theories  have  
some merits but also entail difficulties. Karl Popper’s critical rationalism and  its  
notion of falsificationism is one such view that I take to be broadly correct, at least 
in terms of most kinds of science (see Popper, 2002 [1935]). I will later comment 
on some aspects of the dissertation in light of that philosophy. 
Another perspective that I find helpful is Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigms 
(Kuhn, 1970) and Imre Lakatos’ related notion of scientific research programs 
(Lakatos, 1977). For present purposes, I refrain from entering into the differences 
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of those notions, taking them to be broadly similar; I should emphasize that I do 
not subscribe to Kuhn’s epistemological views which are essentially relativistic, 
nor do I agree that different paradigms are entirely incommensurable. The point, 
at any event, is that Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ notions fruitfully highlight the holistic 
nature of science: scientific models and theories are not evaluated in isolation, but 
as  forming  part  of  broader  paradigms  or  research  programs,  which  should  be  
assessed in a holistic manner. Thus, it is neither the realism assumption nor the 
predictive  power  alone  that  determines  the  strength  of  a  theory,  but  both  of  
those factors as well as many others. 
The Kuhnian or Lakatosian view of science helps to understand better what it 
is, exactly, that the present dissertation attempts. The purpose of the essays 
contained here is neither to perform empirical tests in order to check the validity 
of  specific  economic  models,  nor  to  build  arm-chair  theoretical  models  in  
contempt of empirical observation. Instead, the principal contribution is to apply 
realism-based economic models to legal and regulatory policy.  In  this,  the  essays  are  
contributing  to  the  theoretical  development  of  one  paradigm  or  research  
program within Law and Economics, drawing on empirical work done by others. 
Thus, essays 1 and 2 rely on empirical research called behavioral economics and 
apply it to the theory of financial regulation. The choice of behavioral economics 
as the basis for regulatory policy is made on the grounds that it is more realistic 
than  the  standard  neo-classical  model.  However,  the  leading  question  of  the  
essays is not so much “What does cognitive psychology say about human 
behavior?”, but “What implications does the empirical evidence embodied in 
behavioral economics have for financial regulation?” 
The  other  two  essays  are  similar  in  methodology,  although  they  rely  on  a  
wider  source  of  ideas  in  order  to  advance  the  development  of  realism-based  
economic  models.  Essay  3  uses,  on  the  one  hand,  conceptual  and  empirical  
studies on the notion of social norms and, on the other hand, empirical evidence 
on  internal  and  moral  motivation;  but  again,  the  primary  focus  is  on  working  
out  what  all  of  that  implies  for  law and regulation.  Essay 4  cites  less  empirical  
evidence to support the realism-based theoretical model, as it relies mostly on 
the classical literature on virtue theory (which, in any case, is broadly based on 
observation and experience), but it does also receive scientific support from the 
new literature on positive psychology (see Peterson and Seligman, 2004, for an 
extensive  synthesis  of  the  empirical  literature).  Again,  the  focus  is  on  what  
implications this has for legal policy. 
In terms of paradigms and research programs, it is interesting to ask how the 
essays in the present dissertation develop or challenge existing paradigms. In 
brief, it seems to me that the first three essays are more modest in this sense, in 
that they propose no radical changes to current thinking, although they do help 
to undermine the dominance of the standard neo-classical view. Principally, 
essay  1  is  a  kind  of  internal criticism of certain opinions held in behavioral 
financial regulatory theory, whereas essay 2 is an extension and a more detailed 
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application  of  earlier  literature  within  the  same  paradigm.  Essay  3  is  a  
redevelopment and systematization of the literature on social norms and law, 
although it also combines it with other, complementary perspectives. Essay 4 is 
the most innovative and path-breaking of the dissertation, in that it proposes 
quite  a  novel  view of  economics  (and,  by implication,  of  Law and Economics);  
however,  I  argue  in  the  essay  that  the  classical  virtue  theory  is  in  principle  
compatible with one interpretation of rational choice, and it resonates well with 
behavioral  economics,  so  there  is  the  possibility  that  the  view  advanced  here  
could be absorbed into existing paradigms. 
 
2.2.3 Theory Development: Inductive and Deductive 
Another issue that I wish to clarify is this: How exactly do I work out the legal and 
regulatory implications of these arguably-more-realistic models of economics? 
Traditionally, modes of reasoning have been divided into deductive (working 
from general premises to particular conclusions) and inductive (working from 
particular observations to generalized conclusions). That distinction is a 
simplification, and good science uses both in a creative process, but, still, there is 
a difference of emphasis, and consequently research can often be classified as 
emphasizing  either  induction  or  deduction.  For  example,  most  of  economic  
research follows the deductive model (or deductive-hypothetical, if the 
deductive results are tested empirically). On the other hand, some authors such 
as  Ronald  Coase  have  tended  to  follow  an  inductive  approach,  looking  for  
interesting observations of social and legal phenomena and using them to 
formulate conclusions that are, perhaps, not so formally rigorous but that are 
nevertheless very interesting (see Kerkmeester, 2000: 391-392). Richard Posner 
has  in  some writings accused Coase of  not  developing any theory at all, but this 
seems like an unjust claim that reflects Posner’s misguided understanding of the 
notion of theory (see Mäki, 1998). 
The essays in this dissertation combine both deductive and inductive 
argumentation. The first two essays are principally inductive.  Essay  1  is  a  
collection of different perspectives and examples that point in the direction of 
the general argument of the essay (according to which behavioral economics 
does not imply more but less financial regulation). In fact, the fundamental point 
of that essay is to challenge the simplistic deduction that behavioral economics 
means that heavier regulation is needed (“less rationality implies more 
regulation”).  From  a  Popperian  (falsificationist) perspective, the arguments of 
that essay serve to refute at least the extreme form of the counter-hypothesis. 
Naturally, the evidence should not be seen as completely verifying the principal 
hypothesis of the essay (“less rationality implies less regulation”). 
Essay  2  is  closely  related  to  the  previous  essay.  It  also  draws  heavily  on  
different  kinds  of  empirical  observations  and  arguments,  so  that  the  style  of  
argumentation is quite inductive. From a Popperian perspective, it might even 
be seen as falsifying the extreme form of the hypothesis of essay 1 (“less rationality 
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implies less regulation”):  what  emerges  is  a  more  nuanced  view  that  
acknowledges  the  positive  contribution  of  a  certain  kind  of  regulation  when  
economic agents are imperfectly rational. 
Essays  3  and  4  are,  in  contrast,  more  deductive.  Essay  3  is  principally  a  
systematization of a range of recent literature that highlights the social 
importance of non-legal and informal sources of normativity. In other words, 
the  contribution  of  that  essay  is  to  draw  out  a  range  of  legal  and  regulatory  
implications from those perspectives which, in themselves, are firmly grounded 
in  empirical  facts.  The  essay  does  discuss  many  supporting  and  illustrating  
examples,  which  add  to  the  plausibility  of  the  analysis,  but  the  logic  of  the  
argument follows a deductive mode. Essay 4 is likewise a largely deductive 
study of the legal policy implications of the classical virtue theory. The thread of 
the argument starts from a consideration of the fundamental assumptions of 
rationality in human action, and proceeds by drawing out the principal 
implications that changing the assumptions has for a variety of general legal 
policy options. Again, the supporting examples are more illustrative than 
verifying, although they do still add to the plausibility of the argument. 
 
2.2.4 Technique and Precision 
One remaining methodological issue is that concerning technique and precision. 
By precision I mean both conceptual and empirical exactitude. The challenge of 
precision and rigor is a perpetual one in any kind of science, and it has been well 
summarized by Aristotle in a famous statement in Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 
1980, I:3): 
 
“[I]t is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of 
things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally 
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to 
demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.” (emphasis added) 
 
The reason why this  calls  for  reflection is  that  there  are  those in  economics,  
who hold that scientific rigor is co-extensive with mathematical modeling (see  Kay,  
2011b,  for  evidence  and  critique).  Since  the  present  dissertation  avoids  
mathematics, it seems appropriate to briefly explain, why. 
One reason for avoiding mathematical formalism in the present essays is a 
pragmatic one: the intended audience is such that even a single mathematical 
formula would risk diminishing the readership to a fraction of its potential. Such 
is the nature of professional prejudice. 
There is another reason, too. While I do not deny the potential usefulness, or 
even strict necessity, of mathematics in certain contexts, I do believe that the 
scientific benefits of mathematical formalism are (i) rather overestimated within 
the economics profession and any in case (ii) highly dependent on the nature of the 
question at hand.  This  is  not  only  because  in  some  rare  instances  the  resort  to  
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mathematics  may  function  as  camouflage  that  masks  the  lack  of  depth  in  
substance or the fact that the model stands on feet of clay.3 More fundamentally, 
it is a question of choosing the method to fit the question,  and  not  the  other  way  
around. In the insightful words of John Kay (2011b: 7): 
 
“Economic models are no more, or less, than potentially illuminating 
abstractions. [...] Economics is not a technique in search of problems but a 
set  of  problems  in  need  of  solution.  Such  problems  are  varied  and  the  
solutions will inevitably be eclectic.” 
 
Of course, many questions can be treated both mathematically and verbally, 
but  the  nature  of  the  treatment  will  be  affected  in  many  ways,  not  merely  in  
logical rigor. Indeed, the widespread philosophical criticism of what I call 
“normative economism”, no matter how formally displayed, reveals that rigor in 
one (e.g. mathematical) sense does not guarantee it in another (e.g. philosophical) 
sense. 
In  the  present  set  of  essays,  the  methodological  choices  with  respect  to  
precision might be called satisficing, following Herbert Simon’s famous 
expression  (see  Simon,  1947).  In  other  words,  the  analysis  is  decidedly  verbal,  
and  the  empirical  evidence  used  is  either  based  on  research  by  others  or  on  
casual observations rather than rigorous empirical regressions, because it is 
“good  enough”  for  present  purposes,  that  is,  in  light  of  the  research  questions  
and  objectives  that  I  have  set  for  the  essays.  At  times,  the  argument  invokes  
detailed empirical studies made by others; in those cases, it is a question of 
combining that kind of data with broader theoretical considerations and, 
thereby, reaching better normative conclusions for legal policy. 
The amount of exactitude also varies somewhat between the essays, 
depending  on  the  scope  of  each  essay.  Essay  1  examines  a  relatively  broad  
hypothesis, so the style of argumentation is sketchier than that of essay 2, which 
looks  at  a  narrower  issue  and  can  therefore  go  into  much  greater  legal  and  
empirical detail.  Of the last two essays, essay 4 covers an especially wide range 
of theoretical issues, so that the style of argument is more “impressionistic”; this 
is  justified  by  the  fact  that  the  essay  is  advancing  a  novel  perspective  to  
economic  analysis  of  law,  and  I  have  judged  it  more  opportune  to  present  a  
holistic analysis here, leaving more detailed studies for further research. 
 
  
                                                   
3 In essay 4, I refer to one paper which I believe is rather worse, not better, in substance due its heavy 
use of mathematics (Dal Bo and Terviö, 2008). It might be an isolated instance, but I doubt it. 
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3 Results and Reflection 
In what follows, I will briefly reflect on each essay. First, I will outline the 
principal  objectives  of  the essay and point  out  what  topics  and questions have 
been excluded from the discussion. Second, I will highlight the key 
contributions of each essay to the existing literature. Third, I will try to discuss 
some potential weaknesses and limitations of the essay, and sketch possibilities 
for further research. 
 
 
3.1 ESSAY 1: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 
3.1.1 Objectives and Exclusions 
The first essay, entitled “Behavioral Economics and Financial Markets: More 
Regulation or Less?”,  was  largely  inspired  by  the  academic  and  other  
commentaries made during and after the global financial crisis. While the 
interpretations of  the events  differed greatly,  it  was frequently  argued that  the 
crisis had proven the irrationality of investors and that, therefore, heavier 
regulation of financial markets was the way forward. As I point out in the essay, 
even generally, scholars within Behavioral Law and Economics (BLE) tend to be 
rather pro-regulation, whereas neoclassical legal-economists are more inclined 
toward anti-regulation.4  This  goes  so  far  that  it  is  arguable  that  some  of  the  
opposition to BLE may be motivated by the political implications that  it  has,  or  
seems to have.5 
Some  authors  within  the  BLE  paradigm  have  expressed  mild  skepticism  of  
the pro-regulatory tendency of their field.6 However, to my knowledge, there 
has been no systematic argument to the effect that BLE could have anti-regulatory 
implications.  The  principal  goal  of  the  paper  was  to  explore  the  plausibility  of  
such an argument. 
The scope of the essay is very wide, given that financial regulation is a highly 
complex  and  technical  area  of  law.  That  means  that  I  had  to  make  significant  
                                                   
4 For example, see the debate between Bar-Gill (2008), who is fiercely pro-regulation, and Epstein 
(2006, 2008), who admits that people make mistakes but prefers the neoclassical approaches and 
argues that competitive markets and the common law are enough to deal with problems. 
5 This  tendency  can  be  seen  in  a  wide  range  of  authors  cited  in  the  last  part  of  essay  2.  See  also  
Epstein (2010), who is quite open about the political issue. 
6 I  cite  some articles  in  the  essay.  It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  this  kind of  arguments  are  often  
made by authors who are skeptical of BLE in general. 
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exclusions in order to make the argument manageable. One was that I do not go 
into a discussion of the general validity of behavioral economics: I simply take it for 
granted that the BLE paradigm is valid (at least more or less), and I only cite in 
passing the general methodological criticism that it has received. Actually, in 
one seminar presentation that I have made on this paper, the question was put 
to me: “So, do you agree with behavioral economics or not?” The answer would 
be something like  this:  “Yes,  I  do agree with it  generally,  but  I  do not  consider  
myself competent to assess all the details and all the models proposed in that 
paradigm.” In other words, I believe that there may be difficulties in some of the 
arguments made within behavioral economics, but the broader paradigm seems 
to  be  supported  by  strong  evidence.  In  fact,  the  weakest  area  of  behavioral  
economics seems to be preference theory, and that has little import for this essay. 
Secondly, as I write towards the beginning of the essay, I chose to exclude the 
notion of moral psychology or “fairness” behavior. This was done principally for the 
pragmatic reason that the regulatory implications of moral psychology seem to 
be entirely different, and they cannot easily be placed on the scale of “more” or 
“less”  regulation,  which  was  the  focus  of  the  essay.  Moreover,  few  
commentators have invoked the relevance of fairness behavior in the context of 
financial regulation. As a matter of fact, I happen to believe that it may be very 
relevant  indeed,  but  the  issues  are  quite  different;  essay  3  looks  at  that  sort  of  
questions (although not specifically in the context of financial regulation). 
Thirdly,  I  do  not  go  into  discussions  of  the  normative objectives of financial 
regulation. This is done for the pragmatic reason that the existing framework of 
financial regulation has quite clear policy objectives already, and challenging 
those would be an entirely different study. 
Fourthly,  I  do  not  provide  a  precise  definition  of  what  I  mean  by  “more” 
regulation,  although I  do discuss  the issue briefly  at  the beginning of  the essay,  
and I take it for granted that regulation cannot easily be defined on a more-vs.-
less scale. Nevertheless, given the broad scope of the essay, I believe it is a 
workable short hand expression for the idea that regulation can be more or less 
restrictive, more or less onerous, more or less interventionist. 
 
3.1.2 Contributions 
This  essay  is,  to  my  knowledge,  the  first  article  advancing  a  systematically  
regulation-critical view based on behavioral economics. What makes it interesting 
is precisely its counter-intuitive nature: it seems somehow “obvious” that less 
rationality should lead to more regulation. 
The  thesis  of  the  paper  is  based  on  five  arguments.  Firstly,  it  is  shown  that  
behavioral economics does not automatically imply the need for heavier 
regulation, because it also reveals the possibility of so-called light-touch 
regulations along novel lines that would not be possible within the neoclassical, 
rational-choice framework. These include default rules, targeted information 
disclosure, and cooling-off regulations. This theme is explored in more detail in 
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essay 2. It is not clear whether the overall effect of the perspective is “more” or 
“less” regulation, but it clearly points to the possibility of replacing certain 
intrusive regulations with lighter ones. 
Secondly,  it  is  argued that  faulty perceptions about markets in  general  seem to 
be best corrected through market-based solutions. Behavioral economics implies 
that financial market participants tend to be misled by a range of factors about 
investment prospects, and some commentators have called for the establishment 
of regulatory tools to help “debias” faulty market perceptions. Although I do 
not deny the possibility of such measures, I argue that we should not entertain 
high expectations about  them,  because the track record of  public  authorities  in  
predicting crises  is  rather  poor,  and their  resources  and incentives  for  doing so 
are  weak  in  comparison  with  the  private  sector.  Some  private  sector  actors  
already provide plenty of high quality “debiasing” activity, and it seems that it 
would be better to reinforce and harness those activities. 
The  third  argument  is  that  increasing  regulation  does  not  seem  to  solve  
problems caused by lack of market discipline, pricing inefficiencies and financial 
innovation;  in  fact  better  results  might  be  achieved  through  simpler  rules.  This  
argument  covers  a  wide  range  of  issues  that  go  to  the  heart  of  financial  
regulation; my objective is simply to pinpoint some crucial factors in light of 
behavioral economics. The analysis of financial innovation, instability and 
regulation seems to me to be particularly novel, and it would merit significant 
further research. 
Fourthly, regulatory rule-makers are subject to imperfect rationality, which 
tends to reduce the quality of regulatory intervention. This phenomenon is 
pejoratively called “behavioral bureaucrats”. The analysis is a kind of extension of 
the widely accepted public choice theory, which challenges the assumption of 
perfect and well-intentioned law-making. My analysis shows that the findings of 
behavioral economics reinforce the tendencies identified by public-choice 
theorists, which means that in a behavioral framework, one ought to expect even 
worse-quality regulation (naturally, the quality issue cannot easily be quantified, 
and  one  should  be  careful  not  to  imply  that  we  know  exactly  how  large  the  
effect  is).  I  also  show  how  the  behavioral  view  explains  many  anomalous  
phenomena that we seen in financial regulation. I discuss, finally, the 
possibilities of institutionally mitigating the harmful effects of human 
psychology in law-making, but the overall prospects seem unpromising. 
The fifth and last argument is that regulatory complexity seems to exacerbate 
the harmful effects of limited rationality, while simple rules have positive learning 
effects. This is a complex issue, yet perhaps the most interesting one theoretically. 
I  argue  that,  in  light  of  behavioral  economics,  it  is  actually  good to have some 
crises  from  time  to  time  –  but  they  should  be  frequent and small.  In  terms  of  
institutional solutions, this seems to imply that the rules should not be 
excessively protective of investors, and that decentralized regulation has 
advantages not acknowledged by traditional models. 
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3.1.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Given the counter-intuitive character of the argument, the essay was 
intentionally provocative.  That  also  means  that  I  did  not  try  to  address  all  the  
possible  objections  to  my  argument,  wanting  to  leave  them  for  further  debate.  
However,  I  wish  to  reflect  here  briefly  on  some  of  the  limitations  of  the  
argument. For the most part, these limitations are not in any sense fundamental, 
but rather are invitations to further research. 
One  of  the  principal  limitations  of  the  essay  is  that  it  claims  to  make  a  
generalizable thesis (“less rationality, less regulation”). I have already discussed 
this  issue  in  the  methodological  section:  the  argument  of  the  essay  should  not  
necessarily be seen as trying to prove that BLE implies an anti-regulatory stance. 
Rather, the objective is to disprove the counter-hypothesis that BLE implies a pro-
regulatory stance. It leaves it open where exactly the line should be drawn. Note 
that essay 2 of the dissertation provides as slightly different conclusion, which 
should be seen as complementing essay 1. 
A related criticism would be the following. Given that the argument relies on 
examples taken from highly technical and complex matters, one wonders if the 
examples  are  chosen  and  discussed  fairly  and  not  in  a  biased  way.  Further,  
given the complexity of those issues, they are probably contentious and 
therefore their treatment in this essay is subject to dispute. In conclusion, the 
question  is  how  strong  the  argument  can  be  if  its  constituent  parts  are  not  
absolutely clear. 
These are important concerns, and my response would be as follows. Firstly, 
as  far  as  the  examples  are  concerned,  I  have  tried  to  choose  them  in  a  fair  
manner, and I do consider some possible counterarguments in the paper. In any 
event,  it  is  hard  to  judge  one’s  own  impartiality,  so  that  matter  should  be  
submitted to further debate. Secondly, it is true that some of the technical issues 
are  contentious  and  there  are  different  opinions.  I  have  tried  to  take  note  of  
some of the differences, but for pragmatic reasons, it has not been possible to go 
into all  the  related literature,  given the wide scope of  the essay.  In  any event,  I  
do consider  the substantive positions taken in  the paper  as  strong ones,  not  as  
odd opinions held by a marginal few. Thirdly and most importantly, the 
structure  of  the argument  is  such that  it  would not  collapse even if  some of  its  
parts  were  to  be  wrong;  that  would  only  weaken  or  soften  the  general  
conclusion.  In  other  words,  the  inductive  mode  of  reasoning  implies  that  the  
argument is not only as strong as its weakest link, but instead, the different parts 
of the argument are converging evidence,  and  as  such  they  must  be  evaluated  
separately. 
A third and related issue concerns the generality and applicability of the 
argument. The examples are taken from financial markets regulation, so one 
might ask whether the conclusions can be applied to other areas of regulation. 
On  the  other  hand,  is  the  thesis  equally  strong  for  all  types  of  financial  
  27 
 
regulation, or is it valid for some only? These are interesting questions, which 
call  for  further  research.  I  would  be  inclined  to  opt  for  a  middle position: the 
argument  probably  can  be  generalized  into  other  fields,  too,  but  one  should  
enquire into further details. As regards different areas of financial regulation, 
there probably are some differences: essay 2 discusses that in detail. 
Fourthly, it might be argued that the inexactitude of the notion of more-vs.-less 
regulation lends itself to imprecise analysis, and as evidence of this we have the 
fact that, in the examples discussed in the essay, it is not always clear what “less” 
regulation means. Indeed, I make the point that I am inclined to favor something 
like  “narrow banking” or  even “100% reserves” on demand deposits,  and I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  the  existing  Basel  rules  on  capital  adequacy  are  too  lax  (a  
view  that  I  do  not  discuss  in  the  essay,  although  I  criticize  the  Basel  rules  on  
other grounds). I have also argued elsewhere that credit default swaps should 
perhaps be legally defined as insurance contracts, which would significantly 
limit their use (Juurikkala, 2011). Now, it could be argued that all of this implies 
that I favor heavy regulation in some cases. 
A brief response is as follows. For one thing, many of the reasons for holding 
those views have little or nothing to do with behavioral economics. Therefore, 
those views as such do not disprove the argument of the present essay, because 
that argument is about the relative effect of behavioral economics for financial 
regulation, not whether there should be financial regulation or not, all things 
considered. Whether the behavioral view weakens or reinforces the case for 
those views mentioned earlier,  I  have yet  to  investigate.  For  another  thing,  as  I  
argue in the essay, often problems in one area stem from overregulation in other 
areas,  and  frequently  one  (reasonable)  type  of  regulation  is  a  response  to  
problems caused by other (unreasonable) type of regulation. This reflects the 
classic  argument  that  interference  with  market  dynamics  (e.g.  by  way  of  price  
controls) causes “market failures” that have to be “solved” by further 
interventions (e.g. socialization of the means of production: see Mises, 1998, for a 
detailed analysis). 
There are many other possibilities for further research, too. One important 
task is to do empirical studies on  these  issues,  in  order  to  gain  more  accurate  
information  and  to  test  the  arguments  made  here.  For  example,  it  would  be  
interesting to see empirical studies on the matter of public choice vs. “behavioral 
bureaucrats”, trying to isolate the relative effects of different factors, for example 
by comparative studies of different institutions. 
Another question was mentioned earlier: could the analysis be extended to 
fairness behavior and moral psychology?  It  is  not  clear  how  the  analysis  would  
change, but certainly that perspective would add to the realism of the model. In 
fact, it might imply a critique of the model in this paper; highlighting cognitive 
imperfections is certainly a step towards greater realism, but assuming at the 
same time that  our  cognitively impaired actors  are  all  incurable egoists is hardly 
enough. Public choice analysis is one area which changes quite considerably if 
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we scrap the assumption of  selfishness.  Much work remains to  be done in  this  
field; essays 3 and 4 of the present dissertation are modest contributions to that 
effect. 
 
 
3.2 ESSAY 2: BEHAVIORAL PATERNALISM IN CONSUMER 
CREDIT REGULATION 
 
Many of the issues raised in connection with essay 1 are applicable to the other 
essays too. Therefore, in what follows, I will concentrate on differentiating issues. 
 
3.2.1 Objectives and Exclusions 
As  I  mentioned  earlier,  essay  2,  entitled  “Behavioral Paternalism in Consumer 
Credit Regulation”,  is  closely related to  the previous one and can in  many ways 
be seen as its continuation. If essay 1 presents arguments that are highly critical 
of the benefits of regulation and paternalism, essay 2 offers a complementary 
perspective, showing that a special type of paternalism may be reasonable, at 
least  in  the  area  of  consumer  finance.  As  I  have  pointed  out  earlier  in  the  
methodological section, this essay can be seen as falsifying the extreme 
interpretation of the previous essay (“less rationality implies less regulation 
absolutely”). What essay 2 tries to do is to go into greater detail on the potential 
benefits of a certain kind of paternalism, labeled “behavioral paternalism” (as it 
is inspired by the findings of behavioral economics). 
The  principal  difference  with  respect  to  essay  1  is  that  this  paper  has  a  
narrower focus, and therefore it has been possible to go into much greater legal 
detail.  In  the  essay,  I  explore  both  the  empirical evidence on  the  relevance  of  
behavioral economics in the field of consumer credit, and the existing and 
possible legal responses to those concerns in light of behavioral paternalism. 
In terms of exclusions, much of what was said in connection with essay 1 is 
relevant here, too. For example, the analysis only draws on the role of cognitive 
imperfections, excluding such aspects of behavioral economics as preference 
models and fairness behavior. 
Other exclusions include that essay 2 only discusses consumer credit markets. 
This is done both for pragmatic reasons and also because it is arguable that the 
model of behavioral paternalism is especially applicable in consumer credit 
markets. 
In this essay I draw on a range of legal sources from both sides of the Atlantic 
(United  States  and  European  Union).  I  have  chosen  not  to  go  into  the  national  
laws  of  European  states,  although  there  are  some  references  to  Finnish  laws  
when they seem especially relevant and there is no corresponding EU legislation. 
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3.2.2 Contributions 
Firstly, essay 2 presents a theoretical model of behavioral paternalism. It reviews a 
range of literature in Behavioral Law and Economics (BLE) and generalizes it 
into one model. It also assesses the applicability of that model in different areas. 
Indeed, one of the important issues discussed is whether the same model would 
be equally applicable to areas of finance other than consumer credit; it is argued 
that  probably  not  –  at  least,  not  with  the  same  force  –  because  the  special  
conditions surrounding consumer credit are such that the behavioral model 
seems to be especially relevant. In other areas, for example banking regulation, 
the  behavioral  model  does  have  its  relevance,  but  the  model  of  behavioral  
paternalism is less likely to be fruitful. 
The essay then examines the prospects for behaviorally-inspired paternalism 
by way of three types of regulation: information disclosure, default rules (opting 
out), and cooling-off periods. Each of these is examined in the context of (a) 
home loans or mortgages, (b) credit cards and (c) instant loans. It is found that 
there are substantial prospects for fruitful regulation along these lines, although 
in some cases (for example, cooling-off periods) it seems that the rules should be 
defined very carefully, because it is clearly possible that well-meaning 
regulations end up creating more harm than good. 
The benefit of examining more legal details is that this paper does not merely 
evaluate the general implications  of  BLE;  it  also  advances  a  model of legal policy 
along the lines of behavioral paternalism. Thus, the essay looks not only at 
possible regulatory solutions, but also explores existing laws in light of this 
perspective.  It  is  found  that  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  there  is  a  surprising  
amount  of  legal  rules  in  consumer  finance  that  reflect  this  kind  of  thinking.  
From the theoretical perspective, therefore, the essay advances both normative 
and “interpretive” or “explanatory” behavioral-economic analysis of law (the latter 
resembles  what  Richard Posner  calls  “Positive  Law and Economics”:  see  Ogus,  
2004: 383-385). 
Finally, I present criticism of the model of behavioral paternalism, drawing 
on earlier literature as well as novel arguments. I argue that some of the earlier 
critique is misplaced, but some skepticism is entirely justified. I also suggest that 
we should explore the possibilities of combining private-sector initiatives with 
light-touch regulation, or develop legal rules that foster the creation of helpful 
market-based solutions. This is because in most cases, there are potential 
benefits to all or most market participants from systems that help consumers 
make better choices, and private sector actors tend to be more innovative than 
regulators in devising such systems. 
In  fact,  the  issue  of  criticism  is  one  in  which  this  essay  makes  a  significant  
contribution.  The  reason  is  that,  as  I  see  it,  the  earlier  literature  on  behavioral  
paternalism has been far too sketchy: even papers by Cass Sunstein (the most 
important author within this school of thought) tend to be rather impressionistic 
in  terms  of  legal  details.  That  has  made  it  rather  too  easy  for  the  skeptics  to  
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criticize the proposals, because it is not very clear what really is being proposed, 
and, frankly, many of the examples given by Sunstein and colleagues have been 
unconvincing.  The  present  paper  provides  more  substance  to  the  idea  of  
behavioral paternalism, and that helps to evaluate more reasonably the debates 
on the merits of paternalism in legal policy. 
 
3.2.3 Limitations and Further Research 
In terms of weaknesses, the principal issue in essay 1 is the same one as in essay 
2: the argument relies on some technical issues that are subject to ongoing debate 
among experts. One such issue is the extent to which bounded rationality is the 
cause of the malfunctioning of consumer credit markets, given that other factors 
have played a role, too. 
In this essay I have attempted to consider those debates in more detail, and I 
discuss  some  of  the  empirical  debate  in  the  last  part  of  the  paper.  As  I  write  
there,  I  agree  with  some  of  the  skeptics:  there  is  a  tendency  among  some  
proponents of BLE (for example, Elizabeth Warren) to overstate their empirical 
case  and  to  rely  too  much  on  anecdotal  evidence  that  is  subject  to  a  range  of  
interpretations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  skeptics  sometimes  seem  to  go  to  the  
other extreme, downplaying even the stronger type of evidence. This 
phenomenon reflects the politicized nature  of  the  debate,  as  each  side  may  be  
motivated not merely by scientific curiosity but also by the political implications 
of the arguments. 
In any case, it seems to me that these uncertainties are not hugely important 
for the present essay. Ultimately, the case for behaviorally-paternalistic 
regulations  depends  on  the  empirical  evidence,  which  should  be  studied  
carefully before implementing legal reforms. Note, however, that I disagree with 
Cass  Sunstein  on  a  matter  of  principle:  he  writes  in  a  famous  paper  that  
“objections to paternalism should be empirical and pragmatic, having to do with 
the possibility of education and the likely failure of government response, rather 
than a priori in nature” (Sunstein, 1997: 1178); however, it seems to me that the 
burden of proof should be on those who argue for paternalistic legal policy, and if 
we do not have clear evidence, anti-paternalism is justified. 
In terms of further research, one big question is whether the model of legal 
policy advanced in this essay could be applied in other areas of law. It seems to 
me that it could, but the substantive case calls for a detailed analysis of both the 
legal and the empirical context. Likewise, the interpretive or explanatory model of 
behavioral paternalism could be fruitfully used in other areas of law. 
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3.3 ESSAY 3: SOCIAL NORMS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 
 
3.3.1 Objectives and Exclusions 
The third essay, entitled “Social Norms, Morality, and the Law: Regulatory 
Strategies”,  is  concerned  with  broadening  the  analytic  framework  used  in  
economic analysis of law, and challenging the “legal centrism” that is typical of 
legal scholarship. More specifically, this essay develops a social norms and 
morality-based view of  behavior  and  legal  policy,  a  theme  that  is  taken  further  
(from a different angle) in essay 4. 
This essay is a systematization of a range of recent literature that highlights the 
social importance of non-legal and informal sources of normativity. That 
literature is already significant, but it is also quite dispersed, and it is not 
entirely clear what it implies for legal policy. Therefore, my principal objective 
in the present essay was to attempt a synthesis of some of the literature and to 
create a more holistic model of legal policy along its lines. 
In  terms of  exclusions,  one question that  I  do not  discuss  extensively in  the 
essay is the normative issue. As I wrote earlier, the normative basis of this essay is 
quite open-ended in that the implementation of its proposals requires further 
concretization of  policy objectives.  On the other  hand,  the argument  also relies  
on commonly accepted social values along the lines of the notion of the common 
good. 
Also  in  this  essay  I  do  not  intend  to  expressly  challenge  the  validity  of  the  
perspectives relied upon (social norms, internal and moral motivation). 
Surprisingly,  I  have  as  of  yet  not  even  encountered  any  significant  criticism  of  
those perspectives. 
 
3.3.2 Contributions 
The  key  contribution  of  the  essay  is  the  model of legal policy drawing on the 
insights of the literature on social norms and intrinsic motivation. That model is 
a synthesis that I have divided into three types of legal or regulatory strategies. 
The first category is called alignment strategies. These refer to legal policies 
that seek to align laws with positive social norms and intrinsic motivations. I 
further  identify  a  range  of  possible  applications  and  examples  of  how  law  
should (a) be aligned with positive social norms, (b) be avoided if it seems to 
corrode valuable social norms, and (c) support positive intrinsic motivation. I 
also argue that this framework seems to favor the use of broad standards instead 
of narrow rules (a classic theme in Law and Economics that is further explored 
in  essay 4).  Finally,  I  argue that  the model  points  to  the importance of  cultural  
differences, and it provides an explanatory perspective  on  the  workings  and  
effect of law in different cultural environments. 
The second category of legal strategies is culture-building and habit-formation 
strategies. These are legal policies that seek to change social norms and moral 
habits  for  the  better.  Specific  applications  show  how  law  should  (a)  foster  
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cooperation by combining fairness with toughness, (b) use creative strategies to 
promote positive social norms, (c) use creative strategies to cultivate other-
regarding behavior, and (d) encourage good moral habits and protect the moral 
ecology of the society. I also point out some danger and challenges that this kind 
of legal policy entails; the theme is explored further in essay 4. 
Thirdly, there are enforcement strategies that  rely  on  social  norms  and  moral  
constraints to implement legal policy objectives. I argue that this may sometimes 
by advisable because it may both increase the effectiveness, and lower the costs, 
of enforcement. 
 
3.3.3 Limitations and Further Research 
The perspectives relied on in this essay have received little by way of theoretical 
critique. Such critique would, however, be helpful for the development of the 
theory itself, because there are obvious concerns about its practical application. 
The social norms perspective is, surely, very widely applicable, but it is also 
somewhat vague and it would be important to have more empirical research on 
it in a range of contexts. 
Another  limitation  of  the  present  essay  is  that  it  is  quite  generic,  and  
therefore it does not go into great detail on legal particulars. One possibility for 
further  research  is  to  look  at  the  examples  in  more  detail,  and  gather  more  
empirical evidence as well as legal data on existing policies that may reflect this 
kind of thinking. 
A  related  limitation  is  that  the  examples  given  in  the  essay  are  quite  
anecdotal, so that they may be insufficient for verifying the validity of the model. 
From a falsificationist perspective, they do have their role in giving plausibility 
to the model given here, which indirectly challenges the traditional, more 
simplistic (and less realistic) models of legal policy by showing the practical 
workability and applicability of a more realistic model. However, it would be 
interesting to formulate empirically testable theses and to evaluate them in detail. 
 
 
3.4 ESSAY 4: LAW AND VIRTUE 
 
3.4.1 Objectives and Exclusions 
The last essay, entitled “Law and Virtue: An Economic Analysis”, is a highly 
original  study  that  attempts  to  bring  further  realism  to  economic  models  and  
economic analysis of law by incorporating the insights of classical virtue theory 
into the behavioral  assumptions.  This  is  arguably the most  innovative essay of  
the dissertation, as it proposes an entirely new model of economic analysis of 
law. To be sure, the basic elements of the model are not original, as they simply 
combine classical virtue theory with modern economics. However, as I show in 
the literature review of the essay (discussing earlier economic models), there 
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have been practically no previous attempts to make a holistic model along these 
lines. 
In terms of exclusions, I do not discuss in detail the potential criticism of the 
classical virtue theory, although I do mention some recent critique as well as 
responses  given  to  it.  As  I  explain  in  the  essay,  that  critique  seems  largely  
unfounded, but in any case it would be an entirely different study to discuss the 
matter in depth. 
 
3.4.2 Contributions 
Essay  4  is  the  most  innovative  and  path-breaking  of  the  dissertation,  as  it  
proposes a novel view of economics and, by implication, of economic analysis of 
law. However, I argue in the essay that the classical virtue theory is in principle 
compatible with one interpretation of rational choice, and it resonates well with 
behavioral economics, so there is a possibility that this view could be absorbed 
into existing paradigms. 
The key contributions can be divided into two: those pertaining to economics 
proper and those pertaining to legal theory. Within economic theory in the stricter 
sense,  the  essay  includes  a  literature  review  of  virtues  in  economics,  and  finds  
that quite little of substance has been written earlier from this perspective. It also 
makes a comparison of the virtue-based behavioral assumptions with other 
models in economics, particularly the standard rational-choice model, the 
behavioral economics model and the notion of human capital. The comparison 
reveals interesting similarities and differences between the models, suggesting 
that  the  virtue  perspective  sheds  new  light  to  existing  frameworks.  Finally,  an  
analysis of the economic benefits of virtues is conducted, structured according to 
the classical notion of the cardinal virtues. 
In terms of economic analysis of law, the essay outlines a virtue-based economic 
analysis of law along two levels, labeled static and dynamic analysis. In the static 
analysis,  it  is  assumed  that  a  fixed  “level  of  virtue”  exists,  and  optimal  legal  
policy is studied across different dimensions of legal design. The analysis 
suggests that a high level of virtues should go together with (i) more freedom 
(fewer legal constraints), (ii) morally more demanding laws, (iii) more precise 
legal norms, (iv) broader standards as opposed to narrower rules, (v) lighter 
sanctions, and (vi) wider popular participation in law-making. The results are 
the  opposite  if  the  level  of  virtue  is  low  (i.e.  level  of  vice  is  high).  It  is  also  
examined how law-makers might deal with such problems as lack of 
information and heterogeneous agents. 
In the dynamic analysis,  the  focus  is  on  optimal  legal  policy  in  order  to  
promote  a  higher  level  of  virtues.  A  paradox  is  found:  on  the  one  hand,  law  
seems  to  be  necessary  for  the  practice  and  promotion  of  virtuous  behavior;  on  
the other hand, law may also be counterproductive in this respect. This suggests 
that law-makers wishing to promote virtues should take special care to identify 
the relevant factors and potential consequences of their actions. The analysis 
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also warns against legal perfectionism: it is important to acknowledge the limits of 
law  and  to  understand  the  subsidiary  role  that  law  plays  in  promoting  a  
virtuous society. 
 
3.4.3 Limitations and Further Research 
As  I  wrote  earlier,  this  essay  is  an  outline  of  novel  ideas,  and  naturally  much  
work remains to be done. The model present in the essay is a kind of experiment 
(i.e. a thought experiment) in the sense explained by Mäki (2005: 308), as it uses 
the method of isolation to work out the effect of introducing the notion of virtues 
into economic analysis. 
Several possibilities for further research can be identified. On the theoretical 
level, there is scope for further comparative investigation of the assumptions of 
neoclassical, behavioral and virtue-based economics. I write in the essay that it is 
probably possible to make a mathematical model along the lines of virtue theory, 
but, so far, it seems that no such model has been made successfully. Also, the 
deductive model applying the virtue perspective into legal questions could be 
extended and made more detailed. 
On the empirical level, further work could be done from a range of directions. 
One  of  the  big  questions  is  how  the  presence  of  virtues  could  be  measured  (I  
propose some possibilities in the essay). Another issue is to formulate 
empirically testable propositions that could be evaluated using sufficiently large 
measurement units and long time-spans. 
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Essay 2 
Behavioral Paternalism in 
Consumer Credit Regulation* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Behavioral paternalism is a form of legal paternalism based on the findings of 
behavioral economics. This paper examines behavioral paternalism in the 
context  of  consumer  credit,  looking  especially  at  the  markets  for  home  loans  
(mortgages),  credit  cards  and  instant  credit.  It  finds,  on  the  one  hand,  that  
certain aspects of existing consumer credit regulation in the US and the EU are 
best  understood through the lens  of  behavioral  paternalism,  and that  there  are  
many  possibilities  for  further  regulation  along  these  lines.  On  the  other  hand,  
the paper highlights the potential weaknesses of behavioral paternalism, 
including the fact that even light forms of paternalism may be costlier in practice 
than they seem on paper. It is also argued that the case for paternalistic policies 
should be empirically verified, not merely assumed, and that it is important to 
examine the potential for market-based solutions for helping consumers choose 
better. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Graduate Legal Research 
Conference, King’s College London, 15–16 April 2010. 
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 3 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Paternalism  is  here  understood  broadly  as  the  view  that  people  make  bad  
choices  more  or  less  frequently,  and  therefore  it  is  legitimate  for  the  state,  or  
someone  else,  to  intervene—even  at  a  cost  to  the  freedom  and  autonomy  of  
individuals.1 Naturally, paternalism is controversial. Many philosophical 
traditions place an absolute value on human autonomy (e.g. Kantianism), or 
hold that one should not limit liberty unless some harm is caused to others (J.S. 
Mill).2 
In economics, paternalism is unpopular. It is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the neoclassical model of economic behavior: standard, axiomatic assumptions 
about rational utility maximization and the identity between preference and 
welfare imply that people never make mistakes, in the proper sense of the 
word.3 Bad  outcomes  are  explained  by  external  factors  such  as  imperfect  
information, lack of competition, or weak bargaining power: interventions may 
be justified to correct these problems, but not to protect individuals from 
themselves. 
The a-priori-anti-paternalism of mainstream economics has been challenged by 
so-called behavioral economics, which combines economics and psychology 
(mostly  cognitive  psychology)  to  paint  a  more  realistic  picture  of  real  human  
choosing. The goal of the present paper is to critically examine the prospects of 
what  I  have  termed  behavioral paternalism.  Firstly,  I  discuss  the  meaning  of  
paternalism on a general level and outline different paternalistic proposals 
inspired by behavioral economics. Secondly, I analyze the practical prospects for 
behavioral paternalism in the context of consumer credit regulation. Finally, I 
                                                        
1 On the concept of paternalism generally, see Dworkin (2010). 
2 The obvious problem with Mill’s harm principle is that, as the saying goes, “no one is an island” and 
even private acts tend to create some externalities, sometimes very significant ones. Suber (1999) 
gives  a  long  list  of  supposedly  “harmless”  acts,  most  of  which  are  actually  capable  of  creating  a  
range of negative externalities, some of them more serious than others: “riding a motorcycle without 
a helmet, gambling, homosexual sodomy, prostitution, polygamy, making and selling pornography, 
selling and using marijuana, practicing certain professions without a license (law, medicine, 
education, massage, hair-styling), purchasing blood or organs, suicide, assisting suicide, swimming 
at  a  beach  without  a  lifeguard,  refusing  to  participate  in  a  mandatory  insurance  or  pension  plan,  
mistreating a cadaver, loaning money at usurious interest rates, paying a worker less than the 
minimum wage, selling a prescription drug without a prescription, aggressive pan-handling, nudity 
at public beaches, truancy, flag burning, duelling, ticket scalping, blackmail, blasphemy, and dwarf-
tossing.” The extent and relevance of the externalities is a disputed issue, but it is implausible to 
claim that they do not exist. 
3 One example  of  standard economics  taken to  its  extreme is  the  theory  of  rational addiction, which 
states that “addictions, even strong ones, are usually rational in the sense of involving forward-
looking maximization with stable preferences” (Becker and Murphy, 1988: 657). The theory of 
rational addiction is a plausible explanation of such “addictions” as love of opera, football or hiking, 
although it is doubtful whether they can be classified as addictions in the medical sense of the term. 
The  key  feature  of  addiction  properly  speaking  is  time-inconsistency, which renders it less than 
rational. See also Becker (1992) and, for a critique, Skog (2005). 
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advance both general and specific criticisms of paternalism, and try to make a 
synthesis. 
 
 
2 MODELS OF BEHAVIORAL PATERNALISM 
 
Before  going  into  practical  proposals,  let  us  look  at  some  general  conceptual  
issues as well as the different proposals for paternalism advanced in behavioral 
economics. 
 
2.1 General Considerations 
The economic, and indeed philosophic, acceptability of paternalism depends 
crucially on both (1) the claims made about the way in which people choose (and 
hence may need assistance in choosing), and (2) the proposals advanced for 
helping people choose better. 
In  terms  of  behavioral  claims,  it  is  not  enough  simply  to  assert  that  people  
make mistakes. Several questions should be asked: Do all people make mistakes, 
or only some? Do they make mistakes under all circumstances, or only in special 
settings? How significant in practice are  those  mistakes,  and  do  they  merit  any  
concern? Finally, what costs are created by intervening? 
The  last  question  is  intimately  connected  with  the  second  set  of  issues,  
namely the proposed interventions. In common parlance, paternalism is not 
always understood as helping people make better choices; it implies removing 
their freedom to choose entirely. It is therefore useful to make some general 
distinctions (see Dworkin, 2010). One is between hard and soft paternalism 
(coercive intervention, versus merely making sure the person knows what he is 
doing).4 Another distinction is between weak and strong paternalism (interfering 
with the means chosen by agents to achieve their chosen ends, versus 
preventing them from achieving their ends).5 
Paternalistic policy proposals do not necessarily fall neatly into these 
distinctions. It may be consistently argued that intervention should in most 
cases  be  “soft”  (e.g.  supplying  information),  but  in  some  cases,  for  example  
suicide, “hard” paternalism (e.g. physical coercion) should be adopted. 
Similarly, advocates of paternalism may generally favor “weak” forms of 
paternalism (focusing on facts, not values), but in special cases they may see it as 
legitimate to hold that someone pursues irrational objectives. 
                                                        
4 ”Soft paternalism is the view that the only conditions under which state paternalism is justified is 
when it is necessary to determine whether the person being interfered with is acting voluntarily and 
knowledgeably.” (Dworkin, 2010) 
5 “Another  way of  putting  [weak paternalism]:  we may interfere  with  mistakes  about  the  facts  but  
not mistakes about values. So if a person tries to jump out of a window believing he will float gently 
to  the  ground  we  may  restrain  him.  If  he  jumps  because  he  believes  that  it  is  important  to  be  
spontaneous we may not.” (Dworkin, 2010) 
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2.2 Paternalism Inspired by Behavioral Economics 
Paternalistic proposals made by behavioral economists can be generally 
characterized as being a type of weak and soft paternalism: (1) they focus on 
means, not ends, and (2) they seek to help people choose better by influencing 
cognitive perceptions, not by using force. This approach follows naturally from 
the principal message of behavioral economics: people commit cognitive 
mistakes which prevent them from making optimal choices. 
In behavioral economics, the human tendency to make suboptimal choices is 
often referred to as biases (see Rabin, 1998). For example, salience bias means that 
people  tend  to  give  too  much  importance  to  vivid  evidence  and  emotionally  
strong experiences, while giving too little importance to logical arguments or 
dry statistics. Optimism bias is  the  tendency  to  overestimate  the  chances  of  
personal success, while underestimating risks to oneself. Overconfidence bias 
means that people overestimate their ability to judge facts and situations 
correctly. Confirmation bias says that people often prefer information that 
supports their past decisions. Status quo bias denotes the tendency to want to 
avoid changing anything. 
Proposals for what I have termed “behavioral paternalism” have been made 
under a variety of headings. There is a common theme in all of them, but they 
also highlight different aspects and dimensions of the issue, which is why it is 
worthwhile to look at them in some detail. 
 
2.2.1 Libertarian Paternalism 
Probably the most influential proposal is the so-called libertarian paternalism 
advanced  by  Sunstein  and  Thaler  (2003),  which  states  that  we  should  “steer  
people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of 
choice”  (p.  1159,  emphasis  added).  The  way  to  do  that  is  to  influence  (or,  
manipulate) the decision-making context—or choice architecture6—so that people 
will end up choosing differently but they will continue to have full freedom to 
choose otherwise.  
For example, the state (or some other paternalistic actor) may regulate the 
way in  which relevant  information or  the different  options to  choose from are  
presented; given that the information-processing capacity of ordinary people is 
limited, presentation has an impact on actual choices. Or, there may be a default 
rule which will be followed unless the individual decides to opt out; given that 
people  tend to  hesitate  and are  often uncertain about  their  choices,  the  default  
rule  will  often  be  followed.  In  both  instances,  actual  choices  are  influenced,  
perhaps even significantly, but the ultimate freedom of choice is retained. 
The justification for libertarian paternalism is therefore two-fold. Firstly, it is 
argued  that  people’s  preferences  are  unclear  and  ill-formed,  and  whether  you  
                                                        
6 See Thaler and Sunstein (2009: chapter 5). 
6 
like  it  or  not,  their  choices  will  be  influenced by default  rules,  framing effects,  
and starting points. Secondly, the interventions proposed by libertarian 
paternalists are so light that they do not in any significant way violate people’s 
autonomy. 
The idea of libertarian paternalism is well summarized in a popular book 
that draws on their extensive academic work, in which the same authors 
propose the concept of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009: 6): 
“A nudge […] is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior  in  a  predictable  way  without  forbidding  any  options  or  
significantly  changing  their  economic  incentives.  To  count  as  a  mere  
nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not 
mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk 
food does not.” 
2.2.2 Asymmetric Paternalism 
Another proposal is that of asymmetric paternalism, proposed by Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003). This is closely related 
to the previous one in practice, but the theory is slightly different. Asymmetric 
paternalism builds on the idea that, in all likelihood, some people are better 
decision-makers  than  others.  In  terms  of  welfare  economics,  good  decision-
makers (people who know what they want and how they can get it) should be 
given more freedom, while bad decision-makers (boundedly rational “idiots”) 
should be treated more paternalistically: 
“a policy is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for 
those people who are boundedly rational while imposing little or no harm 
on those who are fully rational. Such policies are appealing because, even 
possessing little information about the frequency of consumer errors […] 
we can conclude with some confidence that the policy is on net beneficial. 
Taken to its extreme, pure asymmetric paternalism [which causes no 
harm to the fully  rational  types]  can only help consumers.”  (Camerer  et  
al., 2003: 1219, emphases changed) 
The authors are more modest than Sunstein and Thaler about the welfare-
increasing impact of their proposal. They note, firstly, that even if the freedom to 
choose  is  not  taken  away  completely,  the  implementation  of  asymmetrically  
paternalistic policies will involve some costs. Secondly, policies which 
presumably help consumers correct their errors will imply a net loss to firms, 
which  otherwise  would  benefit  from  those  errors;  of  course,  this  is  a  rather  
suspect reason for rejecting asymmetric paternalism. 
Given  that  paternalism  always  involves  some  costs,  the  advocates  of  
asymmetric  paternalism  propose  four  types  of  policies  “in  increasing  order  of  
departure from pure asymmetric paternalism—i.e., the increasing ‘heavy-
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handedness’ of the policy” (Camerer et al., 2003: 1224). These are (1) default 
rules, (2) the provision or re-framing of information, (3) cooling-off periods, and 
(4) limiting consumer choices.7 The appropriateness of these policies crucially 
depends  on  the  type  of  bounded  rationality  that  we  are  trying  to  correct.  The  
last type of policy is, of course, similar to more traditional product regulation, 
and usually is not asymmetrically paternalistic at all (the only example given by 
the  authors  is  the  imposition  of  artificial  deadlines  to  combat  procrastination  
bias). The other three will be discussed later in more detail. 
 
2.2.3 Debiasing through Law 
A third variation on the theme is the approach called debiasing through law. In 
their seminal article, Jolls and Sunstein (2006) analyze three types of judgment 
errors—optimism bias, hindsight bias, and self-serving bias in negotiations – as 
well  as  departures  from  expected  utility  theory—loss  aversion,  endowment  
effect, and framing effects. The crux of this approach is that, instead of using law 
to  influence decision-making generally,  law should be used in  a  more targeted 
way to mitigate the distortive effect of specific biases: “legal policy may respond 
best to problems of bounded rationality not by insulating legal outcomes from 
its effects, but instead by operating directly on the boundedly rational behavior 
and attempting to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it” (p. 200). The 
hope is that this, too, would help people make better choices without imposing 
significant costs or restrictions on them. 
Take, for example, consumer safety law (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006: 207–213). 
The traditional economic way of understanding the problem of consumer choice 
is  that  consumers  often lack information;  the solution is  to  provide more of  it.  
The problem is that, if people are generally too optimistic about product safety 
(underestimating the risks that something happens to them personally), accurate 
information alone will not be enough to yield optimal choices. Typical responses 
to  this  concern are  either  to  impose a  higher  liability  standard,  or  to  ban some 
products altogether; but these involve large economic costs. As an alternative to 
all these, Jolls and Sunstein propose “debiasing” strategies, which would 
“provide a sort of middle ground between inaction or the earlier 
prescription […] of providing more information, on the one hand, and the 
aggressive ‘insulating’ strategies of heightened products liability 
standards or outright bans, on the other. Strategies for debiasing through 
consumer safety law may be far more successful than the mere provision 
of statistical facts about average risks, and simultaneously far more 
protective  of  consumer  prerogatives  than  the  strategy  of  an  across-the-
board ban.” (p. 208) 
                                                        
7 It is, however, unclear whether default rules are less “heavy-handed” than behavioral information 
regulation: it really depends on the details of the case. 
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The principal method proposed by Jolls and Sunstein for debiasing against 
optimism bias is the availability heuristic. Psychology tells us that people tend to 
neglect dry, statistical information, whereas concrete, narrative information has 
a  stronger  impact.  Therefore,  the  law  could  be  used  strategically  to  expose  
consumers  to  concrete  instances  of  the occurrence of  the risk:  for  example,  the  
health  risk  of  tobacco  is  better  communicated  through  personal  stories  than  
impersonal warnings. 
  
2.2.4 General Assessment and Applicability 
I will offer specific criticism of behavioral paternalism in the last section of the 
paper, but now it is appropriate to clarify certain theoretical issues. One 
concerns the theoretical characterization of the approach, while the other has to 
do with applicability in different environments. 
In terms of paternalism theory, behaviorally-inspired paternalism is often 
“soft” and “weak,” but not necessarily. Firstly, many of the proposals embody 
coercive elements. For example, disclosure rules force lenders to act in a certain 
way, and cooling-off periods limit people’s choices. Indeed, it may be asked 
whether, in practice, it is possible for the state to intervene at all without some 
form of compulsion. On the other hand, the idea is that the intervention should 
be as light as possible. 
Secondly, the focus is broadly on the outcome of choice, not on the intricacies 
of  how the actor  perceives  the choice.  For  example,  it  is  not  enquired whether  
someone  might  take  a  highly  risky  mortgage  arrangement  simply  because  he  
“enjoys the gamble” (a question of ends, not means). Making a strong separation 
of  facts  and  values  in  human  choice  is  not  feasible  in  practice,  but  given  that  
behavioral  interventions  do  not  dictate  specific  outcomes,  they  leave  more  
freedom for those who have unusual objectives. 
One  of  the  principal  concerns  with  the  behavioral  approach  is  its  
applicability in different contexts.8 There  is  some evidence which suggests  that  
professionals do not fall into certain behavioral anomalies that are common in 
the population at large (List, 2003; Gneezy and List 2006). However, it remains 
uncertain how generalizable these results are: more empirical work is needed. 
What seems to be clear, in any case, is that the behavioral approach is especially 
relevant  in  those  contexts  in  which  there  is  a  lot  of  complex  information  and  
people do not gain sufficient practical experience to learn to avoid their biases.9 
This  means  that  behavioral  paternalism  is  likely  to  be  relevant  in  such  
contexts as consumer finance, because the financial issues related to mortgages, 
for example, are highly complex, consumers have relatively little knowledge 
and  experience,  and  they  may  not  gain  much  experience  mortgage  economics  
                                                        
8 For a study of context-dependence generally, see Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky (1996). 
9 Note that the path-breaking work in behavioral economics by Herbert Simon (1947) focused 
precisely on complex decision-making contexts. 
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even during their whole lifetime. In contrast, commercial mortgage borrowers 
probably are much more financially literate and skilful in choosing their lender 
and negotiating the deal.10 On the other hand, there are also many consumers 
who are quite knowledgeable and experienced. Therefore, the notion of 
“libertarian” or “asymmetric” paternalism is important: if possible, a regulatory 
intervention should abstain from significantly reducing their freedom to choose. 
 
 
3 PATERNALISM IN CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION 
 
This  and  the  following  three  sections  of  the  paper  discuss  light  forms  of  
paternalistic regulation in the context of consumer credit. The focus is on home 
loans  (mortgages)  and  credit  cards,  but  there  is  also  a  short  discussion  of  so-
called instant loans. I will refrain from advancing any major criticism, which is 
instead reserved for the last part. 
 
3.1 Rationale for Intervention 
The effects of limited rationality are especially important in the context of 
consumer credit (Elliehausen, 2010). Strong evidence is hard to obtain, but an 
important study by Campbell (2006) concludes that, although many households 
do make sound financial decision, a significant minority—especially those who 
are poorer and less educated—makes large mistakes that have serious financial 
consequences. Furthermore, it has been argued that home mortgages and credit 
cards are products the markets for which seem to suffer from significant 
imperfections, which in part are caused by the bounded rationality of consumers 
but which also exacerbate the negative effects of limited rationality (Bar-Gill and 
Warren, 2008: 33-43). Therefore, if it were possible to give consumers a helping 
hand without unduly restricting their freedom to choose, that would seem to be 
something worth pursuing. 
 
3.1.1 Home Loans 
There are many reasons why a helping hand might be welcomed by many credit 
shoppers. With mortgages: 
x the stakes are huge for ordinary people; 
x on the customer side there is little repetition and thus little opportunity 
for learning, and the feedback mechanism is so slow and complex that 
consumers may never understand what mistakes they made (Bar-Gill 
and Warren, 2008: 11-14); 
x many  people  understand  little  about  mortgages  even  on  a  theoretical  
level; 
                                                        
10 This fact lends support to the decision of the European Commission to restrict the newly proposed 
mortgage directive (discussed later) to consumer customers only. 
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x the choices are very complex and difficult even for finance professionals 
equipped with sophisticated software (see Shu, 2007); 
x the incentives of banks and mortgage brokers often conflict with those 
of  their  customers,  and  unsophisticated  shoppers  are  especially  
vulnerable  to  unhelpful  advice  (note  that  banks  and  brokers  for  
wealthier clients have stronger incentives to establish a good reputation, 
and  sophisticated  buyers  are  better  able  to  evaluate  the  quality  of  the  
advice they receive: see Bar-Gill and Warren, 2008: 17-20; Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009: 142). 
These concerns have been known for a long time, but the topic has become of 
increasing importance and interest after the recent global financial crisis, which 
arguably  had  much  to  do  with  problems  in  mortgage  markets  in  several  
countries.11 One interpretation is that the development of increasingly complex 
loan agreements made it difficult for borrowers to understand what they were 
doing, making loans appear cheaper and less risky than they really were: 
“Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than 
they  really  were,  because  of  low  initial  monthly  payments  and  hidden,  
costly  features.  Families  commonly  make  mistakes  in  taking  out  home  
mortgages because they are misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand 
the complicated terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgage, wrongly 
forecast their own behavior and misperceive their risks of borrowing. 
How many homeowners really understand how the teaser rate, 
introductory  rate  and  reset  rate  relate  to  the  London  interbank  offered  
rate plus some specified margin, or can judge whether the prepayment 
penalty will offset the gains from the teaser rate?” (Barr et al., 2008: 8) 
This  is  not  to  say  that  none  of  these  innovations  were  sensible.  However,  
much depends on the ability of mortgage shoppers to understand what they are 
being offered, and to assess the appropriateness of the various products to their 
personal  situation.  This  is  why  “libertarian”  or  “asymmetric”  forms  of  
paternalism might be the ideal solution: they would preserve the freedom to 
choose when people know what they need, while helping less sophisticated 
buyers to avoid deceptive products. 
Even excluding spurious mortgage innovations, studies in Europe indicate 
that consumers tend to have difficulties making optimal choices when taking a 
mortgage. For one thing, many people have borrowed too much: in 2008, 16% of 
European citizens reported difficulties in paying their mortgage bills, and 10% 
                                                        
11 On the global financial crisis and mortgages, see Gorton (2010) and Turner Review (2009). 
However, it is disputed to what extent the problems were fundamentally caused by mortgage 
markets: it can be argued that the misbehavior of housing markets was only one of the symptoms – 
albeit an important one – of too expansionary monetary policies as well as unsound inventions in 
structured finance. See Dowd and Hutchinson (2010) and Taylor (2009). 
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reported arrears (European Commission, 2011a: 4). More recent figures are 
likely to be worse, as the general financial situation has been deteriorating. 
Further, it has been found that 
“almost  38  %  of  EU  citizens  find  it  very  or  fairly  difficult  to  compare  
offers. […] Consumers also view the information provided as complex 
and  unclear;  59  %  of  EU  citizens  find  it  difficult  to  understand  
information  on  the  way  their  mortgages  work  and  the  risks  involved.”  
(European Commission, 2011a: 4) 
3.1.2 Credit Cards 
With credit cards, similar concerns abound. Both the use of credit card and the 
average level of debt have exploded in recent years. Consider the following 
summary from the US, made by Thaler and Sunstein (2009: 148): 
x “The U.S. Census Bureau reported that there were more than 1.4 billion 
credit cards in 2004 for 164 million cardholders – an average of 8.5 cards 
per cardholder. 
x “Currently, 115 million Americans carry a month-to-month credit card 
debt. 
x “In 1989 the average American family owed its credit card companies 
$2,697; by 2007 that number had grown to about $8,000. And these 
figures are probably too low because they are generally self-reported. 
Using Federal Reserve data, some researchers suggest that American 
households may have an average credit card debt of $12,000. At typical 
interest rates of 18 percent per year, that translates into more than $2,000 
a year in interest payments alone.” 
It  is  significant  that  the situation only seems to  be getting worse over  time;  
note that the numbers are from a time before the global financial crisis. It might 
be  submitted  that  credit  card  debts  are  soaring  because  that  is  what  people  
prefer:  they  like  flexibility,  and  they  are  only  happy  to  make  use  of  the  
advantages that credit cards offer. There is some truth in that, but there is reason 
to believe that it is not the whole truth. 
Firstly, accumulating significant credit card debt seems to be inconsistent 
with rational financial planning (Ausubel, 1991; but see Elliehausen, 2010: 24-
31). Alternative forms of credit offer better effective interest rates, so a rational 
actor that is planning to stay in a continuous debt of some thousands of dollars 
could, for example, take a small bank loan instead. As Lawrence Ausubel writes 
in  an  influential  paper,  “The  proclivity  of  consumers  to  borrow  at  these  high  
rates  suggests  a  substantial  breakdown  in  optimizing  behavior  among  credit  
card holders” (Ausubel, 1991: 71-72). 
Secondly, there are many psychological biases that operate in favor of getting 
into  credit  card  debt.  Salience  bias  implies  that  one  tends  to  give  too  much  
importance to the benefits of being able to buy something right now, whereas 
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the interest costs are not vividly experienced, especially as many borrowers plan 
to pay their credit card debt in full before incurring interest payments. A closely 
related issue is bounded self-control: projection bias induces consumers to take 
too much credit (getting the benefits now, paying the costs later), and 
procrastination bias hinders the ability of consumers to pay their debt in full as 
early as possible. Empirical studies have confirmed the existence of these biases 
and shown that their magnitude may be very significant: according to one 
study, people who were buying tickets to a baseball match were willing to pay 
twice as much if they could pay with credit card instead of cash (see Prelec and 
Simister, 2001). 
 
3.1.3 Instant Loans 
New technologies such as mobile phones and the internet have permitted much 
faster and cheaper processing of application for small loans. This has given rise 
to a new category of consumer credit, often labeled instant loans.  In  terms  of  
market  size,  instant  loans  are  a  marginal  issue  when  compared  to  home  loans  
and credit cards, and indeed, they seem to have attracted little academic 
interest.12 However, there is growing evidence that instant loans can cause major 
problems for individuals.13 
In terms of regulation, instant loans raise questions similar to earlier forms of 
small loans and pawn shops, but they also imply some specific problems. On the 
one hand, the argument in favor of contractual freedom is that small and instant 
loans  may  be  valuable  in  some  rare  but  real  circumstances,  and  the  pricing  of  
such loans will be fair in a competitive market (Masciandaro, 2001; Rougeau, 
1996: 16-19). On the other hand, it has been argued from times immemorial that 
usurious interest rates are damaging to high-risk customers who are induced to 
accumulate  too much debt  without  understanding the long-term harm of  such 
behavior (see Morris, 1988; Rougeau, 1996: 19-24). The contemporary argument 
for restrictions hinges mainly on the seeming irrationality of this kind of 
financial planning—the effective APR, taking all the fees into account, may be 
over 1000%—and the fact that certain cognitive biases may induce individuals to 
misunderstand the costs and risks embedded in the loan. 
The behavioral case against instant loans is bolstered by several factors. One 
is the selection problem: instant loans and other similar services attract individuals 
who are already in financial trouble. Often their problems are due to cognitive 
and  self-control  deficiencies,  which  imply  that  they  are  especially  likely  to  be  
misled by complex pricing and to overestimate their chances of paying the loan 
off early (we might call this the wishful thinking bias). 
                                                        
12 There has recently been some discussion of other types of small loans, such as payday loans (see 
Plunkett  and  Hurtado,  2011),  but  they  do  not  raise  the  special  types  of  behavioral  concerns  
associated with instant loans. 
13 In Finland, the issue has attracted significant public attention: see Jakobsson, 2008; Kaartinen and 
Lähteenmaa, 2006; Määttä, 2010; Valkama and Muttilainen, 2008. 
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The other behavioral problem with instant loans is that applying for one 
takes place very quickly and only requires a couple of clicks on a computer or a 
mobile phone. That means that self-control problems are  increased.  Further,  the  
process  is  entirely  electronic,  so  that  there  is  no  way  of  controlling  whether  
someone is making the application while intoxicated – —a condition under 
which people are prone to make bad decisions that they regret afterwards. 
One of the principal concerns with respect to instant loans is the special kind 
of adverse selection that takes place—that is, the psychological or behavioral 
adverse selection of the customers. Instant loans are principally used by people 
who  are  finding  it  difficult  to  take  care  of  their  personal  finances;  in  general,  
they are individuals who do not qualify for credit cards (which would offer 
much lower interest rates). This implies that instant loan customers are such that 
their ability to make sound financial decisions is particularly impaired, making 
them prey to misleading advertising and many behavioral biases. In terms of 
regulation, this means that the behavioral argument for paternalism is especially 
strong in the case of instant loans. 
 
3.2 Standard Responses 
There are two standard responses to these concerns. One is disclosure 
requirements. According to the rational choice model, people will make better 
choices  when  they  know  more.  The  trouble  is  that  merely  requiring  more  
disclosure may backfire—especially if the purpose of the regulation can be 
avoided  by  asking  applicants  to  sign  complex  disclosure  forms  they  do  not  
understand, or do not have time to read carefully (Ellinhauser, 2010: 31-33). The 
little empirical evidence that exists demonstrates that the current systems of 
disclosures are far from perfect; Ellinhauser (2010: 32) summarizes as follows the 
rather shocking results by Lacko and Papalardo (2007) on existing mortgage 
disclosures in the US: 
“For current disclosures, 87 percent of participants could not correctly 
identify total up-front charges; 74 percent could not identify charges for 
optional credit insurance; and 68 percent could not identify the presence 
of a prepayment penalty. Participants had problems not just with terms of 
complex mortgages. Fifty-one percent of participants could not correctly 
identify the loan amount; 32 percent could not identify the interest rate; 
and 23 percent could not identify closing settlement charges. Responses of 
subprime borrowers were similar to those of prime borrowers for both 
simple and complex loans.” 
These findings suggest that many individuals are likely to make bad choices 
when choosing their mortgage. But the standard response is extreme—product 
regulation, for example by banning some product features. It might be claimed 
that people are buying into harmful contractual provisions that make no sense—
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prepayment penalties, short-term ARMs (adjustable-rate mortgages) and the 
like—and therefore the exotic mortgages should be prohibited. But imposing an 
outright ban on innovative mortgages would stifle valuable innovation also, 
thereby harming many market participants in the long run. Seemingly unusual 
deals  may  be  perfectly  sensible  for  some  individuals,  such  as  those  who  are  
planning to sell the house in a few years. It is also unlikely that the prohibitions 
would be optimally specified, being over-inclusive or under-inclusive. 
As a third traditional response, usury laws may be relevant in some cases 
such as instant loans, given that the effective interest rates can be staggeringly 
high.  On  the  other  hand,  usury  regulation  is  rarely  workable  in  a  competitive  
market: high prices as such are not exorbitant if they reflect risks and other costs. 
For example, the processing and other administrative costs of instant loans are 
relatively large given the small size and short time span of the loan. Moreover, 
price controls may simply be ineffective for such complex products as 
mortgages, as Willis (2006: 817) points out: “loan instruments are so malleable 
that  any  limit  on  one  aspect  of  price  can  be  evaded  through  restructuring  the  
loan.” 
In light of behavioral economics, there may be better ways. Below I consider 
three broad strategies for helping consumers without taking away much or any 
of  their  freedom  to  choose.  The  first  two  strategies  are  variations  of  the  
traditional approaches (information disclosure and product regulation) but they 
have been adapted using insights from psychology. The third strategy (cooling-
off periods) is perhaps more innovative, but it may require more development 
to become genuinely useful, for reasons given below. 
 
 
4 BEHAVIORAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
 
The  disclosure  of  information  can  be  improved,  but  there  are  better  ways  of  
doing it than just demanding more of it.  People often fail to correctly interpret 
large amounts of information, and the way the information is presented has a 
systematic effect on choices. The problem with disclosure regulation is that there 
is usually too much information that consumers cannot make use of. The final 
decision  will  often  hinge  on  factors  that  financial  theory  would  consider  less  
important or irrelevant but that consumers mistakenly take as paramount, such 
as the size of monthly payments (see Barr et al., 2008: 2). 
 
4.1 Home Loans 
There are numerous possibilities for behavioral paternalism in home loan 
markets. Behavioral economics implies that regulations should not necessarily 
require so much disclosure of information, but the emphasis should be on what 
information is relevant and how it is presented (Camerer et al., 2003: 1230–1237). 
The  following  sub-sections  look  at  (1)  annual  percentage  rates  (APR),  (2)  
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standardized information sheets, (3) the disclosure of conflicts of interest, (4) ex-
post disclosure standards and (5) possibilities for countering over-optimism 
bias. 
 
4.1.1 Annual Percentage Rate 
Rules that stipulate the calculation and disclosure of the annual percentage rate 
(APR) are a prominent example of a widespread regulatory strategy that tries to 
simplify complex information and make it easier for consumers to focus on the 
most important things and compare different offers effectively. These rules are 
not perfect, because there tends to be some discretion and variation on which 
costs must be included in the calculation of APR, and indeed there are different 
opinions on what  is  the optimal  specification of  APR.  Nevertheless,  they are  a  
significant  help  to  many  consumers,  and  cause  little  ongoing  cost  to  creditors  
(implementation costs may be higher, however). 
In Europe, the rules for calculating the APR—or Annual Percentage Rate of 
Charge (APRC), as it is also called—have traditionally differed widely across EU 
member states, and some countries have not specified the matter at all (see 
London Economics, 2009: 168–174). Most countries have adopted a narrow APR, 
which covers  only those costs  that  the lender  levies  for  its  own benefit;  France 
alone has used a broad definition of APR, including all costs that the consumer 
must pay in connection with the credit (except truly optional costs). 
The recent Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) has changed the 
regulatory landscape in Europe by demanding full harmonization of the APRC 
calculation method, adopting a rather broad definition (see Article 19, and 
Annex I).14 That  directive  does  not  cover  home  loans,  but  a  new  Directive  
proposed by the Commission would include the same approach to home loans 
also (European Commission, 2011b). The principal argument for European-wide 
regulation  of  APRC  is  that  it  would  facilitate  cross-border  markets  in  home  
loans, as it would make it easier to compare loan offers from different countries. 
 
4.1.2 Standardized Information Sheets 
The development of more innovative and complex mortgages has significantly 
reduced the relevance of APR alone. Indeed, according to the impact assessment 
of the European Commission (2011c: 11–14), many problems in home loan 
markets are due to difficulties at the stage before the conclusion of the contract. 
Advertising information is often “non-comparable, unbalanced, incomplete and 
unclear,” while pre-contractual information can be “insufficient, untimely, 
complex, non-comparable and unclear.” 
The  proposed  EU  Mortgage  Directive  (European  Commission,  2011b)  uses  
wordings that reflect an unmistakable basis in behavioral economics. The 
proposal includes two elements related to advertising. Firstly, there would a 
                                                        
14 The attempt to harmonize APR specifications in the EU has a long history: see Soto (2009). 
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broad standard: “wording that may create false expectations for a consumer 
regarding the availability or the cost of a credit shall be prohibited” (Article 7). 
Secondly, the proposal stipulates standard information to be included in 
advertising: borrowing rate, annual percentage rate of charge (APRC), total 
amount  payable  by the consumer,  and so on.  But  this  is  coupled with another  
broad standard, which demands that these items be specified “in a clear, concise 
and prominent way by means of a representative example” (Article 8(2)). 
Moreover, the standard information “shall be easily legible or clearly audible as 
appropriate.” 
In  practice,  one  wonders  whether  these  broad  demands  will  have  much  
impact. Yet perhaps the more interesting proposal for facilitating better 
consumer choice is the European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS)  (see  the  
proposal in European Commission, 2011b: Annex II). It is an updated version of 
an earlier Voluntary Code of Conduct, drawn up by the Commission in March 
2001.15 According to the Commission, the implementation of the voluntary code 
has been “inconsistent and sub-optimal.”16 The proposal would make the use of 
the ESIS compulsory across the EU. Its objectives are (1) ease of understanding, 
as it summarizes all the important features of the contract, and (2) better 
comparison of  different  loans,  making it  easier  for  consumers  to  shop around.  
An extensive qualitative study of the proposed information sheet suggests that 
consumers  find  it  helpful  in  terms  of  clarity  and  transparency,  even  if  some  
difficulties remain (Optem, 2009). 
In  the  US,  similar  concerns  have  been  debated  both  before  and  after  the  
collapse of the subprime mortgage sector. Willis (2006) argues that the 
complexities of mortgage deals, combined with the financial illiteracy of many 
customers,  make  for  a  toxic  mix  that  has  been  ruthlessly  exploited  by  finance  
companies. She submits that the most effective regulatory tools would be those 
that, quite simply, make it easier for potential borrowers to compare different 
offers and thereby facilitate shopping around for better offers (Willis, 2006: 820-
828). The way to bring this about is to demand a simplified, standardized 
disclosure, more or less as the European Commission is now proposing. She also 
calls for a “chilling out” period to prevent premature commitment; that will be 
discussed separately later. 
Some changes in this direction have been implemented in the US, too, and 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, established in 2011, is investigating 
possibilities for making mortgage shopping easier. The new regulations of the 
Department  of  Housing  and  Urban  Development  (HUD)  require  all  loan  
originators to issue a new version of the good faith estimate (GFE) to potential 
borrowers. Among other things, the new GFE is completely standardized across 
                                                        
15 See European Agreement on a Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/agreement_en.pdf. 
16 European Commission (2011b: 4; see also 2011c: 14 and Annex 4). 
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lenders, and it aggregates all fees the lender is charging the potential borrower 
into one line entitled “Our origination charge.”17 Something  like  that  would  
seem  to  be  important,  because  up  to  now,  the  US  market  has  suffered  from  a  
proliferation  of  disaggregated  fees,  which  in  total  may  amount  to  as  much  as  
10% of the loan value, “presumably as lenders have seen them as an opportunity 
to increase revenues without encountering customer resistance” (Bar-Gill and 
Warren, 2008: 54-55). 
A more demanding proposal by Thaler and Sunstein (2009: 146–147) is to 
require lenders to provide a machine-readable “RECAP report”18. The report 
would include all the relevant data on fees and interest rates, including the role 
of  possible  teaser  rates  and what  the changes to  variable  rates  will  depend on.  
This data—which shoppers would acquire from a number of potential lenders—
could then be handed on to independent third parties who could offer better 
advice. In fact, well-designed RECAP reports might lead to the development of 
efficient online-shopping for mortgages. 
 
4.1.3 Reliance and Conflicts of Interest 
One concern is that unsophisticated consumer tend to make faulty assumptions 
to  justify  their  reliance  on  their  bank’s  advice  of  instead  doing  more  personal  
investigation; they may assume that the bank is offering them the optimal deal, 
that they would not be offered the loan unless the bank thought they would be 
sure  to  pay  the  loan,  or  that  in  any  case  the  regulators  are  protecting  their  
interests (see Barr et al., 2008: 5). This is one of the reasons why having too much 
superficial regulation may have a negative side-effect: unsophisticated market 
participants  are  likely to  believe that  they are  better  protected than they really  
are. 
On the other hand, empirically it is unclear whether consumers are so naïve 
about  lenders.  The impact  assessment  of  the European Commission (2011c:  18)  
summarizes research findings as follows: 
“in the UK, 35 % of consumers do not believe that banks treat them fairly 
and 32 % felt that they do not trust their bank to sell them products that 
suit their needs. Similarly, in Belgium, one out of every three customers 
does  not  trust  banks  and  less  than  50  %  of  the  customers  felt  that  their  
bank is acting in the interest of its customers. This loss of confidence can 
arise in a variety of ways ranging from irresponsible lending activities to 
the existence of gaps in the regulatory coverage.” 
These figures suggest that many borrowers are not likely to trust too much 
their  bank’s  advice.  Lack  of  confidence  is  not,  to  be  sure,  something  to  be  
                                                        
17 See Entitle Direct (2010) for a detailed exposition of the new Good Faith Estimate. 
18 From the words “Record, Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices”: Thaler and Sunstein, 2009: 
102. 
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pursued. The principal question is how to improve the conditions of loan 
negotiations by mitigating conflicts of interest. 
In the proposed EU directive on mortgages, there is one provision to this 
effect. The directive tries to reduce this lack of trust principally by improving the 
disclosure of information, but it also stipulates some additional rules for credit 
intermediaries (Article  10).  Among  other  things,  a  credit  intermediary  (i.e.  
mortgage  broker)  must  “provide  the  names  of  the  creditor(s)  for  which  he  is  
acting,” declare his directorship and ownership rights in the creditor(s), and 
disclose the fee “payable by the consumer to the credit intermediary for his 
services.” Thus the consumer would become better informed about the specific 
interests  and  incentives  of  the  intermediary.  This,  in  turn,  might  improve  the  
incentives of intermediaries to play fair and make it easier for customers to 
identify untrustworthy vendors. 
However,  the  effect  of  these  rules  is  limited  to  credit  intermediaries,  and  
hence they do not apply to creditor as such.19 One problem with this is that, 
when banks and creditors sell their mortgage deals to other investors through 
securitization or credit derivatives, they too are effectively acting as credit 
intermediaries as far as their incentives are concerned. 
 
4.1.4 Broad Ex-post Disclosure Standards 
Another  concern  is  that  the  existing  disclosure  requirements  still  do  not  
guarantee meaningful information, and effective compliance with the spirit of 
the  rules  cannot  be  externally  verified.  For  example,  there  may  be  too  much  
irrelevant information that hides what really matters, and compliance 
sometimes becomes a mere formality without genuine informational import: 
“Here’s the disclosure form I’m supposed to give you, just sign here” (Barr et al., 
2008: 6). Barr and others believe that these problems could be alleviated by 
moving from strictly ex ante disclosure regimes towards standard-based ex post 
regulation. That would focus on whether the disclosure was really meaningful 
and sufficient, using a reasonable person test (Barr et al., 2008: 6–7). 
In theoretical terms this proposal is not radical, because similar principles 
have been developed in general contract law. For example, the English “big red 
hand”  rule  holds  that  if  a  contract  term  is  particularly  onerous,  “[i]n  order  to  
give  sufficient  notice,  it  would  need  to  be  printed  in  red  ink  with  a  red  hand  
pointing to it—or something equally startling.”20 What the proposed disclosure 
                                                        
19 In the proposed directive, “credit intermediary” is defined as “a natural or legal person who is not 
acting as a creditor and who, in the course of his trade, business or profession, for a fee, which may 
take a pecuniary form or any other agreed form of financial consideration: (i) offers credit 
agreements  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2  to  consumers;  (ii)  assists  consumers  by  undertaking  
preparatory  work  in  respect  of  credit  agreements  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2  other  than  as  
referred  to  in  point  (i);  (iii)  concludes  credit  agreements  within  the  meaning  of  Article  2  with  
consumers on behalf of the creditor.” 
20 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163, per Denning LJ. 
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regime would do is to develop an analogous principle in disclosure regulation 
which,  in  itself,  goes  beyond the requirements  of  general  contract  law.  Indeed,  
the proposed EU mortgage directive would be a step in this direction, as it 
stipulates that pre-contractual information must be presented “in a clear, concise 
and prominent way by means of a representative example” (Article 8(2)). 
This approach has its problems, however (see Warren, 2006: 817-820). While 
a broad standard may encourage honesty, it also creates significant uncertainty 
costs. The classical common law concept of a “reasonable person” is a useful 
theoretical tool, but in many concrete cases its application is prone to such 
subjectivity  that  it  replaces  one  problem  with  another  (see  DiMatteo,  1997).  In  
light  of  psychology,  the  clarity  of  a  contract  may  be  easier  to  verify  after  the  
event, but the problem of hindsight bias can also distort  the judgment:  if  a  case  
goes  to  court  after  something  has  gone  wrong,  a  boundedly  rational  judge  is  
likely to infer that those events that did take place were more likely than they 
appeared to be to a reasonable person at the time of making the loan (see 
generally Rachlinski, 1998). Thus, much will hinge on external events, so that 
judgments  will  be  biased  in  favors  of  lenders  in  good  times  and  in  favors  of  
borrowers in bad times. 
 
4.1.5 Countering Optimism Bias 
Finally, there are disclosure requirements that are not concerned with specific 
contract terms but which merely warn the borrower of generic risks embedded 
in the transaction. For example, the US Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires 
lenders to inform borrowers as follows: 
“If  you obtain this  loan,  the lender  will  have a  mortgage on your home.  
You could lose your home, and any money you have put into it, if you do 
not meet your obligations under the loan.” (15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B)) 
Under the proposed EU directive on mortgages, the European Standardised 
Information  Sheet  (ESIS,  para.  14)  also  includes,  among  others,  the  following  
warnings: 
“Your income may change. Please make sure that if your income falls you 
will still be able to afford your [frequency] repayment instalments. (Where 
applicable) Your  home  may  be  repossessed  if  you  do  not  keep  up  with  
payments.” 
From  a  behavioral  perspective,  such  rules  can  be  seen  as  attempts  to  
counteract the ordinary optimism bias that most people are prone to. 
Highlighting risks puts people alert due to the common phenomenon of loss 
aversion (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006: 205–206). It would however be important to 
know how effective such statements are in reality. As Donald Langevoort (1995: 
880) points out, 
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“we can readily see why the law’s prized warnings and disclosure will so 
often have relatively little practical effect, especially if they are formalized 
into boilerplate. Investors and consumers want to think the warnings are 
meant for someone else, not them.” 
One can imagine more effective ways of debiasing optimism through law (see 
Sunstein, 2006: 261-263). For example, mortgage offers could be combined with 
statistical information about the amount of payment difficulties in similar types 
of  loans  over  a  specified  period  of  time.  On  the  other  hand,  generalized  
warnings tend to be ineffective, and customers underestimate the risk that they 
themselves will run into payment difficulties. What might be more effective is 
some tailored requirement of disclosing vivid information about real cases that 
have gone wrong (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006: 212–216). One must ask, however, 
how necessary all this is, and what the costs are. Besides, we do not want to turn 
people into overpessimists (Jolls and Sunstein, 2006: 213–214). 
 
4.2 Behavioral Disclosure for Credit Cards 
In many ways, the question of behaviorally inspired disclosure regulation for 
credit cards mirrors the discussion on home loans. Therefore, most of the issues 
will  not  be  repeated.  However,  there  are  some  differences  of  both  theory  and  
law. 
In terms of theory, the problems with mortgages are concentrated in 
cognitive issues (bounded rationality in the strictest sense), as home loan deals 
are more complicated than other forms of credit. Also the amounts of credit are 
significantly larger in the case of mortgages, which is another reason why that 
market has a stronger case for behaviorally paternalistic regulation. With credit 
cards,  cognitive  issues  are  also  important,  but  it  seems  that  many  of  the  
problems are due to bounded self-control, as some people are prone to take too 
much credit too easily (projection bias), and many fail to pay off their credit card 
debt according to an optimal financing plan (procrastination bias). These 
questions of bounded self-control receive more attention below in the context of 
default rules (section 5) and cooling-off periods (section 6). 
In terms of law and legal proposals for information disclosure, the issue is 
much in line with mortgages. As was mentioned earlier, the EU Consumer 
Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) imposes a full harmonization of APRC, following 
a  broad  definition  (see  Article  19,  and  Annex  I).  It  also  sets  out  a  compulsory  
Standard European Consumer Credit Information sheet (Annex II). This could 
be developed further along the lines of a Thaler–Sunstein RECAP report, which 
would consist in requiring credit card companies to 
“send an annual statement, both hard copy and electronic, that lists and 
totals all the fees that have been incurred over the course of the year. This 
report  would  serve  two  purposes.  First,  credit  card  users  could  use  the  
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electronic  version of  the report  to  shop for  better  deals.  (…) Second,  the 
report would make more salient to users just how much they are paying 
over the course of the year.”21 
This information would enhance the effective comparison of different service 
providers.  Note  that,  although  such  a  report  would  include  a  lot  of  data,  it  
would  cost  practically  nothing  to  produce,  because  the  companies  need  that  
data anyway for billing purposes. 
Barr  and  others  further  argue  that  credit  card  users  could  also  be  assisted  
with compounding and timing issues, which are difficult even for many 
educated people. A tailored disclosure regulation would focus on salient 
information  such  as  “how  much  long  it  would  take,  and  how  much  interest  
would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance were paid off only in minimum 
payments and card companies could be required to state the monthly payment 
amount that would be required to pay the customer’s actual balance in full over 
some reasonable period time” (Barr et al., 2008: 13). The provision of such 
information would be practically without cost, yet it might help financially 
unsophisticated consumers to focus on relevant facts. 
 
4.3 Instant Loans 
Instant loans are very similar to credit cards in terms of information disclosure, 
with the one practical difference that the effective annual percentage rate (APR) 
tends to be very high—even thousands of percents—for small loans, given that 
the administrative costs are so large relative to the loan amount. One interesting 
feature of the EU Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) is that, in addition to 
imposing standardized APRC calculations, it requires companies to provide a 
representative sample calculation in their advertising materials. Also, it is worth 
noting  that  the  Consumer  Credit  Directive  does  not  cover  amounts  below  200  
euros (Article 2(c)). However, some countries, including Finland, have 
implemented legislation which omits this exclusion (see Finnish Consumer 
Agency, 2009).  
It was explained earlier that the primary marketing target group of instant 
loans is such that the borrowers are likely to be financially incompetent. This 
implies that regulatory methods focusing on financial figures may be rather 
ineffective,  or  at  least  less  effective than in  other  contexts  such as  credit  cards.  
On the other hand, interventions aiming to reduce overoptimism bias—for 
example, by way of alarming anecdotes and personal stories—might be a 
worthwhile idea in this context. 
                                                        
21 Thaler and Sunstein (2009: 148–149). Similar price disclosure regulations can be found in other 
areas: for example, mobile phone operators in Finland are required to provide a detailed monthly 
breakdown of usage costs, including duration and total cost of calls to different operators; number 
and total cost of text messages to different operators; duration and cost of receiving calls abroad; and 
any other expenses. Unfortunately, the report is not electronic—that would be a major improvement. 
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5 OPTING OUT: DEFAULT RULES 
 
The  problem  with  ordinary  product  regulation  is  that  it  tends  to  go  from  one  
extreme to the other—from freedom of contract to restrictions and prohibitions. 
In  light  of  behavioral  economics,  a  more  nuanced  policy  may  sometimes  be  
better. Using default rules with the possibility of opting out, the law may be able 
to help people make better choices without fundamentally reducing contractual 
freedom. 
In neoclassical economics, default rules are a way of reducing transaction 
costs. The behavioral approach accepts this but adds something different.22 On 
the one hand, the status quo bias suggests that people tend to stick with default 
options unless the alternatives are clearly better. The anchoring heuristic, on the 
other hand, implies that even if a departure is made, it is usually “anchored” to 
the default rule, that is, it will differ less than without any starting point.23 
 
5.1 Default Home Loan Design 
With home mortgages, one could imagine a default mortgage deal (a “plain 
vanilla” mortgage)—or even a small menu of such mortgages—which would be 
specifically designed by an independent third party so as to avoid any hard-to-
understand details or complex interest rate calculations that exploit common 
psychological biases (see Barr et al., 2008: 8–11). The potential advantages of this 
approach are numerous. Such simplified mortgages would be easier to compare 
across different offers, reducing transaction costs to unsophisticated shoppers 
and improving the quality of their choice. They would hinder dubious 
innovation,  because  most  people  would  at  least  anchor  their  choice  to  the  
default option, which would be relatively simple and safe by design. The default 
rule would also function selectively in the sense that it would be especially 
relied  on  by  unsophisticated  customers,  who  feel  uncertain  about  taking  a  
mortgage.  In  contrast,  sophisticated  shoppers  would  be  free  to  explore  other  
options. Importantly, the “plain vanilla” mortgage would permit opting out, 
which may be entirely reasonable if, for example, someone’s circumstances or 
preferences clearly differ from the standard assumptions—or if the default 
mortgage is poorly designed (I will come back to that in section 7). 
There  are  several  questions that  would have to  be answered in  designing a  
default mortgage (or menu of mortgages). The fundamental variables include 
the loan term and the interest rate determination of the mortgage. The issues are 
                                                        
22 See Korobkin (1998a, 1998b, 2000) for extensive general discussions on default rules in light of 
behavioral economics. 
23 There may also be other reasons for the strength of default rules. For example, default rules will 
mean more certain legal outcomes if there are interpretation problems faced by imperfectly rational 
judges. See La Porta et al. (1998: 1121). 
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complex, but the basic question is: What would an average consumer prefer if he 
were capable of making an optimal choice? Some answers could be gathered 
from finance theory, and the default mortgage could be periodically revised by a 
relevant regulatory body, for instance using statistical and survey research. 
As an example, the longer the loan term, the larger the total interest paid. But 
this  tends  to  be  ignored  by  consumers  who  focus  on  the  size  of  monthly  
payments, so the default rule should stipulate a relatively short loan term. This 
would implicitly discourage too sizeable mortgages also. 
As to interest rates, mortgages in many European countries are 
predominantly  tied  to  variable  short-term  rates  (such  as  the  LIBOR  or  the  
EURIBOR). In the US, fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) have become the standard, 
but complex adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) have caused problems in recent 
times, and generally consumers do not seem to understand correctly under what 
conditions one alternative is better than the other (Campbell, 2006: 1577-1580). 
Variable  or  adjustable  rate  mortgages  may  sometimes  be  the  better  or  the  
only option, but generally they contain disadvantages to consumers. Firstly, 
they are unlikely to imply an efficient allocation of risk. Due to economies of scale, 
banks are better able to bear and hedge interest rate risk. They also have better 
access  to  relevant  knowledge  and  expertise  in  order  to  make  an  accurate  risk  
assessment. Secondly, consumers tend to be ignorant of the significant 
likelihood that short-term interest rates will change considerably over the lifetime 
of  the loan,  so  that  they underestimate  the risk of  rapidly rising interest  costs.  
Thirdly,  from  a  consumer  viewpoint,  unhedged  interest  rate  risk  also  tends  to  
coincide with macroeconomic downturn risk,  which  means  that  one  ends  up  
paying more while being more likely to be unemployed.24 Fourthly, complex 
ARMs often cause error costs, which consumers tend to pay without noticing.25 
The details of a generally optimal mortgage are somewhat disputed, but the 
consensus seems to favor either fixed rates, or variable rates indexed to inflation. 
Reviewing the literature, Miles (2004: 91) concludes that variable-rate mortgages 
(or ARMs) are riskier in terms of default probabilities, as they are more sensitive 
to  both  interest  rate  risk  and  changes  to  factors  such  as  payment-to-income  
ratios. Miles’ model results support this opinion, finding that under most 
specifications, households should prefer a very long fixed-term mortgage (Miles, 
2004: 15). Campbell (2006: 1586) also writes, summarizing earlier literature that 
“economists have often recommended mortgages that adjust interest and 
principal payments for inflation, thereby combining the best features of nominal 
FRMs and ARMs,” while more recently some “have proposed an automatically 
                                                        
24 On the issue of personal macroeconomic risk management, see Shiller (2004) for an extended 
discussion. 
25 A 1995 study by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) found that 50–60% 
of  all  Adjustable  Rate  Mortgages  in  the  US  contained  an  error  regarding  the  variable  interest  rate  
charged  to  the  homeowner.  The  estimated  total  amount  of  interest  overcharged  to  borrowers  was  
over $8 billion. See Renert (1995). 
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refinancing nominal FRM that would eliminate sluggish refinancing and also 
save consumers’ considerable costs of current refinancing procedures.” 
Given the theoretical criticism of typical variable rate mortgages, one 
wonders why they are so common. In the UK, one quarter of mortgages are 
have a fixed rate, but of only 2–3 years (which really means that it is more like a 
variable-rate mortgage); as few as about 2% of all mortgages are fixed for more 
than 5 years. Miles (2004: 17-21) discusses three hypotheses that could explain 
this, and concludes that the only convincing explanation is the psychological 
one, that is, “imperfect understanding of risks and of the likely profile of future 
interest  rates,  a  tendency  to  focus  on  initial  payments  on  mortgages,  and  a  
pricing structure that plays to that tendency” (p. 21). 
In  other  words,  behavioral  economics  would tell  us  that  the use of  variable  
rates makes it extremely difficult—impossible, really—for non-professionals to 
calculate the likely total cost of the mortgage. Given that the risks of variable 
rates are largely hidden (not salient), and that consumers tend to give too much 
importance to initial monthly payments, the market will in times of low short-
term rates be biased in favor of variable rates—especially if there is an even-
lower “teaser rate” at the beginning of the loan (Campbell, 2006: 1588; Miles, 
2003). 
Further,  it  turns  out  that  disclosure  rules  may  also  influence  the  choice  
between fixed and variable rate mortgages. Miles (2004: 38-40) explains that in 
the UK (where there is practically no market for long-term fixed rate mortgages) 
the APR is calculated under the assumption that interest rates will not change 
during the life of the loan. But in times of expected increases to interest rates (an 
upward-sloping yield curve), the APR will understate the real expected costs of 
the  mortgage,  and  unsophisticated  consumers  will  only  pay  attention  to  the  
APR in comparing different offers. That causes a suboptimal bias towards 
variable rate mortgages when the spot rates are low. As a partial solution, Miles 
(2004: 39) submits that “[a] potentially more informative measure of APR could 
be  calculated  based  on  expected  interest  rates  over  the  life  of  the  debt.  This  
would provide a better figure for comparing the likely cost of variable-rate 
mortgages with fixed-rate mortgages; it could be used instead of, or in addition 
to, the standard APR. Such a figure could be based on the forward rates implied 
by the yield curve.” However, the costs of providing such APR figures might be 
significant,  and  it  also  might  cause  more  confusion  to  consumers,  as  there  is  
evidence that they already misunderstand the meaning of APR figures. 
The  issue  is  even  more  complicated.  In  an  efficient  market,  variable  rate  
mortgages may be cheaper on average, because borrowers bear the interest rate 
risk. For this reason, some commentators have argued that variable rates are the 
better choice for many consumers (Milevsky, 2001).26 In  terms  of  regulation,  
                                                        
26 Note  however  that  Milevsky’s  study uses  Canadian data  in  which the  “fixed rate”  refers  to  a  5-
year mortgage rate. That reflects the fact that longer fixed rate mortgages are not available in all 
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contentious matters could be overcome by a compromise solution, for example 
creating two different “plain vanilla” mortgages, one variable and one fixed rate 
(perhaps labeled “riskier” and “safer” respectively, so as to nudge in favor of the 
latter). The former should in any case avoid any complex mechanisms—such as 
teaser rates and bullet or balloon payments—that confuse unsophisticated 
customers and exploit cognitive quirks. 
It may be argued that the approach taken here is still too simplistic: it is not 
sensible to create any standard design, because people have different 
preferences. That criticism should not be accepted too easily, because people’s 
risk preferences and house purchase plans do not differ very much, and even a 
simplistic default rule would serve as a useful anchoring device for less 
sophisticated buyers. On the other hand, the critique points towards innovative 
improvements. Namely, it may be possible to develop “smart defaults,” such as 
a standardized formula that creates a customized default mortgage based  on  key  
borrower  characteristics,  including  age,  income,  family  situation,  and  other  
personal finance factors (see Barr et al., 2008: 10–11). Indeed, it seems likely that 
the  optimal  “safe  and  simple”  mortgage  depends  on  many  factors,  such  as  
whether one is buying the first home as a young father of many children and no 
savings, or acquiring a house in the country for retirement purposes. Note, for 
example, that Milevsky (2004) finds that, even if a variable rate is often better 
according to his model, a first-time homebuyer should nevertheless lock in at a 
fixed rate. 
One concern is that the default mortgage contract would have little effect in 
practice  if  there  are  strong  incentives  for  lenders  and  brokers  to  provide  
different deals. However, there are many implementation possibilities. In one 
extreme, it would be compulsory for lenders to lay out the default deal in all its 
detail before presenting alternative offers. This would increase the salience of 
the default plan and create a strong anchoring effect with respect to the 
alternatives.  The  disadvantage  is  that  transaction  costs  would  be  increased  for  
those  who  are  only  interested  in  the  other  offers.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  
default mortgage strategy is adopted along with the RECAP disclosure regime 
(discussed earlier), and if online mortgage shopping emerges as a result, then 
transaction costs of taking a mortgage are reduced, too. 
                                                                                                                                         
markets.  Campbell  (2006:  1586)  argues  that  the  existence  of  different  standards  across  countries  is  
puzzle that is probably due to the existence of unsophisticated consumers: “unsophisticated 
households  tend  to  use  whatever  financial  contracts  are  standard  in  a  particular  country,  possibly  
because  they  follow  the  lead  of  relatives  and  neighbors.  It  is  expensive  for  would-be  financial  
innovators to reach such households, particularly if they need to explain a complex new financial 
product.” Furthermore, the incentives to offer new products to sophisticated clients may be weak, 
because “existing products often involve a cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated households. A 
refinanceable FRM, for example, offers a low rate in part because many households do not optimally 
refinance. Sophisticated households gain by pooling with naive households, and will not be 
attracted to a new mortgage if it is only taken up by other sophisticated households.” 
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Barr  and  others  have  speculated  with  the  idea  of  making  the  default  rules  
“stickier” by imposing different interpretative principles applicable to default 
and alternative contracts, so that the latter would imply additional legal 
exposure for  lenders  through increased scrutiny (Barr  et  al.,  (2008:  8–11).  How 
that might work in practice is difficult to tell, but in principle there is nothing 
unusual  about  a  law that  combines  narrow rules  and broad standards.  On the 
other hand, it would be useful to test the idea in a simpler fashion before adding 
complications that may not be needed. 
 
5.2 Default Credit Card Rules 
Something similar could be developed for credit cards. It has been argued that 
credit card product offerings are systematically designed to exploit common 
behavioral biases (Bar-Gill, 2004). Many consumers underestimate how much 
they will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay on time. Credit card bills 
may also encourage the accumulation of debt by highlighting the minimum 
payment, which then serves as an anchor even though it is normally just a small 
proportion of the total bill. The pricing of credit cards is moreover set to benefit 
from late payment, creating an incentive for companies to try to get their clients 
deeper into debt (Mann, 2007). 
A possible help to consumers—at least to those who are subject to bounded 
rationality and bounded willpower—would be to develop suitable default rules 
(Barr et al., 2008: 13–15). These would govern all credit card contracts except 
those  in  which  the  customer  specifically  chooses  otherwise.  For  example,  the  
default contract would be simple and straightforward, with no teaser rates and 
other complications. It would also require consumers to pay off their existing 
balance automatically in a short period of time. 
The law could also require that all credit cards allow clients to set up 
automatic payment of the entire bill; many credit card users could pay it in full, 
but tend to forget or ignore it and end up paying high interest (see Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009: 149–150). Some creditors allow the automatic payment of the 
entire  bill,  while  others  permit  you  only  to  pay  automatically  if  you  pay  the  
minimum amount. The latter case is sub-optimal from a behavioral point of view, 
because it prevents behaviorally astute borrowers from opting into bias-
reducing devices. 
People may have very different situations and preferences, and the law 
should not restrict their freedom to choose what suits them best. A well-
designed default credit card would, however, help many consumers by 
providing a safe and simple card. It would also serve as an anchor that hinders 
going  over  the  top  with  exotic  features.  As  with  mortgages,  the  possibility  of  
developing “smart defaults” is also worth investigating. 
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5.3 Default Rules for Instant Loans 
Default  rules  may  not  be  so  relevant  in  the  case  of  instant  loans,  because  the  
terms of  such loans are  already quite  straightforward.  Moreover,  the  nature of  
the  market  is  such  that  the  lenders  tend  to  use  standard-form  adhesion  
contracts, because the small size of the loans would make individual 
negotiations prohibitively expensive. Therefore, if regulation is deemed 
necessary to  avoid abusive contract  terms,  it  is  probably necessary to  resort  to  
stronger forms of product regulation, not default rules. 
 
 
6 COOLING OFF 
 
Cooling-off periods play an important role in consumer protection laws (Haupt, 
2003: 1147–1151). There are at least three broad justifications for them (Haupt, 
2003: 1147–1148, and references cited therein). One is informational asymmetries, 
especially in distance transactions (where prior inspection is impossible) and in 
connection with so-called experience and credence goods and services (which 
cannot be properly evaluated before use). The second justification is situational 
monopolies such as  door-to-door selling where consumers  are  wrongly brought  
to  believe  that  seeking  alternatives  would  be  too  costly  (Sunstein  and  Thaler,  
2003: 1188). Thirdly, cooling-off periods may be helpful if problems are caused 
by lack of self-control and appropriate rational deliberation (see also Camerer et 
al., 2003: 1238–1247). 
There are thus different possible justifications for cooling-off periods, ranging 
from standard economics to behavioral economics. Thus, Sunstein and Thaler 
(2003: 1188) write that 
“mandatory cooling-off periods make best sense, and tend to be imposed, 
when two conditions are  met:  (1)  people  are  making decisions that  they 
make  infrequently  and  for  which  they  therefore  lack  a  great  deal  of  
experience, and (2) emotions are likely to be running high. These are the 
circumstances—of bounded rationality and bounded self-control 
respectively—in which consumers are especially prone to making choices 
that they will regret.” 
In  consumer protection laws,  cooling-off  periods normally  take the form of  
withdrawal periods or cancellation rights within  a  specified  time  period.  In  
economic terms, these can be called ex post cooling-off periods. There are also ex 
ante cooling-off periods, i.e. waiting periods, during which the transaction cannot 
be finalized. 
In practice the difference between ex ante and ex post regulations may be 
small,  but  generally  waiting periods are  more intrusive.  On the other  hand,  ex 
ante waiting periods may sometimes be better for sellers in that there is no risk 
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of ex post opportunistic behavior. Note also that, in light of status quo bias and 
the endowment effect, waiting periods are likely to have a stronger behavioral 
effect than withdrawal periods, because people are reluctant to withdraw from a 
trade they have already entered into, especially if they are in possession of the 
good or benefit (Haupt, 2003: 1149; see also Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 
1990, discussing empirical evidence on the endowment effect). 
 
6.1 Home Loans 
Cooling-off periods are not common in personal finance regulation, but some 
examples  can be found in existing laws.  In  light  of  the two criteria  of  Sunstein 
and Thaler (2003: 1188), cooling-off periods in taking a mortgage would seem 
justified on the basis of infrequency and lack of experience, and it is possible that 
many imprudent borrowers have been heavily influenced by transitory 
emotions provoked by a personal financial crisis or a manipulative salesperson. 
Commentators such as Willis (2006: 823-824) have argued for more extended 
chilling-out periods for mortgages. She points out that a cooling-off or chilling-
out period is an important accompaniment to behaviorally-motivated disclosure rules, 
because consumers need time to consider the offer and shop around. Also, there 
should not be significant application fees, because otherwise people will be 
reluctant to shop around and may become psychologically committed to the first 
offer due to loss aversion bias. To further encourage detachment from the initial 
offer, Willis even proposes an explicit pro-shopping declaration in the 
mandatory disclosure sheet: 
“My proposed language is: ‘It is possible that this loan is not the lowest 
priced available. This paper is the Price Tag for this loan. You should use 
it to shop with other lenders or brokers for the best loan at the best price, 
just as you would for any major purchase.’;  and a non-too-subtle double 
entendre, ‘Time to go shopping!’” (Willis, 2006: 824, footnote 462)  
Note that the regulation of application fees is  a  kind  of  ex post right-of-
cancellation regulation, and it influences the extent to which consumers are 
committed  to  the  deal  from  the  start.  Another  ex post cooling-off rule is the 
regulation of refinancing or early repayment:  if  borrowers  can  opt  for  a  new  deal  
without incurring significant penalties, they are effectively enabled to cancel the 
original deal. 
In Europe, the proposed EU mortgage directive (European Commission, 
2011b) includes some features related to cooling off. Perhaps the most 
interesting of them is the broad ex ante cooling-off standard in Article 9(2) of the 
proposal: 
“Member States shall ensure that when an offer binding on the creditor is 
provided to the consumer, it shall be accompanied by an ESIS. In such 
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circumstances, Member States shall ensure that the credit agreement cannot 
be concluded until the consumer has had sufficient time to compare the offers, 
assess their implications and take an informed decision on whether to accept an 
offer, regardless of the means of conclusion of the contract.” (Emphasis 
added) 
In terms of ex post regulation, article 18 requires that member states provide 
consumers  with  a  right  to  early  repayment;  the  exercise  of  this  right  may  be  
subject to certain conditions, and creditors should be entitled to fair 
compensation, but these conditions must not render the exercise of the right 
“excessively difficult or onerous for the consumer”. Further, in accordance with 
the earlier Doorstep Selling Directive (85/577/EEC), consumers “should have a 
right  of  withdrawal  for  credit  agreements  relating  to  residential  immovable  
property concluded off-premises and should be informed about the existence of 
that right” (European Commission, 2011b: preamble 13). 
In the US, the Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act 2008 tries to improve 
consumer choice through a strict ex ante cooling-off rule known as the “3/7/3 
Rule.” Within three business days after receipt of the loan application, an initial 
good faith estimate (GFE) disclosure must be provided. Next, a seven business 
day waiting period follows during which the borrower is not permitted to close. 
Finally,  the  borrower  must  receive  an  accurate  annual  percentage  rate  (APR)  
calculation at least three business days prior to closing. If the final APR is off by 
more  than  0.125%  from  the  initial  GFE  disclosure,  then  the  lender  must  re-
disclose and wait another three business days before closing on the transaction. 
It would be interesting to see an empirical study of how, if at all, these rules 
have  influenced  behavior,  and  what  the  costs  are.  Also,  if  the  proposed  EU  
directive is approved, empirical comparative studies would be very helpful for 
better understanding the effects of different approaches. 
 
6.2 Credit Cards 
With credit cards, self-control problems may be one factor contributing to the 
accumulation of credit card debt. If that is correct, then cooling-off regulations 
might be relevant. On the other hand, the issues of complexity and infrequency 
are not so much present in this context, so the case for cooling-off is weaker than 
with mortgages. 
The principal challenge to cooling-off rules with credit cards is a practical 
one, because it is not clear how to design a cooling-off regulation that effectively 
mitigates problems without creating significant costs. Typically there are general 
consumer-protection type withdrawal-periods applicable to credit card loans, 
but they have little practical relevance, because credit card debt is taken at the 
moment of purchase, and some purchases cannot be cancelled because the 
goods in question are immediately consumed. In other cases, when the purchase 
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can be cancelled, the endowment effect tends to reduce the likelihood of people 
going back to the shop and returning the product. 
Compulsory  waiting  periods  would  have  a  stronger  effect,  but  they  would  
create significant transaction costs—at least psychic costs—because the principal 
advantage of credit cards is that they enable consumers to buy something with 
credit  on  the  spot.  And  if  the  waiting  period  is  very  short,  then  the  effect  
evaporates. 
What might be worth investigating is the use of customized controls to credit 
card usage. These customized limits could be set or re-set by the card user, or by 
other  relevant  persons,  such as  a  young person’s  parents,  or  spouses  together.  
The limits could be determined on the basis of purchase type, amount, and 
timing. For example, a person who has alcohol problems could set limits on the 
amounts of alcohol or related products that can be bought with the credit card. 
Likewise, night-time purchases could be limited or prohibited, or made subject 
to  a  waiting  period.  There  may  be  some  practical  challenges,  but  the  
development of technology would help to overcome them. 
In terms of paternalism theory, this kind of voluntary mechanism would not 
be a question of forcefully limiting the freedom to choose; rather it is an example 
of facilitating the provision of self-control mechanisms whereby imperfectly 
rational and imperfectly self-controlled actors can opt into bias-reducing devices. 
Such  mechanisms  may,  of  course,  be  provided  by  the  market  without  any  
regulatory intervention. The case for regulation hinges of the argument that 
lenders  may  not  have  sufficient  incentives  to  develop  such  services,  because  
they profit significantly from borrowers who have difficulties controlling their 
use of credit, while the benefits (in terms of customer loyalty) of better service 
may be small. 
 
6.3 Instant Loans 
In the case of instant loans, cooling-off regulations may be especially justified in 
light of self-control problems. In this case, as with credit cards, an ex post right of 
cancellation exist as part of general consumer protection laws. It turns out that 
this is economically problematic, because it enables opportunistic behavior by 
borrowers (assuming that they know their legal rights). 
According  to  the  statutory  consumer  protection  laws  that  are  in  place  in  
many countries, early repayment or loan cancellation has to be compensated to 
the lender in accordance with the APR of the loan contract. The APR is higher if 
the  contractual  loan  period  is  shorter  and  lower  if  the  loan  period  is  longer,  
because the APR includes the fixed administrative fees. The result is that if one 
wants  to  take  a  very  short-term  loan,  it  is  better  to  take  a  longer-term  instant  
loan, cancel it within the cancellation period (14 days in many countries), and 
repay the loan together with the relevant interest after the statutory repayment 
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period (usually 30 days).27 The  compensation  for  the  cancellation  and  the  
repayment  delay is  only the APR of  the initial  contract.  The result  is  a  loan of  
more than a month, but with an APR corresponding to a longer-term contract. 
Ex ante waiting periods may be more relevant in terms of helping people 
avoid getting imprudently into debt. Naturally they cannot be very long without 
entirely transforming the concept of instant loans. One option is to target the 
waiting period to specific problems such as night-time drinking. In Finland, for 
example, a consumer loan applied for between 11pm–7am can only be received 
after 7am.28 
Another possibility—which could be used either separately or in conjunction 
with the night-time waiting period—is a minimum waiting period of 1–2 hours 
at any time; during this time period the borrower could also receive notification 
of the principal costs and risks of the loan. A further modification that could be 
added is that the loan agreement would have to be specifically confirmed by the 
consumer  after  the  waiting  period  (as  opposed  to  a  right  to  cancel  the  loan  
during the waiting period); this might reduce the psychological commitment as 
the default  rules  would be such that  the loan is  cancelled if  it  is  not  expressly  
confirmed. 
Personalized or customized borrowing limits might also be useful, but their 
implementation would be more complicated. Given that the market for instant 
loans is generally not based on longer-term contracts, this kind of arrangements 
would probably cause relatively high costs. 
 
 
7 CRITICISM AND IMPROVEMENTS 
 
Paternalistic proposals inspired by behavioral economics have met with a range 
of  criticism.  Some  commentators  argue  that  the  behavioral  approach  is  too  
flawed and obscure to yield a workable analytical model (Posner, 1998). Some 
go so far as to claim that the supposed mistakes made by people are not really 
mistakes at all (Mitchell, 2002, 2003). Others accept the critique of neoclassical 
economics at least in part, but disagree on the policy implications (Glaeser, 2006; 
Klick and Mitchell, 2006). In what follows, I will try to address some of the more 
plausible criticisms and discuss some general ways in which behaviorally 
paternalistic policies might be improved. 
 
                                                        
27 See for example Finnish Consumer Protection Act 7:20. 
28 Consumer  Protection  Act  7:19.  Määttä  (2010:  277)  points  out  that  a  bright-line  rule  like  this  one  
may be both over-inclusive (some  borrowers  may  reasonably  need  the  money  at  night)  and  under-
inclusive (some  may  unreasonably  apply  before  11pm,  or  indeed  be  intoxicated  during  the  day).  
However,  it  is  not  possible  to  create  a  workable  flexible  standard  in  this  case.  See  more  generally  
Kaplow (2000). 
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7.1 General Criticism of Paternalism 
The claim that behavioral economics is entirely unfounded is hardly plausible 
(see Rachlinski, 2003, for a detailed discussion). There are, however, many 
important general arguments against paternalistic regulation. 
One criticism, addressed particularly against Cass Sunstein and colleagues, 
is that it is conceptually misleading to talk about “libertarian paternalism” (Hill, 
2007; Mitchell, 2005). While it may be the case that sometimes paternalistic 
policies  are  good,  they  always  imply  that  the  regulators  know  better  what  
people  need,  and they always limit  personal  autonomy in some way.  Sunstein 
and Thaler (2003: 1171) try to argue that paternalism is “inevitable” because 
there are always default options and framing effects; but the examples they 
provide are hardly convincing. In practice, only a small proportion of 
behaviorally inspired paternalistic policies are somehow inevitable. Therefore, 
the notion of “libertarian paternalism” is problematic, whereas “behavioral 
paternalism” seems more accurate, because it builds explicitly on the idea that 
people make mistakes and they may need assistance in order to choose better. 
A second issue concerns the ability of people to learn to avoid their mistakes, 
to adopt behavioral strategies for mitigating mistakes, and to delegate decision-
making  to  persons  equipped  with  better  judgment  (Epstein,  2006;  Rachlinski,  
2003).  This  is  a  major  issue,  which  has  already  been  touched  upon  earlier  to  
some extent. The difficult task is that of identifying when and how people learn 
to choose better and whether they are able to look for the right assistance. In any 
case, this is not really an argument against behavioral paternalism as such. 
Paternalism may be practiced in the private sphere, too, and public intervention 
may  be  needed  to  correct  lack  of  learning  and  inappropriate  delegation  of  
decision-making. For example, in home loan markets people often delegate 
some of the judgment to the bank or mortgage broker; but this is usually not the 
ideal arrangement because of strongly conflicting interests. 
Thirdly, some commentators have raised the concern that behavioral 
paternalism will result in a flood of new regulations, which seem light and low-
cost when considered in isolation, but which together impose a significant 
regulatory burden (Ginsburg and Wright, 2012; Whitman and Rizzo, 2007). This 
slippery slope argument is  not  mere scaremongering,  but  is  a  valid concern.  The 
legal interventions proposed earlier have the disadvantage that they may seem 
so harmless and innocent that they might be accepted “too easily.” Indeed, one 
of the big questions in relation to behavioral paternalism is whether it is used (a) 
to design lighter and cleverer regulations to replace heavier and clumsier ones, 
or (b) to justify new regulations where none existed before. 
A fourth general concern is that the empirical facts in support of behaviorally 
inspired paternalism are uncertain in many cases, and that its advocates are 
exaggerating or misrepresenting those facts (Wright, 2007). An interesting 
example  is  the  debate  that  has  ensued  over  the  rationality  of  credit  card  use.  
Behavioral economists have often used credit cards as a typical example of 
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people making suboptimal borrowing choices, misled by attractive features and 
complex interest rates (Bar-Gill, 2004; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2006: 196-
198). However, recent empirical studies have challenged the validity of these 
concerns.  One  study  looks  at  the  issue  of  so-called  hyperbolic  accounting  and  
claims, contrary to behavioral economics, that most people choose their credit 
card  optimally  and  are  not  misled  by  the  difference  between  short-term  and  
long-term rates in some credit cards (Brown and Plache, 2006). However, 
another study, using a market experiment with two credit card contracts, finds 
that a substantial fraction (about 40%) of the people choose the suboptimal card 
initially; many of the initial mistakes were corrected later, but a small minority 
of consumers persisted in holding substantially suboptimal contracts (Agarwal, 
Liu, Souleses and Chomsisengphet, 2006). 
Sunstein writes in defense of paternalism that “objections to paternalism 
should  be  empirical  and  pragmatic,  having  to  do  with  the  possibility  of  
education and the likely failure of government response, rather than a priori in 
nature” (Sunstein, 1997: 1178). However, the problem is that the notion of 
“empirical” is vague, and it is not clear that critics of paternalism should always 
have the burden of proof. One could argue in contrast that, when clear empirical 
knowledge is lacking, anti-paternalism is justified. 
 
7.2 Overstating Benefits, Understating Costs 
Some  degree  of  general  or  a priori skepticism towards paternalism may be 
justified, because we tend to overestimate the benefits of regulation and 
underestimate  its  costs.  There  are  at  least  three  reasons  for  this,  supplied  by  
cognitive psychology. Firstly, the availability bias implies that we tend to give too 
much importance to existing problems, while we discount the unforeseen costs 
of  trying  to  solve  those  problems.  The  traditional  theory  of  markets  and  
regulation shows that regulatory intervention creates many hidden costs, 
including non-measurable costs (psychic or subjective costs) and dynamic costs 
which are caused as regulations lag behind new developments and impose 
obstacles  to  value-adding  innovations.  Whereas  the  benefits  of  resolving  a  
problem are easy to image, these hidden costs are not salient and will tend to be 
ignored. 
Secondly, the overconfidence bias means that most people—experts in 
particular, including legal scholars and regulators—are likely to overestimate 
their ability to come up with good solutions to social problems. In reality, many 
regulations  do  not  work  the  way  they  were  supposed  to,  and  even  excellent  
ideas tend to become less perfect when they go through the complexities of the 
political process. Scholars should be aware of this, especially when they propose 
highly intrusive and costly policies. 
Thirdly, the overoptimism bias implies  that  when  we  are  excited  about  an  
interesting  theory,  we  are  likely  to  place  too  much  hope  in  it.  It  should  be  
remembered that the adaptive behavior of individuals and firms may render 
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nice  ideas  less  effective  in  practice.  Regulated  firms  will  try  to  avoid  costly  
regulations, just as has happened so many times earlier, for example with 
compulsory disclosure rules.  Consumers,  too,  may change their  behavior  from 
bad to worse as a result of too protective regulations (Klick and Mitchell, 2006). 
One  can  think  of  several  examples  to  illustrate  the  problem.  For  instance,  
Sunstein and Thaler (2003: 1187–88) are highly optimistic about the advantages 
of cooling-off periods, but they fail entirely to consider both the indirect costs of 
cooling-off and the different ways in which this type of regulation may become 
ineffective as people adapt their behavior. 
Likewise, the proposals for “debiasing through law” do not seem intrusive, 
but in practice they can be costly, the benefits are uncertain, and they can have a 
range of negative side-effects. Jolls and Sunstein (2006: 208–209) acknowledge 
that optimism bias is context dependent: people do not always fall into it, and in 
fact, sometimes people are excessively pessimistic. For example, right after a vivid 
crisis, people overestimate the risks of investing, of air travel, of nuclear energy, 
and so on. It will be difficult to design well-targeted debiasing laws, given that 
law-makers  have  limited  information,  law  is  a  crude  and  clumsy  instrument,  
and changing the law is time-consuming and difficult. 
Another  problem  with  debiasing  through  law  is  that,  unlike  asymmetric  
paternalism, the strategy does not distinguish between heterogeneous actors (see 
Rachlinski, 2006). Jolls and Sunstein (2006: 229) correctly point out that trying to 
reduce optimism bias through a strategic use of the availability heuristic may 
“distort  the  behavior  of  individuals  who  did  not  suffer  from  optimism  bias  in  
the first place. For those who previously had an accurate understanding of the 
situation,  such  strategies  for  debiasing  through  law  could  produce  a  kind  of  
unrealistic pessimism.” 
These concerns do not mean that behavioral paternalism cannot work—only 
that we should be wary about taking it too far. In practice, this prudent caution 
may be shown in requiring more empirical evidence of specific problems before 
launching into solving non-issues. It can also mean that paternalistic regulations 
should first be tried in a preliminary fashion as local experiments (this would be 
easy in federal states). The initial experiments would provide valuable feedback, 
which could be used for ex post impact assessment (in light of overconfidence 
and overoptimism, ex ante impact assessments are of limited value). Even if it 
turns out that the original plan was great, it could probably be still improved in 
some way. 
A different way of putting the same principle is that decentralized policies may 
be optimal, when there are likely to be complex dynamic costs that cannot be 
easily predicted. An interesting case that merits critical discussion is the 
regulation of APR in the European Union: centralization of APR calculations has 
its advantages, but it may also reduce vital debate on the best way of defining 
the APR. The definitional question is not without importance, because (as was 
explained  earlier),  it  has  been  argued  that  the  current  mortgage  APR  
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calculations, which assume that interest rates will not change during the life of 
the loan, tend to understate the real expected costs of the mortgage (Miles, 2004: 
38-40). 
Note also that different regulatory strategies have different implications for 
regulatory failure. Generally, the more intrusive the regulation is, the greater the 
need for caution. For example, ex ante cooling-off periods are significantly more 
intrusive than ex post rights  of  cancellation,  and  therefore  demand  stronger  
justification. With respect to information disclosures, the costs can vary greatly 
depending on what is demanded of lenders. On the other hand, default contract 
designs have the advantage that the regulatory costs are probably not significant 
even if the default rule is very poorly designed; markets may simply ignore the 
default  option  (there  is  a  small  increase  in  transaction  costs,  of  course).  Note,  
however, that if most customers choose to ignore the default deal, regulators 
ought to have the humility to admit their mistakes—not to conclude that people 
do not know how to choose and therefore the opt-out deal must be made 
compulsory. 
 
7.3 Finding the Right Balance and Combination 
Regarding ways of improving paternalistic regulations, it was mentioned earlier 
that  some  authors  have  proposed  making  the  default  or  opt-out  mortgage  or  
credit cards deals “stickier” through creative legal standards (Barr et al., 2008: 8-
11). A couple of further points on this are in order. For one thing, it should be 
remembered that we need to look at the combination of legal strategies that will or 
can be adopted, not just any one of them in isolation. For example, cooling-off 
periods may be applied selectively to some deals and not others, thereby 
strengthening the attraction of the former. One possibility among many is to 
impose a short waiting period for non-default proposals, as this would 
encourage consumers to consider these offers more carefully. 
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that people may ignore the 
default contract design, not because there are harmful market pressures and the 
default plan is not sticky enough, but simply because it is badly designed. The 
upshot is that the opting-out strategy may fail in different ways, and one should 
enquire  into  the  causes  before  changing  the  system.  Again,  local  trials  would  
facilitate better discovery of good solutions. 
A related issue is that behavioral paternalism may result in too detailed 
regulations, which become overly rigid and unable to adapt to changing 
environments.  That  is  a  valid  concern  generally,  and  an  argument  for  broader 
standards (see Kaplow, 2000). However, as far as default or opt-out regulations 
are  concerned,  rigidity  is  less  of  an issue than in  the case  of  compulsory rules,  
because market participants will be free to ignore the default rule if it becomes 
significantly outdated. Moreover, the rules could in any case be updated using 
survey  data.  The  idea  of  “smart  defaults”  or  customized  opt-out  deals  should  
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also be considered as a way of reducing unnecessary rigidity (Barr et al., 2008: 
10–11). 
 
7.4 Beyond Government 
Another question that has been touched upon at various points is whether 
government is the most suitable actor for influencing private decision-making. 
The issue merits further reflection. An interesting point about the popular book 
by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) is that almost all the examples of positive 
“nudging”  that  the  authors  supply  are  taken  from  the  private  sector.  The  
authors  go  on  argue  that  the  same  approach  should  be  adopted  in  the  public  
sector, and certainly that may be correct. There are, however, important 
differences between public and private actors, which influence their ability to 
design helpful and efficient nudges. 
The  fundamental  advantage  of  private  sector  solutions  for  “nudging”  or  
“debiasing” is  the same as  the advantage of  market-based solutions in  general  
(see Hayek, 1949; Kirzner, 1973, 1997). Markets are driven by entrepreneurship 
and hence rely on competition as a discovery procedure. The price system provides 
fast  and  detailed  information  to  producers  about  the  value  added  in  different  
productive options, and private actors taken together have a vast amount of 
decentralized information that cannot be easily collected and summarized in 
statistics. Further, the ability of entrepreneurs to try many new things, and learn 
through a process of trial and error, makes market-based solutions enormously 
more  capable  of  coming  up  with  new  solutions  and  improvements  to  earlier  
methods. In contrast, governmental actors do not receive quick feedback on how 
well  they  are  doing;  they  have  weak  incentives  to  try  new  things  and  change  
policies that are not worthwhile; they lack crucial information about private 
needs  and  preferences;  and  their  ability  to  try  out  new  things  is  always  
hampered by the complexity of the political and bureaucratic processes which 
dominate public sector activity. 
The implication is not that governmental regulation is never advisable. It is 
rather that the first question is whether it is possible to improve the incentives of 
private sector actors in  such  ways  that  they  will  want  to  come  up  with  helpful  
(rather than unhelpful) nudges and such like for improving consumer decision-
making. In other words, before jumping into the conclusion that governmental 
regulation is necessary, one should also enquire into the workability of market-
based—and civil society-based—solutions. If these work, they tend to be more 
flexible and adaptable, and less costly for companies to comply with. There are 
several interrelated issues here, including the incentives of firms, industry self-
regulation, and the role of civil society. 
Sometimes regulation is not needed, because firms have the incentives to 
develop similar solutions freely—but perhaps they have not yet discovered the 
profit potential of helping consumers better. It is difficult to say anything 
general about the incentives of firms in this regard: that depends on the firm, the 
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customer segment, the reputational benefits, the relevant time-horizon and other 
factors. On the one hand, the interests of lenders and borrowers may be poorly 
aligned, and the former will have an incentive to exploit the biases of the latter 
(Barr et al.,  2008: 3-4). On the other hand, some lenders—for example banks of 
the more conservative type—may have the incentive to develop the kinds of 
mechanisms that have been discussed in this paper (well-designed default 
contracts, better and clearer information disclosure and so on), because that 
would give them a competitive advantage over so-called rogue dealers. 
These incentives of certain lenders may be insufficient to reform a poorly-
functioning market—assuming one exists—but they are nevertheless relevant 
for seeing the bigger picture correctly. For one thing, this implies that there 
would be more political support for paternalistic regulations than otherwise, 
because some members of the industry would welcome such policies as being 
helpful  for  their  business  too.  For  another  thing,  it  means  that  industry  self-
regulation could evolve in order to coordinate the strategy of conservative 
lenders and reinforce the reputational benefits of providing more cognitive-
friendly services. An alternative approach is enforced self-regulation (or co-
regulation), whereby industry associations would be required to develop a self-
regulatory  plan,  which  would  then  be  approved  by  a  public  agency  and  
reviewed  periodically.  The  industry  motivation  for  coming  up  with  a  good  
proposal could be fostered by the threat of command-and-control regulation as 
the alternative. 
Finally, industry initiatives and governmental regulation can be combined 
with the activities of civil society groups such as consumer associations. Such 
organizations  could  play  a  role  in  developing  services  that  firms  do  not  offer.  
For example, consumer associations could provide guidance and 
recommendations for their members, and they could also be empowered to do 
so better through legislation. Moreover, behaviorally-designed information 
disclosure regulations would facilitate the provision of additional services, not 
only by markets but also by relevant civil society groups. 
 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
Behavioral economics provides an interesting case for a new type of paternalistic 
regulatory policy, labeled here behavioral paternalism. This paper has clarified 
the notion and theoretical underpinnings of behavioral paternalism, and 
examined its relevance and prospects in the context of consumer credit 
regulation, looking especially at the markets for home loans, credit cards and 
instant loans. 
It has been found that some existing aspects of consumer credit regulation 
are  best  understood  through  the  lens  of  behavioral  paternalism,  and  there  are  
many  possibilities  for  further  regulation  along  these  lines.  Some  of  the  more  
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promising possibilities not taken up by regulators so far include the default 
mortgage deal and customized cooling-off devices for credit cards. 
It  is,  however,  important  to  bear  in  mind  the  potential  weaknesses  of  
behavioral paternalism. Even light forms of paternalism may be costlier in 
practice than they seem on paper, because there are many hidden costs that are 
likely to be ignored. The case for paternalistic policies should also be empirically 
verified, not merely posited on the basis of vague theoretical notions. Finally, it 
is  important  to  examine  the  prospects  of  market-based  solutions  for  helping  
consumers choose better, because these solutions are likely to be more flexible 
and innovative than solution imposed by law. 
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Essay 3 
Social Norms, Morality, and 
the Law: Regulatory 
Strategies* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper explores two related ways for improving law and regulation. 
The first is to link laws and regulations with the realm of social norms and other 
sources of normativity that govern human choosing and acting. The second is to 
explore the role of intrinsic motivations, moral character and broader culture in 
human decision-making. These perspectives are translated into regulatory 
strategies that (i) align laws with positive social norms and motivations, (ii) seek 
to  foster  positive  norms  and  cultivate  moral  habits,  and  (iii)  rely,  when  
appropriate, on moral and social norms for the enforcement of laws. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The starting point of this paper is twofold. Firstly, theories of regulation1 imply 
theories of man and society: what human persons are; how they choose and 
behave; how they interact with each other; why and when they obey laws, and 
so on. Secondly, there is nothing more useful than a good theory.  A good theory is 
one that is sufficiently simple, so that it can be used in practice, and sufficiently 
realistic, so that it does not significantly depart from the truth.2 
One of the most successful theoretical frameworks in regulatory literature 
has been law and economics, which combines legal and economic analysis. It is a 
useful approach, because it is both quite simple and quite realistic. It is not my 
intention to do away with it, but I will argue that it can and should be improved. 
There are two improvements that seem especially pertinent. 
One is to challenge ‘legal centralism’ and to adopt a broader understanding 
of the sources of normativity in human choosing and acting. In other words, we 
should  not  limit  the  analysis  to  different  types  of  law  and  their  usefulness  in  
regulation. The other is to expand our concept of motivation in human behavior, 
especially taking into such notions as moral character and culture. In what 
follows, I will firstly explain these ideas in more detail and then suggest 
implications for regulatory discussion. 
 
 
2 SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL THEORY: TWO PROPOSALS 
 
2.1 Against Legal Centralism 
My first objective is to challenge the legal centralism that is implicit in most law-
and-economics and regulatory theory and debate. It is assumed that law is what 
matters: simply put, when there is a problem, we probably need a new law. This 
assumption  is  not  often  said  explicitly,  but  it  is  implicit  in  the  logic  of  most  
legislative and regulatory projects. Certainly, legislators and regulators are 
increasingly aware of the limits of legislation and regulation: they realize that law 
cannot do everything. But then again, that is often where the analysis stops. 
Yet  much  more  can  be  said  about  it  –  and  has  been  said.  The  French  
aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville once mused in his observations on the 
democratic  experiment  of  the  United  States:  ‘Laws  are  always  unsteady  when  
unsupported by mores; mores are the only tough and durable power in a nation’ 
(Tocqueville 1969: 274). 
                                                        
1 I am using the word regulation in a broad sense that covers both ‘regulatory law’ properly speaking 
and other kinds of deliberate state influence, ranging from general legal rules to specific intervention 
by regulatory bodies. I do however distinguish it from other (non-state) forms of social control or 
influence. See Baldwin and Cave (1999: chapter 1) for different definitions of the concept of 
regulation 
2 This is obviously a simplistic summary of very complex set of issues. 
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More  recently,  we  have  seen  a  burgeoning  literature  on  the  roles  of  and  
relationships between law, social norms, private morality, culture etc. 
Contributors to this discussion include several recipients of the Nobel Prize in 
economics. Ronald Coase (1991), for example, has frequently argued for the 
importance of studying the economic system empirically, especially in light of 
the richness of institutional arrangements. Drawing on evidence from economic 
history, Douglass North (1990) has studied the roles of formal and informal 
institutions in economic development. In her empirical work on the governance 
of common-pool resources, Elinor Ostrom (1990) has demonstrated the 
complexity and fundamental importance of non-state governance. Oliver 
Williamson (2000) has also underlined the role of non-state governance 
institutions in the transition from socialism to a market economy. 
Among experts of regulation, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 12–14) could 
especially  be  mentioned  for  their  stress  on  the  role  of  communities  and  
associations  in  understanding  the  institutional  order  of  a  society.  And  in  law-
and-economics  literature,  we  have  seen  wide-ranging  discussions  on  the  roles  
and interactions between law and social norms.3 In  the  next  section  I  will  
highlight some interesting findings of this discussion and then draw out 
implications for regulation. 
 
2.2 Law and Social Norms 
The perspective here  is  not  simply that  there  are  limits  to  legislation.  It  is  that  
law, social norms, culture, morality and so on are parts of a complex whole that 
should be analyzed as such. The argument for a more holistic perspective is that, 
firstly, it is more realistic, and secondly, it is possible. Although ‘social norms’ is a 
vague concept, it can be studied both theoretically and empirically.4 In  broad  
terms,  both  social  norms  and  law  can  be  seen  as  sources  of  normativity  for  
human  choosing  and  acting  –  sources  which  may  be  complementary  or  
conflicting, supportive or eroding. 
Social norms and law relate to and interact with each other in various ways 
(see Panther, 2000). On the one hand, law and social norms may complement each 
other,  as  is  perhaps  often  the  case  without  our  even  noticing  it.  Social  norms  
provide the broad institutional environment within which legal norms and 
formal institutions function and operate. The central importance of these 
supportive social norms is usually only appreciated when they begin to be eroded. 
The  supportive  function  may  also  manifest  itself  the  other  way  around:  
                                                        
3 Mercuro and Medema (2006: chapter 7) provide a good overview of the literature. 
4 There  is  a  rich  literature  connecting social  norms and evolutionary  game theory:  see  for  example  
Binmore (2004, 2005), Ostrom (2000) and Young (1998, 2008). North (1990: chapter 5) is a 
theoretically broader discussion of internal constraints. See also Juurikkala (2009) for a review of the 
literature on law and social norms in the context of commercial relationships. 
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enshrining pre-existing social norms into law will give them greater strength 
and importance – perhaps even if such laws are difficult to enforce.5 
On the other hand, law may come into conflict with social norms. In such 
setting there are several possible scenarios. (i) It may be that, over time, social 
norms adapt to legal rules. This is likely to happen when such adaptation does not 
imply a  loss  on any significant  party.  But  it  may also be argued that  generally  
law tends to shape social norms through its ‘expressive function’ (Sunstein, 
1996a, Cooter, 2000).6 (ii) Legal rules may adapt to social norms. In broad terms this 
happens often through legal reform, given that social norms are among the main 
factors that influence legal and social change.7 But it may also happen that ‘law 
in  the  books’  is  supplanted  by  ‘law  in  action’  that  reflects  entrenched  social  
norms in opposition to the literal meaning of the law. (iii) The two may also 
influence each other, one dominating from time to time and in different contexts. 
Some social and legal theorists have emphasized the importance of social 
norms  as  the  proper  basis  of  legal  norms.8 Cooter (1996) argues that English 
contract law was rooted in the traditional ‘law merchant’ (lex mercatoria), which 
was based on business customs and cooperative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
As  the  power  of  English  common  law  judges  grew,  they  began  to  deal  with  
commercial disputes; but instead of trying to create a new set of rules, they 
sought  to  discover  the  rules  already  in  existence  among  merchants,  and  to  
enforce those rules selectively so as to create a coherent and systematic body of 
rules. 
However,  placing  too  much  emphasis  on  law  may  have  an  adverse effect on 
social norms. Pildes (1996) has warned about the possibility of destroying 
valuable social norms through law. In the same vein, Ostrom (2000: 147) writes: 
‘Several […] recent experimental studies have confirmed the notion that 
external rules and monitoring can crowd out cooperative behavior. […] 
Moreover, norms seem to have a certain staying power in encouraging a 
growth  of  the  desire  for  cooperative  behavior  over  time,  while  
cooperation  enforced  by  externally  imposed  rules  can  disappear  very  
quickly.’ 
                                                        
5 Cooter (2000) gives an amusing example. A new law in California required dog-walkers to clean up 
the poop. Before that, most people thought that was the right thing to do anyway, yet people did not 
complain  much  about  dog  poop;  now  after  the  new  law,  they  do  complain  if  someone  breaks  the  
law. It is easier to say ‘obey the law’ than ‘don't be so rude’. When a standard of behavior is included 
in the legal code, it has the moral backing of the legitimate public authorities of the community. 
6 For example, laws relating to environmental protection, tobacco smoking or drug use can have a 
powerful effect on public perceptions and expectations. 
7 An  interesting  historical  example,  among  many  others,  is  the  formation  of  the  Western  legal  
concepts of criminal culpability, which emphasizes subjective intention instead to the objectivism of 
earlier Germanic practice; this notion of culpability was simply rooted in Christian moral theology 
(Berman, 1983). 
8 Earlier contributions include Hayek (1960, 1973) and Leoni (1991). 
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Various  fundamental  social  virtues,  such  as  reciprocity,  are  learnt  and  
acquired  not  through  law  but  through  life  in  smaller  communities  such  as  
families, clubs and churches (see Tocqueville, 1969). Such social norms as 
reciprocity can be undermined through law-making and public policy by 
destroying the social conditions that enable informal reciprocity. For example, 
urban planning,  when it  pays little  attention to  the social  context,  may remove 
the practical opportunities for exercising reciprocity and maintaining active 
community life; thus the transition from busy street interaction to empty and 
quiet places may, paradoxically, have lead to the creation of more dangerous 
neighborhoods (see Jacobs, 1961). Similarly, overambitious welfare policies may 
crowd out pre-existing local-level and voluntary institutions that provide 
informal but effective remedies in unemployment, illness and old age (Beito, 
2000, Putnam, 2000, Juurikkala, 2007).9 It  may therefore  be that  sometimes law 
should simply provide a good, broad institutional context, but avoid unwise 
over-judicialization of society, as that may have complex and negative long-term 
consequences. As Ostrom (2000: 147–148) warns: 
‘the  worst  of  all  worlds  may  be  one  where  external  authorities  impose  
rules but are only able to achieve weak monitoring and sanctioning. In a 
world of strong external monitoring and sanctioning, cooperation is 
enforced without any need for internal norms to develop. In a world of no 
external rules or monitoring, norms can evolve to support cooperation. 
But in an in-between case, the mild degree of external monitoring 
discourages the formation of social norms, while also making it attractive 
for some players to deceive and defect and take the relatively low risk of 
being caught.’ 
One of the central insights of the social-norms perspective is that both law 
and social norms have their proper role and scope. Even when they support 
each other, they operate very differently. For example, Bernstein (1996) observes 
that there are many reasons why parties to a commercial transaction may 
actually prefer some aspects of their agreements and relationships to be legally 
unenforceable. Negotiating remote contingencies may signal distrust or unusual 
desire to litigate, and overly detailed contracts may make things too inflexible if 
circumstances change; legal system costs (litigation costs, delays, risk of judicial 
error) are high and both parties may prefer to avoid the possibility of legal 
battles; and there are many factors that are known to the parties by not verifiable 
by in a legally enforceable way. One common strategy seems to be that 
                                                        
9 Beito (2000) is an insightful historical investigation of how so-called fraternal societies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century provided extensive assistance ranging from health insurance, 
support in unemployment, orphanages, and homes for the elderly. Similar institutions existed in 
many  European  countries.  Beito  argues  that  such  institutions  died  out  not  because  they  were  
deficient but because governments took over their role with taxpayer money, yet something 
important was lost in the transition. 
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commercial transactors govern their dealings through flexible, cooperative social 
norms when they have a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship; but they 
combine  those  norms  with  legally  stricter  contracts  that  can  be  invoked  if  the  
other party turns out to be untrustworthy. 
This sensitivity to social context is reflected in some traditional legal 
principles  such as  the English doctrine that,  when it  comes to  agreements  of  a  
domestic nature, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parties did not 
intend to create legal relations. The wisdom of this principle is that legal battles 
tend to shatter relationships, and strictly legal rights and duties cannot contain 
the  rich  and  complex  notions  of  justice  and  reasonableness  that  parties  to  a  
personal and long-term relationship have. As Lord Justice Atkin famously put it: 
‘The common law does not regulate the form of agreements between 
spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. The 
consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love and affection 
which  counts  for  so  little  in  these  cold  Courts.  The  terms  may  be  
repudiated, varied or renewed as performance proceeds or as 
disagreements develop, and the principles of the common law as to 
exoneration and discharge and accord and satisfaction are such as find no 
place in the domestic code.’10 
Greater sensitivity to the relationship between law and social norms also 
enables  us  better  to  understand  legal  –  and  regulatory  –  practices  in  different 
cultures and societies. Each culture is a product of numerous factors working over 
centuries and millennia. Western legal culture cannot be properly understood 
without  taking  into  account  the  complex  ‘synthesis  of  Athens,  Jerusalem,  and  
Rome’ (Gregg, 2003: xiv) that gave rise to Western civilization. In such places as 
Africa, India or China, the history and the accompanying social norms are very 
different indeed. Winn (1994), for example, argues that in the context of non-
Western  countries  like  China,  it  is  appropriate  to  speak  of  legal marginalism, 
because Chinese relational systems give more importance to elaborate notions of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness. 
Last  but  not  least,  social  norms  can  be  enforced  through  various  non-legal 
sanctions, which in some respects resemble legal sanctions but in other respects 
are quite different (Panther, 2000, Charny, 1990). On the one hand there are 
external sanctions of  two types,  (i)  second-party control and (ii) third-party control. 
Second-party control refers to non-legal sanctions that may be used by the other 
party  to  the  transaction,  such  as  refusing  to  do  business  again  or  creating  
credible threats (Williamson, 1983). Third-party control requires the cooperation 
of  third  parties,  for  example  in  the  form  of  gossiping,  shaming,  and  loss  of  
reputation. Then there is also a third type of non-legal sanction, namely (iii) 
internal sanctions (which may also be called first-party sanctions). They are various 
                                                        
10 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, at 579–580. 
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emotional reactions that human beings may have as a result of following or 
breaking  social  norms.  On  the  positive  side,  they  include  such  emotions  as  
empathy, human desire for approval, honor and esteem. On the negative side, 
one may experience regret, remorse, shame, guilt and embarrassment. Frank 
(1987, 1988) proposes that the ability to undergo such emotional reactions is 
valuable, because it supports the establishment of mutually beneficial, 
cooperative relationships. 
The idea here  is  not  simply that  social  norms can be enforced too,  but  that  
legal and non-legal sanctions are different yet related to each other. For example, 
Cooter (2000) notes that, although legal enforcement of rights and duties is often 
necessary,  it  also  tends  to  be  expensive,  time-consuming  and  uncertain.  
Therefore  it  is  important  that  laws  be  complemented  by  social  norms  which  
support reasonable behavior. On the other hand, Pildes (1996) argues that over-
intrusive laws can destroy social capital by failing to see the differences between 
enforcing  social  norms  and  enforcing  laws.  Social  norms  are  not  substantive  
rules, but they are dynamic wholes which are tied to complex social structures 
and flexible enforcement mechanisms. The informal enforcement of social norms 
differs drastically from formal legal processes, and the remedies available for 
breach of social norms are flexible and subtle, something that is rarely the case 
with law. This is a reason to respect the proper realm of social norms. 
 
2.3 Incentives, Motivation and Moral Behavior 
I  have  tried  to  show  that  the  legal  centralism  of  much  of  regulatory  debate  is  
neither necessary nor fruitful, because better results can be obtained by looking 
at a broader scope of sources of normativity. My second objective is to show that 
we can and should do the same about our understanding of human motivation 
and morality. The motivational and ethical perspective on behavior goes beyond 
informal social constraints. Mitchell (1999: 208–209), for example, has powerfully 
criticized  the  new  ‘norms  jurisprudence’  for  accepting  too  much  of  the  
behavioral and positivistic attitude of modern social science and economics; the 
approach may end up distorting instead of improving the explanation of norms, 
because the leading authors 
‘generally share the same basic goal, which is to establish a non-normative 
theory  of  norms.  [...]  They  tend  to  share  an  underlying  metanorm  of  
efficient wealth or welfare maximization, and all share the basic belief that 
people are motivated principally – if not solely – by self-interest. Most 
importantly, by limiting their inquiry to what they see, they are unable to 
explain,  except  at  the  most  superficial  level,  how  norms  become  
normative  –  that  is,  how  they  come  to  tell  us  what  we  ought  (or  ought  
not) to do.’ 
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The economic and political importance of internal moral norms has 
acknowledged  by  many  authors,  including  Douglass  North  (1990).  He  writes,  
among other things, that 
‘One gets efficient institutions by a polity that has built-in incentives to 
create  and  enforce  efficient  property  rights.  But  it  is  hard  –  maybe  
impossible – to model such a polity with wealth-maximizing actors 
unconstrained by other considerations. It is no accident that economic 
models of the polity developed in the public choice literature make the 
state into something like the Mafia […]. Now we do not have to look far 
afield to observe states with such characteristics. But the traditional public 
choice literature is clearly not the whole story.’ (North, 1990: 140) 
The political scientist William Riker (1976) has likewise argued that it is 
implausible to claim that the emergence of stable and economically efficient 
political structures can be explained merely by the establishment of a good 
constitution. Discussing the role of constitutional forms in restraining the 
tyrannical exercise of political power, he writes: 
‘The question is: Does constitutional structure cause a political condition 
and a state of public opinion or does the political condition and a state of 
public opinion cause the constitutional structure? The sounds at first like 
the chicken and egg problem in which there  is  no causal  direction;  but  I  
think that usually there is a cause and that constitutional forms are 
typically derivative. It seems probably to me that public opinion usually 
causes constitutional structure, and seldom, if ever, the other way around. 
As  Rousseau  contended,  it  is  in  the  end  the  law  that  is  written  in  the  
hearts of the people that counts.’ (Riker, 1976: 13) 
The theoretical literature related to internal moral norms is so vast that it is 
not possible to discuss it exhaustively here. The following sections highlight 
some perspectives that seem to have strong empirical backing and that also lend 
support to each other. 
 
2.3.1 Intrinsic Motivation 
It is obvious that people do many things not because they get some external 
benefit  from  it  but  because  is  an  immediate  source  of  human  fulfillment  (see  
Staw, 1976, Deci and Flaste, 1995, Frey, 1997). Children need not be paid to play, 
and  even  few  adults  work  only  for  the  money  (this  is  especially  true  of  some  
professions, notably academic research). Similarly, most people devote time and 
energy to different forms of friendship and community – especially marriage 
and the family – not only because of some external benefits but mainly because 
friendship itself is an important aspect of truly human life. 
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Nevertheless, mainstream economic models of human behavior tend to 
ignore  the  relevance  of  intrinsic  reasons  for  action,  because  they  treat  human  
motivation as a ‘black box’. The problem is that this leads to too much 
importance being given to external compensation or punishment. Many 
empirical  studies  have shown that  external  incentives  –  sticks  and carrots  –  do 
not  always produce the desired results,  because external  interventions interact  
with intrinsic motivations in complex ways (Frey 1993, Kohn, 1993). Building on 
a wealth of psychological literature, Frey (1997) summarizes the relationships 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as follows: 
(i) Intrinsic motivation is of great importance for all human activities; 
it is inconceivable that people are motivated solely or even mainly 
by external incentives.  
(ii) The use of monetary incentives crowds out intrinsic motivation 
under identifiable and relevant conditions (Crowding-Out Effect). 
The same may also be true of  other  external  interventions such as  
commands or regulations. 
(iii) External interventions may, on the other hand, enhance intrinsic 
motivation under some conditions (Crowding-In Effect). 
(iv) Changes in intrinsic motivation may spill over to areas not directly 
affected by monetary incentives or regulations (Spill-Over Effect). 
For example, when a child is paid for doing household chores, she is unlikely 
to contribute without compensation (crowding-out effect). Yet if her father gives 
her  a  surprise  present  as  she  has  been  helpful  in  the  house,  it  is  likely  to  
reinforce her intrinsic willingness to help out (crowding-in effect). As a general 
rule, when external intervention is perceived as controlling or failing to recognize 
the intrinsic value of a non-instrumental relationship, it crowds out intrinsic 
motivation. On the other hand, when it is perceived as supportive, self-esteem is 
fostered and people feel they are encouraged to act with self-determination. 
These considerations have great relevance for law and regulation. The same 
as with social norms, legal constraints and interventions may negatively 
influence the intrinsic motivations of individuals to cooperate, be honest and 
generous  with  each  other,  and  so  on.  David  Hume  famously  advised  that  a  
country’s constitution should be designed for ‘knaves’ motivated solely by their 
‘private interest’ (Hume, 1898: 117–118). But the evidence on intrinsic motivation 
suggests  that  the  opposite  may  be  the  case:  such  a  constitution  may  end  up  
produces  knaves when they did not  exist  before,  at  least  not  in  large numbers  
(Bowles, 2008; Frey, 1997: chapter 6). Legal policies that signal distrust of citizens 
may be counterproductive from the viewpoint of morality. 
 
2.3.2 Fairness and Moral Emotions 
The theory of intrinsic motivation shows that rational self-interest cannot be 
reduced to external interests and benefits. Evidence on altruistic behavior goes 
further away from the narrow concept of rationality found in mainstream 
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economic models: ordinary people often act in other-regarding ways even at the 
a substantial cost to themselves (see Frank, 1988). However, fairness-based 
behavior  is  usually  complex  and  dynamic.  According  to  Rabin  (1993),  the  
empirical evidence can be summarized in three simple principles: 
(a) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being 
especially to help those who are being kind.11 
(b) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to 
punish those who are being unkind. 
(c) Both motivation (a) and (b) have a greater effect on behavior as the 
material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller. 
In  other  words,  most  people  care  about  fairness  in  two  ways.  On  the  one  
hand, they want to treat others fairly, treating them well especially when they 
have  received  good  treatment.  On  the  other  hand,  people  tend  to  retaliate  
against  those  who  have  treated  them  badly.  But  importantly,  the  extent  of  
fairness-based behavior nevertheless varies according to various criteria, such as 
reputation effects, amount of material loss, standards of fairness, and self-image. 
 
2.3.3 Moral Character 
Yet  moral  behavior  is  not  a  question  of  emotions  alone.  Already  the  ancient  
Greeks thought that human persons can become morally better or worse, 
according to their education and their own free choices. Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics (1980) is a systematic exposition of such virtue ethics, which sees good 
moral character as the result of good habits, i.e. internal capabilities of acting 
justly, wisely, honestly, maturely etc. Through a consistent attempt to use one’s 
reason,  to  give  each  person  their  due,  to  overcome  internal  inertia,  and  to  
channel one’s various desires according to reason, one develops the cardinal 
virtues  of  prudence,  justice,  fortitude  and  temperance  –  habits  which  in  turn  
make it easier for that person to do the right thing in concrete situations.12 There 
is  also a  rich literature  of  the moral  psychology view of  virtues  that  takes  into 
account more recent work in psychology.13 
It cannot be denied that the moral character of persons and citizens is 
fundamental for the well-being of communities and nations. If all men and 
women are just and reasonable, law has merely a marginal and supportive role 
to play. Yet if everyone is cruel, selfish, dishonest and irrational, there is no legal 
and regulatory solution in the world to deal with all the resulting social 
problems.  Indeed,  it  can be argued that  the optimal  extent  and manner  of  law 
                                                        
11 This  is  not  to  deny  that  people  can  act  altruistically  regardless  of  how  the  others  behave;  one  
thinks of all kinds of voluntary workers. However, that probably requires stronger internal 
commitment to help others, and also the positive response of those being helped is likely to reinforce 
one’s willingness to make sacrifices for them. 
12 For a modern exposition of virtue ethics, see Pieper (1966). 
13 See Peterson and Seligman (2004) and the numerous references cited therein. 
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and regulation greatly depends on the moral character of the relevant people 
(see George, 1993). 
Recently  some  economists  have  come  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  
internal moral dispositions and constraints for economic efficiency (see 
Buchanan, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Stringham, 2011; Wight, 2005). It has also been 
demonstrated  empirically  –  contrary  to  the  conviction  of  Stigler  and  Becker  
(1977: 76) that ‘deplorable tastes […] are not capable of being changed by 
persuasion’  –  that  moral  dispositions  are  not  beyond  external  influence.  For  
example, Ariely (2008: 207–209) reports that starting experiments by asking 
subjects to think about the Ten Commandments made them more likely to tell 
the truth, probably because the exercise reinforced moral commitments that the 
subjects  already  had  in  their  background.  In  another  series  of  experiments  by  
Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2010), experimental subjects were exposed to a variety of 
messages,  some  of  which  contained  a  moral  argument;  this  kind  of  moral  
suasion had a significant effect on behavior. Interestingly, cooperative behavior 
was  particularly  common  when  the  moral  message  was  combined  with  the  
presence of punishments – more common than with either of them alone. 
 
 
3 STRATEGIES FOR BETTER LAW MAKING AND 
REGULATION 
 
In this section I outline some implications of these perspectives for better 
legislation and regulation. They have been divided into three categories. First, 
there are alignment strategies, i.e. regulatory approaches that seek to align law 
and regulation with supportive social norms and intrinsic motivations. The 
second category is entitled culture-building and habit-formation strategies, which 
focus  on  influencing  social  norms  for  the  better  and  helping  persons  to  adopt  
good habits. Thirdly, enforcement strategies seek to replace or combine legal and 
formal enforcement with informal enforcement through internal constraints and 
other non-legal sanctions. 
 
3.1 Alignment Strategies 
There are various possibilities for aligning laws and regulations with positive 
social norms and intrinsic motivations. Here are some general guidelines and 
examples. 
Align regulation with positive social norms. Broadly speaking, positive social 
norms  are  those  that  are  constructive,  cooperative,  pro-social  etc.  When  such  
norms are strong in the relevant regulatory context, the most effective strategy is 
likely to one that builds upon and reinforces those norms. Generally, it is likely 
that in such situations there is no need for heavy, top-down regulation, because 
a light-touch, grass-roots approach will be sufficient, less costly and more effective.  
This  is  one  reason  why  some  form  of  self-regulation  may  be  advisable  (see  
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generally Ogus, 2000). This is not to say that self-regulation is the right solution 
to  all  situations,  for  reasons  discussed  later  in  more  detail.  The  point  is  that  
when there are positive, pre-existing social norms, giving them a semi-formal 
regulatory  status  through  self-  or  co-regulatory  schemes  is  likely  to  reinforce 
those norms – and to suppress less positive social norms and attitudes. 
Avoid law and regulation that corrodes valuable social norms. An interesting 
example in this respect is the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) on social 
norms in research communities (see Menell, 2000: 144). Although it is generally 
agreed that  some form of  intervention may be necessary to  provide incentives  
for  research  and  development,  it  has  been  argued  that  IPR  may  undermine  
progress in science by promoting values that conflict with the traditional norms 
of collaboration, disinterestedness and the emphasis on path-breaking basic 
discoveries (Merton, 1973). The adverse effect of IPR may be especially strong in 
biomedical  research,  which traditionally  has  favored the sharing of  research to  
promote progress and serve humanity (Eisenberg, 1987). There is no simple 
solution to this dilemma, but such proposals as compulsory licensing may be 
worth  consideration  –  not  only  for  economic  efficiency,  but  also  to  foster  a  
cooperative culture of research. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  in  countries  such  as  the  UK,  law  reform  
proposals have began to give significant weight to surveys on public opinion, 
which closely relates to social norms.14 In light of the present paper this is a step 
forward, because more precise knowledge of public attitudes is vital to the 
design of good rules. It is however important to understand that public opinion 
should not be seen as an automatic source of legal normativity, because public 
attitudes may be poorly founded or  incoherent,  and social  norms may also be 
manifestly negative and harmful, as is discussed shortly in more detail. 
Support positive intrinsic motivation; avoid creating a ‘culture of minimal 
compliance’. The theory of intrinsic motivation gives additional support to light-
touch regulation in certain circumstances. Over-intrusive and formalistic 
regulatory approaches signal mistrust and confrontational attitudes, which are 
likely to weaken intrinsic motivation to do what is right. If regulatory subjects 
feel  they  are  being  treated  mistrustfully  and  unfairly,  they  will  also  tend  to  
respond with spiteful behavior, even to the point of making the job of regulatory 
authorities  as  difficult  as  possible  just  to  ‘get  even’  (see  Bardach  and  Kagan,  
1982). In the worse case, the regulators will in response feel their authority being 
undermined, and will retaliate with even worse treatment, giving rise to a spiral 
of hostility. 
Frey (1997) advises that positive intrinsic motivation is reinforced by external 
intervention that is perceived as supportive. This perception can be fostered 
numerous ways. One way is to develop personal relationships between regulators 
and regulatees. Another is to give the regulatees a sense of autonomy and to 
                                                        
14 See for example Law Commission (2006: 1.21, 5.74-77, 5.84, 7.12-17, 7.47). 
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provide participation opportunities;  self-  and  co-regulation  are  clear  instances  of  
such participation, but one can think of many other possibilities too. Thirdly, the 
message implied by external intervention is important; for example, rewards may 
be more fruitful in some contexts than punishments and commands. 
It  will  also  be  better  at  times  to  rely  on  soft, non-enforceable directives 
implemented by agreement instead of hard rules backed up by harsh sanctions. 
Building  on  evidence  from  health  and  safety  regulation,  Bardach  and  Kagan  
(1982) argue that hard regulation tends to cause crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivation among the better manager, who otherwise would have gone beyond 
the regulations. A similar argument could probably be made about 
environmental regulation, where too much emphasis on prices and regulations 
may  actually  have  an  adverse  effect  on  intrinsic  motivations  to  be  pro-
environment; the consequences will be even worse if hard regulations are poorly 
designed. 
It  is  obvious  that  tough  sanctions  are  sometimes  needed.  However,  Ayres  
and Braithwaite (1992) argue that regulation should always start with a 
persuasive  approach,  and  it  should  provide  differentiated  treatment  for  the  
‘good guys’ (those who comply voluntarily) and the ‘bad guys’ (those prone to 
cheating). Punishing misbehavior is also important for the intrinsic motivation 
of others, because they will otherwise feel that the rules are unfair and there is a 
‘law of the jungle’ in place. 
Use broad, flexible standards instead of detailed rules. In alignment strategies, 
flexible and principles-based standards are likely to work better than narrow, 
detailed rules. The reason is simple: broad standards are similar in kind to social 
norms – and indeed moral principles – because they focus more on fairness and 
reasonableness than on formal rights and duties. They are also more flexible and 
adaptive, which is why many authors claim that they are the best approach in 
rapidly changing environments. For example, UK industrial safety legislation 
has been criticized for failing to create any substantial reduction in accidents, 
partly because the laws center too heavily on machinery accidents that are less 
relevant  in  today’s  workplaces,  and  also  because  the  mandated  safety  devices  
fail  to  take  into  account  broader  factors  such  as  the  adaptive  responses  of  
workers (Veljanovski, 2007). 
Once again, the optimal strategy will depend on the details of each case. 
Strict rules – or at least demanding interpretation of broad standards – may be 
necessary when there are strong adverse incentives to depart from cooperative and 
pro-social behavior. 
Identify the proper role, scope and style of law and regulation. The theory of social 
norms highlights the difference between social and legal norms: they operate 
differently,  and  this  means  that  it  is  important  to  give  each  a  suitable  role.  In  
legal and regulatory design, one implication is that we should be conscious and 
discerning of the relevant social context. In some situations, legal categories and 
principles cannot adequately reflect the relevant factors that the participants 
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themselves feel should determine the outcome of certain conduct or dispute. 
Family problems are  the most  obvious case,  but  the issue is  relevant  to  all  the  
examples discussed so far. 
It is also important to be conscious of and sensitive to cultural differences. 
They are, for example, a fundamental factor when it comes to the success of 
‘legal transplants’ (see generally Watson, 1993). North (1990: 101) illustrates the 
problem as follows: 
‘The U.S. Constitution was adopted (with modifications) by many Latin 
American countries in the nineteenth century, and many of the property 
rights laws of successful Western countries have been adopted by Third 
World countries. The results, however, are not similar to those in either 
the United States or other successful Western countries. Although the 
rules are the same, the enforcement mechanisms, the way enforcement 
occurs, the norms of behavior, and the subjective models of the actors are 
not.’ 
Boettke (1998) argues likewise that one cannot understand differences of 
economic development without taking into account the role of culture. The twist 
in  Boettke’s  argument  is  that  on  the  general  level,  we  know  what  kinds  of  
institutions  are  necessary  for  economic  development  –  institutions  such  as  
private property, sound money, and freedom of contract – but we do not know 
how to implement them successfully: 
‘Economics may establish the properties of alternative rules, but culture 
and the imprint of history determine which rules can stick in certain 
environments. The problem is not one of private property and freedom of 
contract generating perverse consequences, but the fact that some social 
conventions  and  customary  practices  simply  do  not  legitimate  these  
institutions. If market transactions – which are universal – are constrained 
to a sub rosa existence, the commercial life and development will be 
limited. To move from that sub rosa existence, legal-political institutions 
must be adopted, but such adoption is only possible if there is a cultural 
fit.’ (Boettke, 1998: 13) 
A topical example of the role of cultural differences is intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection in China. The central government seems to be making an 
effort to enforce Western-style patents and copyrights, but practices in regional 
courts and other public bodies can be very different, because Chinese attitudes 
towards Western rights and privileges are influenced by many factors other than 
formal legal provisions alone (see Fung, 1996, and Allison and Lin, 1999). The 
role  of  culture  is  also  relevant  closer  to  home:  the  European  Union  consists  of  
countries  with  very  different  histories  and  cultures,  which  is  one  reason  why  
‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions may become ‘one-size-fits-none’ regulations. Thus the 
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social norms perspective cautions us against excessive centralization of 
regulation in a setting of large cultural differences. 
 
3.2 Culture-Building and Habit-Formation Strategies 
Foster cooperation by combining fairness with toughness.  Most  of  the  time  social  
problems are caused by various kinds of destructive, anti-social and 
uncooperative habits and norms. Can anything be done to improve the 
situation? One way of looking at it is that, assuming the issue is important and 
persuasive regulation does not deliver results, tough sanctions are needed. The 
general idea here is that when people are not freely willing to act fairly and 
reasonably, external intervention of some type may be needed. An interesting 
case  to  consider  is  the  UK  Financial  Services  Authority  (FSA),  which  has  been  
criticized for having adopted an unduly light-touch approach to financial 
regulation. The criticism has been raised after serious failings and abuses in the 
UK financial sector, and it is based on the idea that financial market participants 
are often tempted by powerful monetary incentives to act less-than-completely 
altruistically. 
But the issue is complex: not all finance professionals are selfish and greedy. 
How should regulation be framed in contexts that include multiple actors with 
different kinds of motivations and values? Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) propose 
an interesting strategy, called the ‘benign big gun’ approach. The idea is to create a 
regulatory system that combines persuasion – and thus recognition of positive 
intrinsic motivation – with severe but targeted sanctions on misbehaving 
persons. This approach builds on the game-theoretic notion of tit-for-tat 
strategies, which imply that regulators should normally treat regulatees well, 
but if their trust is broken, they should respond with punishments, the severity 
of which is measured in accordance with the seriousness of the offense. 
Importantly, the success of the benign-big-gun strategy hinges on the ability of 
regulators to play both reasonable and tough, and also on the credibility of their 
threat to raise the severity of punishments as the offenses get dirtier. The 
argument is that, in the optimal case, most actors will perceive the rules as fair 
and reasonable, because the ordinary approach is flexible and persuasive; and in 
addition, there will be no incentives to break the rules, because the punishments 
for violations are sufficiently tough and certain to come. 
One might suppose that the benign-big-gun proposal is perfectly obvious 
and  that  is  how  most  regulators  operate.  Unfortunately  that  is  not  the  case.  
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 49) cite the case of the US Occupational Health and 
Safety  Administration  (OSHA),  which  seems  to  operate  with  the  completely  
opposite logic: ‘They constantly nip at firms with flea-bite fines. In most 
encounters  with OSHA inspectors,  petty  punitiveness  is  in  the foreground and 
no big guns are in the background. The result of flea-biting is that cooperation is 
destroyed  without  any  of  the  benefits  that  can  flow  from  tough  enforcement  
being  secured.  When  scholars  point  to  an  agency  like  OSHA  to  conclude  that  
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punishment and persuasion are incompatible, they have not understood the 
foregrounding of cooperation and backgrounding of punishment that benign 
big guns can accomplish.’ 
Indeed, there are numerous examples regulations that fail to combine 
persuasion with serious sanctions. In the context of financial markets regulation, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is famed for its tendency to 
churn  out  complex  and  expensive-to-comply  regulations  that  signal  a  mistrust  
of  anyone  participating  in  financial  markets;  but  when  it  comes  to  dirty  play  
involving multi-million dollar pay-offs, the SEC’s punitive responses appear 
more symbolic than real.15 Perhaps  the  same  could  be  said  about  Finnish  
competition  law  and  its  enforcement:  even  after  a  recent  decision  that  raises  
punishment standards in anti-competitive agreement cases, the level of fines is 
arguably too low (given low probabilities of getting caught) to create a real 
deterrent effect.16 In light of the present discussion, such approaches to 
regulation are likely to fail on both counts: they cultivate both opposition and 
disobedience. 
Use creative strategies to promote positive social norms. The interesting question 
is  whether  other  –  less  interventionist  and  less  costly  –  strategies  could  be  
adopted to foster the formation of positive social norms. The ideas cited in this 
paper  suggest  that  are  various ways in  which this  can be done.  Considered in  
isolation, their impact may be limited, but many of them could be combined to 
create a holistic solution to a specific social problem. 
Frey’s (1997) strategies for encouraging intrinsic motivation were already 
mentioned earlier, but they are equally relevant here: developing personal 
relationships, giving participation opportunities, providing rewards (instead of, 
or  in  addition  to,  punishments),  etc.  Now  if  we  are  assuming  that  the  initial  
situation is rather more negative than positive, such light-touch approaches 
alone  may  not  be  enough,  but  they  should  never  be  completely  ignored  as  if  
some people were beyond any possibility of change. As Goethe famously said, 
‘Treat  a  man  as  he  is  and  he  will  remain  as  he  is.  Treat  a  man  as  he  can  and  
should be, and he will become as he can and should be.’ 
In  the  literature  on  social  norms  and  law,  some  commentators  have  
advocated the notion of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ (Sunstein, 1996b). The idea, 
common  in  sociology,  is  that  some  individuals  have  a  special  role  in  
transforming  established  social  norms  through  their  words  and  example.  The  
concept can be taken in a value-free sense: ‘norm entrepreneurs’ may change 
social norms for better or for worse. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  regulation,  the  idea  of  norm  entrepreneurship  is  
highly important.  It  may of  course  be difficult  for  politicians  and regulators  to  
change powerful social norms (Posner, 2000). Ordinarily, the only way to change 
                                                        
15 See Partnoy (2003) for a series of case studies. 
16 On the optimal level of fines for antitrust practices, see Wils (2006). 
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social norms is to violate them in a public and decisive way, and such behavior 
can  be  especially  risky  for  public  officials,  who  are  so  dependent  on  their  
acceptance  by  the  public.  However,  law  and  regulation  may  play  a  role  in  
supporting actions and role  models  –  for  example authors,  artists  and actors  –  
that are committed to challenging harmful social norms. Such support may 
include, among others, financial and moral support, and protecting such social 
actors against persecution in the public square. In economic terms, we could say 
that such legal and regulatory strategies aim to alter the payoffs of potential 
norm-entrepreneurs.  Such  strategies  obviously  call  for  a  high  degree  of  
prudence, because they may backfire, and it is difficult to predict all the 
unintended consequences flowing from attempts to manipulate social norms. 
Use creative strategies to cultivate other-regarding behavior.  It  may  also  be  
possible to encourage altruistic behavior in some regulatory settings. As Frank 
(1987, 1988) has pointed out, personal face-to-face contact tends to advance 
mutual understanding and altruism (see also Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1996). 
This can be illustrated by a counterexample that is familiar to most readers: car-
driving. Most drivers become impatient and annoyed much more easily behind 
the wheel than they would in other situations. According psychologists, the 
explanation is that conflict situations between different drivers are faceless and 
non-communicative, which obstructs the development of mutual 
understanding. 
This  has  at  least  two  implications  for  regulatory  strategy.  The  first  is  that  
when cooperation is needed, the enforcement of laws and regulations should be 
designed in such a manner that there are sufficient opportunities for personal, 
face-to-face  contact.  This  strategy  can  also  be  used  when  the  challenge  is  to  
obtain cooperation in the sense of fairness and honesty; it is simply much more 
difficult (even for physiological reasons) to lie face-to-face than in an impersonal 
letter. One can think of many potential areas of application, including the 
enforcement of tax and competition laws. Note however that in order to 
promote cooperation and fairness, the rules being enforced must also be seen as 
fair and reasonable; but the positive side is that personal contact and the 
exchange of ideas will normally help to create a more affirmative attitude 
toward the rules too.17 
The  second  implication  is  that  laws  can  be  employed  to  frame  the  relevant  
institutional set-ups so as to reduce to need for external intervention. For 
example,  when  the  aim  is  to  reduce  egoistic  or  greedy  conduct  by  certain  
individuals, the problem may be alleviated by reducing the amount of 
impersonal dealings and obliging more personal, face-to-face contact between 
the  relevant  transactors.  Financial  markets  and  company  law  are  just  some  
potential areas of application. 
                                                        
17 For further discussion in the context of tax policy, see Cowell (1992) and Vihanto (2003). 
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These examples demonstrate the importance of taking altruistic and fairness-
based behavior into account in all legislative and regulatory deliberations. 
However, altruism cannot always be relied on, and it is necessary to understand 
the influence of the context. For example, when there are powerful financial or 
other incentives to cheat or to be selfish, high ideals and internal constraints are 
more likely to be pushed aside (Rabin, 1993). 
Encourage good moral habits and protect the ‘moral ecology’ of the society. Finally, 
it is possible to encourage good moral habits. Law has an obvious role of play in 
this regard in the sense of promoting basic fairness and justice: in the absence of 
criminal, contract and accident law, many more people would be tempted to opt 
for  unjust  modes  of  conduct.  In  light  of  virtue  ethics,  such  conduct  would  
reinforce bad habits in those persons, making them morally worse. 
However,  virtue in  the fullest  sense cannot  be  forced from without;  it  must  
involve the free decision of the person to do the good. In this sense, law can play 
a  limited  role  only.  Good  moral  habits  are  fostered  mainly  through  one’s  
upbringing, education, role models, example of one’s peer group etc. The main 
responsibility lies therefore in the various institutions of the civil society: families, 
schools, churches, associations and so on. 
Nevertheless, the state can make important decisions in this respect too. Just 
like laws and regulations facilitate the activity of certain ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
similarly they influence the institutional setting in which the civil society 
operates. Educational laws give direction to the curricula of schools and 
universities; laws on marriage and the family influence the stability and health 
of natural families; laws on religious freedom, and even tax laws, influence the 
ability of religious communities to take formative activities upon themselves; 
and through its budgetary choices, the state makes numerous decisions that 
sustain certain social and cultural activities instead of others. Note also that, 
because  of  crowding-out  problems,  even  basic  social  policy  choices  have  
complex but powerful consequences on the vitality and social role of various 
kinds of voluntary associations and charitable organizations (see Beito, 1992). 
This perspective of moral habits is not much talked upon today, and it would 
be  easy  to  dismiss  it  as  secondary,  unimportant,  or  simply  too  vague.  Such  
skepticism is not warranted. There is a wealth of evidence supporting the view 
that people are significantly influenced by various educational and social 
factors, and that good influence can help change them for the better. Perceptions 
of  good  life  –  based  on  one’s  upbringing,  education,  and  books  and  movies  –  
have an empirically measurable effect on moral attitudes.18 There  are  also  
                                                        
18 For example, economics and business education has been criticized for implicitly promoting an 
egoistic and materialistic ideal of life. Individual cases differ, but empirical studies confirm that 
economics, finance and business students display more selfishness experiments than other groups: 
see Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993, 1996). The effect of economics is not clear, however, as it has 
been claimed that the selfishness-factor is the result of self-selection rather than indoctrination: Frank 
and Schulze  (2000).  Some have  sought  to  challenge  the  validity  of  the  finding that  economists  are  
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encouraging results  from certain programs aimed at  helping prisoners  avoid a  
criminal career.19 
In order to cultivate moral virtues, it is also necessary to protect what some 
have called the moral ecology of  the  society  (George,  1993).  This  broad  concept  
refers to the totality of moral and cultural factors which helps the upright moral 
development of persons and groups. The protection strategy here can mean 
many things, including the regulation of advertising so that the natural desire of 
companies to do more business will not corrupt individuals (young persons in 
particular) by promoting images and ideals that display materialistic and 
hedonistic lifestyles, fail to reflect and respect the dignity and rationality of 
human persons. Similarly, in such fields as entertainment, there is a danger that 
sales  are  boosted by way of  resorting to  the exploitation of  human temptation 
and moral weakness, and public authorities can legitimately act to restrain such 
influences, especially because the logic of competition may otherwise create 
pressures for all market participants to engage in dubious practices. Laws might 
also deliberately aim to protect the public against harmful norm entrepreneurs, 
i.e. influential individuals that spread norms and values that are destructive of 
life in society. 
Obviously, much prudence is needed.20 Intrusive intervention in social life 
risks giving rise to moral paternalism, which may backfire in the longer term. 
Fundamental values such as freedom of expression are also involved; and taking 
a moral stand in a pluralistic society provokes the question of conflicting values. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties alone may not be a sufficient reason to go from 
one  extreme  to  the  other,  from  paternalism  to  libertinism.  It  is  generally  
acknowledged that freedom of expression is not an absolute value, as it needs to 
be balanced against other human and fundamental rights. Similarly the mere 
existence  of  different  values  is  not  in  and  of  itself  a  good  reason  for  taking  
(whether actively or passively) a particular stand in the debate; and to treat all 
norms and values as equally laudable is also a position that calls for justification 
by independent reasons. 
 
3.3 Enforcement Strategies 
There are numerous reasons why social norms and internal constraints – either 
alone or  supported by legal  enforcement  –  may provide an attractive basis  for  
                                                                                                                                         
more selfish: Laband and Beil (1999) and Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996). More recent evidence 
suggests that the selfishness-factor of economics students is selection-based (as it does not increase 
over the course of the studies), but economics courses taken by non-economics majors seem to have 
a significant indoctrination effect (making them less generous): Bauman and Rose (2011). 
19 One  study  finds  that  Prison  Fellowship’s InnerChange Freedom Initiative participants were 60 
percent less likely to be re-incarcerated and 50 percent less likely to be re-arrested than the 
comparison group (see Johnson, 2003). 
20 See George (1993: 42) for an insightful discussion of the various prudential considerations which 
might militate in favor of a policy of tolerating certain moral evils. 
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enforcing socially desirable regulations. They may yield more effective results; 
they may imply lower costs for both regulators and regulatees; they may be more 
flexible and also more deeply rooted in those concerns that matter (for example, in 
the case of personal, long-term relationships); and they may reduce formalistic 
confrontation, which tends to corrode cooperative attitudes and positive social 
norms. 
It  is  not  easy  to  formulate  any  general  principles  or  guidelines  for  social-
norms-based enforcement strategies, and in any case the enforcement aspect of 
social  norms  has  been  implicit  in  the  foregoing  analysis  of  alignment  and  
culture-building regulatory strategies. Here I would only like to make some 
additional comments. 
One question concerns the conditions that make non-legal enforcement 
advisable and effective. As is clear from the previous sections, this depends on the 
nature and strength of the relevant social norms and moral values. For example, 
many aspects of business ethics (such as corporate responsibility programs) are 
not  enforced  legally,  but  there  are  reputational  incentives  for  implementing  
effective ethics programs in companies. To some extent, these reputational 
incentives depend on institutional arrangements and social expectations, which 
in turn are shaped by various social-norm entrepreneurs. It can be argued that 
many aspects of corporate responsibility should not be legally enforced, because 
the complex and aspirational character of business ethics implies that codifying 
its requirements in legal enforceable codes would be likely to stultify its 
development and to discourage ethically-orientated businesspeople; the 
difficulties involved in measuring and verifying corporate responsibility 
variables also argues against the over-judicialization of the field. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of informal enforcement depends on 
many factors such as the financial incentives to violate social and moral norms. 
It may also be that, although the general public strongly disapproves of certain 
conduct,  the  disapproval  remains  mostly  a  private  matter  because  it  is  not  
transformed into concrete  and relevant  action.  These concerns seem to hold in  
the context of anti-competitive agreements among businesses: the expected 
financial gain can be significant, and the reputational penalty seems to be less 
significant.21 
The other important question concerns the role of law and the state in the 
design of non-legal enforcement. For example, reputation effects can be 
deliberately influenced by laws and regulations. A topical example is the 
decision  of  the  Estonian  Ministry  of  Justice  to  publicly  ‘name  and  shame’  
parents  who  have  failed  to  make  maintenance  payments  after  divorce.  The  
reason for the decision seems to be that there have been difficulties in enforcing 
maintenance agreements through the court system. 
                                                        
21 On the reputational costs of corporate crime generally, see Alexander (1999). 
22 
More generally, law plays a supportive role even when the principal method of 
enforcement is non-legal. Law strengthens social norms through its expressive 
function and may give them necessary moral support. The specific content of 
social norms may also depend on laws and regulations; for example, standards 
of fairness can be shaped by legal rules even when they are enforced non-
legally. Finally, benign-big-gun strategies of regulation require that there exists 
the threat of powerful legal sanctions, which to facilitate cooperation between 
regulators and regulatees on a more flexible basis. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
Legal  and  regulatory  strategies  could  be  improved  in  two  ways.  Firstly  by  
looking  beyond  laws  and  regulations  to  the  realm  of  social  norms  and  other  
sources of normativity that govern human choosing and acting, and secondly by 
becoming  more  conscious  of  the  role  of  motivations,  moral  character  and  
culture. These perspectives can fruitfully be translated into regulatory strategies 
that (i) align laws with positive social norms and motivations, (ii) seek to foster 
positive norms and cultivate moral habits, and (iii) rely, when appropriate, on 
moral and social norms for the enforcement of laws. The goal of this paper has 
not been to replace pre-existing wisdom, but to propose ideas that may give new 
insights and show directions for new initiatives. Its application in specific fields 
of regulation requires further discussion, experience and learning. 
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Essay 4 
Law and Virtue: An 
Economic Analysis 
ABSTRACT 
 
Classical  virtue  theory  has  received  limited  attention  in  economics.  The  paper  
demonstrates its fruitfulness for but economic and legal analysis by linking the 
traditional ethical literature with modern law and economics. Virtues are 
interpreted  as  a  theory  of  moral  psychology,  and  applied  to  economic  theory,  
with comparisons against other behavioral models in economics. It is found that 
the virtue factor has major significance in economic life. 
The paper  also outlines  a  general  framework for  the analysis  of  law from a 
virtue-based perspective, showing how optimal legal design depends on the 
level of virtue of the citizens. Six general principles are identified: (1) virtue goes 
together with more freedom, while lack of virtue calls for more legal and 
regulatory constraints; (2) virtue goes together with more demanding law, while 
lack of  virtue calls  for  less  demanding law;  (3)  virtue goes  together  with more 
precise laws, while lack of virtue calls for less legal precision; (4) virtue goes 
together  with  broad  standards,  while  lack  of  virtue  calls  for  narrow  rules;  (5)  
virtue goes together with lighter enforcement and sanctions, while lack of virtue 
calls  for  harsher  punishments;  and  (6)  virtue  goes  together  with  more  
participation in law-making and law-enforcement, while lack of virtue implies 
less participation. 
It  is  shown  that  there  are  various  ways  of  gathering  information  about  the  
level of virtue in society, and that laws and regulations may be designed in ways 
that  account  for  the moral  heterogeneity  of  the citizens.  Finally,  it  is  found the 
law  plays  a  major  role  in  promoting  and  safeguarding  virtues,  but  legal  
perfectionism may be counterproductive. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of virtues has received limited attention in economics. This essay 
argues that the classical theory of virtues provides a fruitful perspective for both 
economic and legal  questions.  The argument  if  structured as  follows.  First,  the  
principal concepts and ideas of classical virtue theory are explained. Second, the 
notion of virtue is analyzed in the context of economics, comparing the 
assumptions of virtue theory with those of modern economics, and 
demonstrating the practical importance of virtues in economic life. Third, a 
general  framework  is  developed  for  analyzing  the  role  of  virtues  in  the  
economic analysis  of  law,  showing how the optimal  design of  law depends on 
the level of virtue of the citizens. 
 
 
2 VIRTUE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
This section provides a short introduction to the fundamentals of classical virtue 
theory. In ancient Greek philosophy, virtues were understood as perfections of 
character, acquired through the repetition of good acts. At least since Plato, the 
idea of the virtues was organized around the four cardinal virtues: prudence, 
justice, fortitude, and temperance.1 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Plato’s student 
Aristotle  developed  a  rich  account  of  the  theory  of  virtues,  and  subsequent  
literature  has  tended  to  take  it  as  the  fundamental  point  of  reference  (see  
Aristotle, 1980). In recent decades, academic philosophy and psychology have 
witnessed a kind of renaissance of virtue ethics.2 Now, the interesting question 
for our purposes is not the ethical and normative dimension of virtues, but rather 
the theory of virtues as a descriptive account of the perfection of human 
personality. There is a rich literature of this “moral psychology” view of virtues 
that  takes  into  account  more  recent  work  in  psychology  (see  Peterson  and  
Seligman, 2004, and the references cited therein). 
In what follows I will first explain the notion of habit, and then outline the 
cardinal  virtues  and  show  how  they  are  related  to  each  other.  I  finish  by  
discussing the question of whether virtue theory is universally applicable. 
 
                                                        
1 The four-fold distinction appears in Agathon’s speech in praise of Love in Plato’s Symposium. It 
probably has an earlier origin, as Pieper (1966: xi) points out: “An avant-garde intellectual who, 
incidentally, is the host of the famous banquet, Agathon offers no special reasons for this approach. 
That is, the contemporaries of Socrates already took for granted these traditional categories sprung 
from the earliest speculative thinking.” Later writers have sought to justify the idea of four cardinal 
virtues by linking them to different faculties of human persons: intellect, will, and two generic types 
of passion or emotion called irascible and concupiscible passion. 
2 See for example Pieper (1966), Geach (1977), Foot (1978), MacIntyre (1984) and Kruschwitz and 
Roberts (1987). See also Peterson and Seligman (2004) for an extensive discussion of virtues by 
leading psychologists. 
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2.1 Habits: Temperament vs. Character 
According to the classical doctrine of virtue, no one is born virtuous or excellent. 
In each person there are passions (emotions, feelings and impulses) that militate 
against  the  correct  and  reasonable  exercise  of  one’s  freedom.  One  of  the  
principal effects of virtue is to gain a greater harmony between reason, will and 
the passions. In the words of Aristotle (1980: I.13), 
“the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. 
[Whereas] in the continent man [the soul] obeys [reason] – and 
presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still  more obedient; for 
in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as [reason].” 
Another distinction is sometimes made between nature-given temperament 
and moral character.3 The first  is  an innate  reality,  whereas  the latter  is  shaped 
over time by education, environment and the exercise of one’s freedom. 
Different  temperaments  imply  that,  in  order  to  perfect  one’s  personality  and  
become truly virtuous, one has to struggle in different ways, depending on one’s 
natural propensities. But temperaments as such are neither virtuous nor vicious. 
The fundamental principle of virtue theory is that habits – virtues and vices – 
become stronger and more stable by way of repetition. Aristotle writes that 
“intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching 
[…], while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit” (Aristotle, 1980: II.1). It 
is again clear that virtues do not arise in us by nature, but “we are adapted by 
nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit” (ibid.). 
It may be helpful to realize that the modern English word habit does not quite 
convey the meaning of Greek hexis or Latin habitus (see Sachs, 2005). Rather, the 
concept  refers  to  a  kind  of  ability  –  an  inner  strength,  power  or  skill  –  that  is  
developed by the constant and repeated exercise of virtuous acts. It also refers to 
various practical skills that are mastered by repeating the relevant acts: walking, 
doing sports, playing and instrument etc. Thus, by doing righteous deeds one 
becomes  an  increasingly  and  stably  just  person;  similarly  with  acts  that  are  
prudent,  courageous  or  temperate.  On  the  other  hand,  the  exercise  of  vicious  
acts  –  foolishness,  injustice,  cowardice,  overindulgence  and  so  on  –  fosters  the  
weakening and degradation of moral character and, consequently, of the whole 
personality. 
Implicit in the classical theory of virtue is the idea that there is certain stability 
about one’s character, whether it be virtuous or vicious. That stability is 
translated  into  a  tendency  –  weaker  or  stronger  depending  on  the  deep-
rootedness  of  the  virtue  or  the  vice  –  to  behave  in  accordance  with  one’s  
character  in  future  situations too.  Therefore  one cannot  normally  change one’s  
                                                        
3 The theory of temperaments is an important field in modern psychology, but its roots can be found 
at least in the work of Galen (AD 131–201), who described the four classical temperaments 
(melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine and choleric). 
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character overnight for better or for worse, because character-change implies an 
inner transformation that requires the development of a habitus,  which  takes  
times and repetition. 
The  doctrine  of  virtues  does  not  imply  anything  specific  to  the  perennial  
question of how much of our personality is based on innate qualities as opposed 
to education, environment and other external factors. The theory is compatible 
with  the  fact  that  people  may  have  all  kinds  of  natural  gifts  as  well  as  moral  
propensities that have an impact on later development. It does, however, 
underline  the  fact  that  the  perfection  of  personality  is  a  complex  interplay  of  
numerous factors  that  cannot  really  be separated from one another,  even if  we 
can conceptually distinguish them. Moreover, some personality traits that are 
commonly assumed to  be natural  or  innate  may not  be  so in  fact.  It  is  difficult  
for us to know such things with any precision, because the development of 
character starts straight after birth if not earlier. Often, what is seen as an innate 
trait may really be the result of the complex interaction between the educational 
and environmental conditions, on the one hand, and the free responses of the 
person  in  question,  on  the  other  hand,  going  back  all  the  way  to  earliest  
childhood. Aristotle (1980: II.1) seemed to have this in mind when he wrote: “It 
makes  no  small  difference,  then,  whether  we  form  habits  of  one  kind  or  of  
another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the 
difference.” 
 
2.2 Cardinal Virtues 
The  words  that  are  used  to  signify  specific  virtues  are  not  always  understood  
correctly. Pieper (1966) repeatedly points out that contemporary language tends 
to  depart  significantly  from  the  classical  sense  of  the  words  that  refer  to  the  
virtues. Therefore their traditional meaning is briefly outlined in the following. 
Prudence as a cardinal virtue does not mean the timorous, danger-shunning, 
small-minded self-preservation that the word may bring to the modern mind. 
Rather, prudence is “the perfected ability to make good choices” (Pieper, 1966: 
6) – nothing more, and nothing less. The notion of “good choice” here includes 
technical quality and skill as well as moral goodness. It is possible to analyze the 
different aspects of good choosing, but the cardinal virtue of prudence should be 
understood to  encompass  them all:  in  its  perfect  form,  it  is  the  firm and stable  
ability to make good choices – without any conditions. 
The virtue of justice is  not  mere  equity  and  fair  play,  but  something  much  
more interior to the person. In the words of Aquinas (1920: II-II, 58, 1): “Justice is 
a habit [habitus], whereby a man renders to each one his due with a constant and 
perpetual will.” The specific requirements of the virtue of justice are a very 
complex question, which in fact is the principal question in ethics. What 
concerns us here is not the specific content of justice, but the general notion of 
justice as virtue: it is a stable and perfected volitional disposition of a person to 
6 
really want to fulfill the requirements of justice in each and every concrete 
situation. 
Fortitude or courage is  not  fearlessness  (which is  actually  a  vice  by way of  a  
defect). In its classical essence, courage is readiness to fall in battle (Aristotle, 
1980: III.6). But speaking more generally, courage is the perfected ability to stay 
the course and resist pressures of all kinds, whether that requires boldness and 
daring or endurance and patience (see Havard, 2007: 70-78; Pieper, 1966: 126-
133). 
Temperance or self-control is neither a fear of exuberance (which again would 
be a vice), nor mere moderation in eating and drinking. It is the ability to lead 
oneself  to  the good,  i.e.  to  subordinate  passions (emotions and feelings)  to  the 
spirit and direct them towards that which is truly and not only superficially good 
(see Havard, 2007: 80-90; Pieper, 1966: 145-152). 
The classical approach organizes the virtues around these four cardinal 
virtues, but there are countless other virtues too, including thoughtfulness, 
decisiveness, kindness, gratitude, faithfulness, industriousness, cheerfulness, 
modesty, purity and so on. The various “minor” virtues can, however, be rooted 
in  the  cardinal  virtues  to  which  they  are  related  by  way  of  implication  or  
analogy.  Thus,  for  example,  thoughtfulness  and  decisiveness  are  aspects  of  
prudence; kindness, gratitude and faithfulness are different instances of justice; 
industriousness and cheerfulness flow from courage; and modesty and purity 
stems from self-control. The word cardinal stems from the Latin cardines meaning 
“hinges,”  because  the  other  virtues  move  around  and  depend  on  the  cardinal  
virtues.  That  is  not  to  say  that  they  are  less valuable. A better way of 
understanding it is to say that it is precisely those more specific virtues that give 
depth and content to the (more general) cardinal virtues. 
 
2.3 The Unity of Virtues 
If one considers virtue theory as a mere list of different virtues, the multitude of 
virtues can seem perplexing, and one may wonder how it is possible to become 
truly  virtuous  if  there  are  so  many  different  excellences  to  be  mastered  and  
perfection  to  be  acquired.  One  might  also  pose  an  objection  to  the  classical  
theory of virtues by pointing out that, surely, prudence and fortitude sound like 
nice  things,  but  they  can  also  be  used  for  evil  purposes.  The  answer  to  these  
concerns can be found from another fundamental tenet of the classical doctrine, 
known as the unity of virtues. 
This principle can be summed up in the saying, “Virtues grow together like 
the five fingers of the hand.”4 The systematic nature of classical virtue theory 
becomes evident if we consider the claim that no virtue stands on its own, as they 
are all intimately related to one another. The names given to different virtues are 
                                                        
4 This famous saying is usually attributed to Aquinas (1920: I-II, 66, 2), but it is not a literal quotation. 
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simply means for analyzing and distinguishing, but real virtues are qualities of 
concrete persons, who cannot be sliced up and cut apart. 
So,  for  example,  justice  and  fortitude  –  as  genuine  virtues  –  are  really  
different aspects of a whole. On the one hand, courage combined with the lack 
of justice can become a force for evil:  “injustice corrupts the fruits of fortitude” 
(Pieper, 1966: 64-65). On the other hand, justice without courage is weak and 
unstable – and, hence, not really a virtue at all. Havard (2007: 121) puts it 
graphically: 
“Many politicians, lacking courage, make a travesty of justice. Think of 
Pontius Pilate and his brand of justice: ‘I could find no substance in any of 
the charges you bring against him [Jesus of Nazareth] … so I will scourge 
him…’ Here is the frightening logic of a coward.” 
Similar connections can be found for the other virtues, too. For example, 
deep-seated  intemperance  –  an  uncontrolled  craving  for  power,  money  and  
pleasures – spoils all the other virtues: it blinds the intellect, perverts the will, 
and makes a person cowardly (Pieper, 1966: 21-22, 203). 
Although all the virtues need one another, prudence has a special role in the 
theory of virtues. The reason for the primacy of prudence is that, as the classical 
expression has it, prudence is the “measure” of justice, fortitude, temperance 
and  all  the  other  virtues  (Pieper,  1966:  7).  The  meaning  of  this  expression  
becomes clear when one considers the fact that the specifically moral virtues 
cannot guide themselves. It takes prudence – that is, the perfected ability to 
perceive the reality as it is and to make good choices –  to  see  what  each  virtue  
requires in each concrete situation. Justice without prudence is mere “good 
intention” and “meaning well”:  it  is  a  good start,  but  very far  from perfection.  
Pieper  (1966:  8)  sums  it  up  eloquently:  “The  intrinsic  goodness  of  man  […]  
consists in this, that ‘reason perfected in the cognition of truth’ shall inwardly 
shape and imprint his volition and action.” 
 
2.4 Criticism: Stability, Universality and the Role of Culture 
The  classical  theory  of  virtuous  has  encountered  criticism,  some  of  which  is  
briefly mentioned here. A principal criticism is the claim that situational factors 
are more determining of choice than moral character; it is questionable to talk of 
virtues  if  all  people  respond  to  external  pressures  and  incentives  (Doris,  1998,  
2002; Harman, 1999, 2000). One frequently cited support for this view is the 
famous Milgram experiment, in which many people obeyed an authority figure 
who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their conscience (see 
Milgram,  1963).  However,  the  criticism  seems  unfounded,  because  such  
experiments are open to different interpretations. Advocates of virtues theory 
have responded by saying that the critics misconstrue the nature of character 
traits and misleadingly interpret limited empirical data (see Athanassoulis, 2000; 
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Kamtekar, 2004; Kupperman, 2001; Miller, 2003; Montmarquet, 2003; Sabini and 
Silver, 2005; Solomon, 2003; and Sreenivasan, 2002). 
Another criticism is that people disagree on the content of the virtues, so the 
classical theory is not universally accepted. This claim raises fundamental 
questions about truth relativism, but, briefly, it is important to remember that 
the  mere  fact  of  disagreement  is  not  a  definitive  proof  one  way  or  another.  
Moreover,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  disagreement  about  virtues  ordinarily  
consists of disagreement on what is virtuous, not what the virtues are in their 
general form. In other words, people may have diverging views on what is the 
just and equitable solution to this or that moral dilemma, or how a courageous 
or self-controlled person should act in a concrete situation, but it is rare to find a 
person who – understanding the meaning of words – sincerely thinks that 
foolishness, injustice, cowardice and intemperance are good and admirable traits 
of personality. 
The disagreement, therefore, principally concerns the practical application of 
the virtues to concrete situations, and it is only natural that there should be some 
variance  of  opinion,  even  within  a  specific  culture  and  community.  That  is  
implied in the idea that prudence is the measure of  all  the  virtues  –  and  in  
matters  of  prudence,  it  is  possible  and  in  fact  quite  easy  to  err.  A  different  
problem arises when people do not care to act in accordance with the virtues, or 
do not even know that there are such things. 
On the other hand, it is certainly true that the virtue ethics outlined here has 
its origins in Greek philosophy. One unavoidable consequence is that the 
language employed is specifically Western. However, many cultures have 
ethical traditions which closely resemble Western virtue ethics, or at least exhibit 
elements of it. For example, there is a growing comparative literature on 
Aristotelian and Confucian ethics, demonstrating the great similarities of these 
traditions despite very different linguistic concepts.5 It has also been argued that 
there are certain fundamental personality traits that are admired – or despised – 
by others  across  cultures  (see  Lewis,  2001:  Annex 1).  One reason why we may 
fail  to  notice  it  is  that  we  tend  to  focus  on  differences  –  the  similarities  are  
sometimes too obvious to attract our attention. 


3 VIRTUE AND ECONOMICS 
 
It  is  surprising  to  find  that  the  notion  of  virtues  has  received  practically  no  
systematic  treatment  in  modern  economics.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  
numerous minor  comments  and side remarks to  virtues  in  economic literature  
(and much more in the broader field of social and behavioral sciences). 
                                                        
5 See especially Yu (1998, 2007) and Sim (2007, 2010). MacIntyre (1991, 2004) is skeptical, but believes 
these traditions can engage in fruitful dialogue. 
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In  what  follows,  I  will  first  provide  an  outline  of  some  of  the  economic  
literature  that  touches upon virtue theory.  I  will  then analyze how that  theory 
differs from the assumptions concerning rationality and behavior in some 
branches  of  contemporary  economics.  Finally,  I  try  to  provide  a  sketch  of  the  
various specifically economic benefits of virtues. 
 
3.1 Virtues in Economic Literature 
There  are  at  least  two  possible  reasons  why  virtue  theory  has  not  been  
systematically  studied in  economics.  One is  that  the classical  theory fell  out  of  
fashion some time during what is now called the modern period in European 
history (see MacIntyre, 1984; McCloskey, 2008). Other theories of ethics, from 
Bentham’s utilitarianism to Kant’s deontology, replaced the classical tradition. 
Until  quite  recently,  virtues  were  conceived  of  as  odd  and  archaic  concepts  of  
little interest to others than Classics students. 
The second reason is that virtue theory is principally understood as an ethical 
theory. In fact, when the notion of “virtue” appears in economic literature, it is 
often understood not in the classical, Aristotelian sense of human perfection, but 
merely as a synonym for “ethics” or “justice” (see for example, Vogel, 2005). Of 
course, virtue theory is an  ethical  theory,  too  –  but  it  is  also  a  theory  about  
human nature, psychology and behavior.6 
Nevertheless, there have been many references to virtues in economic 
literature broadly understood. It is not possible to give an exhaustive review 
here, but some of the key contributions should be mentioned. 
In early modern economics, Adam Smith is the obvious example of a thinker 
who was also interested in the virtues. Although he is primarily famous for The 
Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1976), which is seen by some as an apology for greed 
and selfishness, the reality is more complicated. Smith was principally a moral 
philosopher, and his other published book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments ([1759] 
1976), was broadly in the tradition of virtue ethics (McCloskey, 2008).7 Smith did 
not develop a virtue-based theory of economics, but out-of-context quotations 
                                                        
6 In this respect virtue theory in the broader sense resembles Bentham’s utilitarianism, which is both 
an ethical and a psychological theory. His psychological hedonism is not a normative theory, but an 
attempt to describe actual human behavior. In the opening passage of the Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation, Bentham ([1789] 1970: ch. 1) writes: 
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we  shall  do.  On  the  one  hand  the  standard  of  right  and  wrong,  on  the  other  the  chain  of  
causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
all  we  think:  every  effort  we  can  make  to  throw  off  our  subjection,  will  serve  but  to  
demonstrate and confirm it.” 
7 The tense relationship between Smith’s two major works – the “Adam Smith problem” – remains 
an  object  of  study  among  historians  of  thought.  For  an  explanation  and  an  attempt  to  resolve  the  
problem, see Otteson (2000, 2002, 2011) as well as McCloskey (2008). 
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fail  to  do  justice  to  the  fact  that  he  was  deeply  convinced  that  certain  
fundamental  virtues  were part  and parcel  of  the functioning of  a  good society 
(Fitzgibbons, 1995). 
Closer  to  our  times,  Max  Weber’s  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism ([1905] 1958) is an important work that highlights the role of moral – 
and religious – outlook in economic development. Weber argued that capitalism 
was rooted in a particular state of mind, which subordinated emotion, custom, 
traditional, folklore and myth to the domination of instrumental rationality.8 
This  type  of  rationality,  according  to  Weber,  was  common  among  the  
ascetically-inclined Protestants. Weber’s general thesis has subsequently been 
challenged on both theoretical and empirical levels, but it remains an important 
contribution to the workings between moral outlook and economic life.9 
Irving Fisher’s classic Theory of Interest (1930) is also especially interesting, 
because it often mentions personal characteristics that contribute to, or lessen, 
impatience in the use of money. Among characteristics that lessen impatience 
are found foresight, self-control, thrift, expectation of a long life, and concern for 
welfare of family after death. Traits that contribute to impatience include short-
sightedness, weak will, habit of spending freely, emphasis on the shortness and 
uncertainty of life, selfishness, and slavish following of whims of fashion. 
Among  contemporary  economists,  Deirdre  McCloskey  is  probably  the  one  
that  has  expressed  most  systematic  interest  in  virtue  ethics.  Her  book  The 
Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (2006) is a lively discussion of the 
ethics of market economics. However, it is more a philosophical journey, and an 
ethical defense of capitalism – not an attempt to create an economic theory that 
draws on the notion of virtues. 
Despite these examples, references to virtues seem to be almost non-existent 
from in economic science today. One exception is Nobel-prize winning 
                                                        
8 Weber  (1958:  17)  argues  that  a  capitalist  economy as  such is  not  based on greed and avarice,  but  
rather on the restraint of such irrational impulses: 
“The impulse of acquisition, the pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of 
money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed 
among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, 
nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One may say that it has been common to all sorts 
and conditions  of  men at  all  times  and in  all  countries  of  the  earth,  wherever  the  objective  
possibility  of  it  is  or  has  been  given.  It  should  be  taught  in  the  kindergarten  of  cultural  
history that this naïve idea of capitalism must be given up once and for all. Unlimited greed 
for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism, and is still less its spirit. Capitalism may 
even  be  identical  with  the  restraint,  or  at  least  a  rational  tempering,  of  this  irrational  
impulse.” 
9 On the theoretical level, Weber describes incorrectly both Calvinism and pre-Reformation 
Catholicism (see Gregg, 2007: 4-6). On the empirical level, it has been shown that capitalism began to 
emerge at least a century before Luther and Calvin, especially in the city-states of Northern Italy (see 
Fanfani, 1984). These critiques show that Weber’s “Protestant ethic” thesis is misplaced, but they do 
not reduce the value of his analysis on the impact of ethical outlook on economic life. 
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economist Kenneth Arrow, who once famously said: “It can be argued that the 
presence of what are in a slightly old-fashioned terminology called virtues in fact 
plays a significant role in the operation of the economic system” (Arrow, 1972: 
345). However, it remained an unelaborated comment in a philosophical paper 
discussing the role of altruism in social life. 
 
3.2 Comparison with Other Models in Economics 
Different approaches in economics have both differences and similarities with 
the virtue-based view of human behavior. Three approaches are contrasted here 
with  virtue  theory:  (1)  the  standard  or  rational choice theory,  (2)  the  behavioral 
approach drawing from psychology, and (3) the theory of human capital and its 
different varieties. The virtue theory can be seen as combining elements of the 
first two approaches, although it also differs from both. The third view (human 
capital) is a more specific theory that could be fruitfully employed to explain 
some of the implications of virtues to economics. 
 
3.2.1 The Standard Model: Rational Choice 
The standard model in neoclassical economics, sometimes known as rational 
choice theory, holds that people act according to personal utility maximization, 
given a set of stable preferences and constraints. This vision of choice, which is 
akin to a maximization calculus, is subject to continuous debate. In its extreme 
form, the rational choice model has best been summarized by Becker (1976: 14, 
emphasis added): 
“The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not 
compartmentalized, sometimes based on maximizing, sometimes not, 
sometimes motivated by stable preferences, sometimes by volatile ones, 
sometimes resulting in an optimal accumulation of information, 
sometimes not. Rather, all human behavior can be viewed as involving 
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets.”10 
There are, of course, many different conceptions of rationality.11 But instead 
of labels like that, what concern us principally are the specific assumptions of 
rational  choice  theory,  and  how  they  differ  from  the  assumptions  of  virtue  
theory. 
Naturally, there are divergent opinions among economists on both the 
content  and  the  applicability  of  these  assumptions.  Many  economists  are  
                                                        
10 Elsewhere (p. 5), Becker writes: “The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market 
equilibrium,  and  stable  preferences,  used  relentlessly  and  unflinchingly,  form  the  heart  of  the  
economic approach as I see it.” 
11 See MacIntyre (1989), Sen (1977; 1987: 10-28).  
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reluctant to extend the rational choice model far beyond the realm of material 
production and exchange in a market setting.12 Likewise, most economists do 
not suppose that their fundamental assumptions are literally true. Rather, they 
are a useful simplification, which renders their analysis easier and more robust. 
What matters is that they yield clear and fruitful predictions.13 A further defense 
of rational choice theory is that, although it is not true of everyone’s behavior, it 
may be true generally, because competitive conditions force people to adapt and 
those who fail to maximize their preferences will fail.14 
There are different ways of understanding the meaning of the fundamental 
terms and assumptions. I will briefly comment on three of them – utility 
maximization, preferences and self-interest – and will then discuss the 
compatibility of virtue theory with the rational choice model. 
 
3.2.1.1 Utility Maximization 
The principal assumption of rational choice theory is that choice is based on 
utility  maximization.  What  follows  from  this  assumption  is  a  kind  of  choice  
determinism: when both the internal objectives (preferences) and the external 
options and constraints (budget and prices) are given, choice follows. Machina 
(1987: 124-125, emphasis added) explains: 
“[In  the  expected  utility  model]  we  assume  that  the  objects  of  choice,  
either commodity bundles or lotteries, can be unambiguously and 
objectively described, and that situations which ultimately imply the same 
set of availabilities (e.g. the same budget set) will lead to the same choice. 
[W]e also assume that the individual is able to perform the mathematical 
operations necessary to actually determine the set of availabilities, e.g, to 
add  up  the  quantities  in  different  size  containers  or  calculate  the  
probabilities of compound or conditional events. Finally […] we assume 
that  preferences  are  transitive,  so  that  if  an individual  prefers  one object  
(either a commodity bundle or a risky prospect) to a second, and prefers 
this  second  object  to  a  third,  he  or  she  will  prefer  the  first  object  to  the  
third.” 
                                                        
12 For example, Coase (1994). See (Becker, 1993: 3-4) for other references and criticism of this kind of 
behavioral compartmentalization. 
13 In the famous words of Friedman (1953: 14): 
“In so far as a theory can be said to have ‘assumptions’ at all, and in so far as their ‘realism’ 
can  be  judged  independently  of  the  validity  of  predictions,  the  relation  between  the  
significance of a theory and the ‘realism’ of its ‘assumptions’ is almost the opposite of that 
suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and significant hypotheses will be 
found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, 
and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this 
sense).” 
14 See North (1990: 19, 24) for a summary and critique of this kind of argument. 
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One of the interesting implications of the assumption of utility maximization 
is  that  there  is  no  account  of  human  weakness  or  genuine  error.  People  can  
make objectively bad choices, but subjectively speaking  their  choices  are  always  
the best ones. In other words, rational actors always choose optimally, and attain 
the maximum welfare  that  was within their  reach,  given their  preferences  and 
perceptions of the choices available to them. 
As  is  explained  later,  preferences  are  assumed  to  be  stable,  which  implies  
that  people  cannot  change them.  And,  as  far  as  perceptions of  the options are  
concerned,  these  are  due to  natural  capacities  as  well  as  acquired information.  
But even with respect to information that is costly to acquire, the standard 
model implies that people invest – deterministically – in the accumulation of 
information to the extent that the marginal benefit of better information equals 
the marginal cost of acquiring it (Stigler, 1961). Ultimately, therefore, if people 
make bad choices and end up being miserable, it is ultimately due to bad luck. 
 
3.2.1.2 Stable and Revealed Preferences 
“Preferences” – or “tastes” – form the underlying basis of the maximization 
calculus of the standard model, because they give rise to the objective function 
that is supposed to be maximized. The ordinary assumption in the standard 
model is that preferences are stable: “tastes neither change capriciously nor 
differ importantly between people. [Tastes] are there, will be there next year, 
too, and are the same to all men” (Stigler and Becker, 1977: 76). The fundamental 
reason for the assumption of stable and unambiguous preferences is practical, not 
philosophical: 
“The assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for 
generating predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents 
the analyst from succumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the 
required shift in preferences to ‘explain’ all apparent contradictions to his 
predictions.” (Becker, 1976: 5) 
This  is  a  complicated  issue.  In  practice,  economists  often  try  to  reduce  the  
problem to clearly defined terms so that no complex assumptions of preferences 
are needed; ideally, it is assumed that all the variables can be measured in 
monetary terms, and thus people are only interested in money.15 However, most 
contemporary economists hold that preferences can be complex. So, for example, 
Becker  (1976:  5)  explains  that  preferences  “do  not  refer  to  market  goods  and  
services”, but rather to “fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, 
sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy”. The abstract modeling of such complex 
preferences  is  a  subject  of  ongoing discussion (see  Becker,  1996).  Some authors  
have asked whether it is workable to extend preferences to such a wide range of 
                                                        
15 See the notion of “economic man” (homo economicus) according to Jensen and Meckling (1994: 10). 
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objects, while continuing to claim that they are stable and unambiguous (Frank, 
2004). 
In  addition  to  stability  and  non-ambiguity,  preferences  are  assumed  to  be  
revealed through choice.  The reason for this assumption is “the idea that the only 
way  of  understanding  a  person’s  real  preference  is  to  examine  his  actual  
choices” (Sen, 1977: 323). Naturally, this has been a contested assumption for 
decades. It is, however, important for the deterministic nature of the rational 
choice model, because it guarantees the identity between preferences and choice 
by way of a “definitional fix” (Sen, 2002: 6). 
 
3.2.1.3 Self-interest 
Amartya Sen begins his perhaps most famous article, entitled “Rational Fools”, 
as follows: 
“In his Mathematical Psychics, published in 1881, Edgeworth asserted that 
‘the  first  principle  of  Economics  is  that  every  agent  is  actuated  only  by  
self-interest.’  This  view  of  man  has  been  a  persistent  one  in  economic  
models, and the nature of economic theory seems to have been much 
influenced by this basic premise.” (Sen, 1977: 317) 
Thousands  of  pages  have  been  written  for  and  against  the  self-interest  
assumption in neoclassical economics, and the debate shows no signs of slowing 
down.  A  leading  critic  of  the  self-interest  assumption,  Amartya  Sen  writes  in  
another work: 
“The self-interest view of rationality involves inter alia a firm rejection of 
the  ‘ethics-related’  view  of  motivation.  […]  To  see  any  departure  from  
self-interest maximization as evidence of irrationality must imply a 
rejection of the role of ethics in actual decision taking” (Sen, 1987: 15). 
Naturally, there are many different ways of understanding the notion of self-
interest, but the standard assumption in almost all of economic research is that 
people are simply looking after themselves, and ethical considerations do not 
enter into the picture (Sen, 1987: 7).16 
                                                        
16 What  Sen finds  most  inappropriate  in  this  approach is  that,  in  addition to  taking an implausible  
assumption as fact, the standard approach defines rationality as equal to self-interested utility 
maximization: 
“Indeed,  it  may  not  be  quite  as  absurd  to  argue  that  people  always  actually do maximize 
their self-interest, as it is to argue that rationality must invariably demand maximization of 
self-interest. Universal selfishness as actuality may well be false, but universal selfishness as 
a requirement of rationality is patently absurd. […] To try to use the demands of rationality 
in going to battle on behalf of the standard behavioural assumption of economic theory (to 
wit, actual self-interest  maximization)  is  like  leading  a  cavalry  charge  on  a  lame  donkey.”  
(Sen, 1987: 16) 
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Part of the difficulty is that the concept of self-interest is so vague. If in earlier 
time  it  was  common  to  speak  of  outright  egoism,  today,  some  economists  will  
grant that, at least in principle, self-interest may include all kinds of seemingly 
non-selfish or even irrational motivations: “The analysis assumes that 
individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, 
altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic” (Becker, 1992: 1). Although this 
concession seems to open the door to a wider range of considerations, it should 
be remembered that one fundamental issue remains unchanged: rational choice 
theory assumes that non-selfish behavior is a preference among others, and 
preferences are stable and, hence, given – not subject to rational deliberation and 
choice. Ultimately, again, the implication is that moral considerations are not 
chosen any more than one’s liking of football instead of opera, or chocolate ice-
cream instead of plain vanilla.17 
In sum, the combination of utility maximization, stable and revealed 
preference, and self-interest create a deterministic totality in which one 
assumption feeds into the others: 
“The absolutist version of self-interest, together with the assumptions of 
stable preferences and maximizing behaviour, leads to a deterministic 
relationship among preferences, choice, and welfare […]. Summing-up, 
we  get  a  triple  identity  or  full  circle:  self-interest  is  the  only  generic  
preference, which in turn is revealed through choice, and given that any 
choice advances individuals’ welfare, personal welfare is the result of 
pursuing self-interest.” (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006: 592) 
 
3.2.1.4 Comparison 
The classical virtue-based theory of behavior and character is not absolutely 
hostile  to  the  conventional  theory  of  rational  choice  in  economics.  There  are  
fundamental differences, but there are also important similarities. 
First,  virtue  theory  has  an  ambiguous  relationship  with  the  assumption  of  
utility maximization. On the one hand, there are similarities: the Aristotelian 
theory of choice says that people naturally aim to be happy, and in this sense 
they always choose the option that they perceive as the best one. On the other 
hand,  there  is  a  major  difference,  which  is  that  people  will  not  always  choose  
                                                        
17 This,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  fundamental  weakness  of  Robert  Frank’s  (1987,  2004)  various  –  in  
themselves very interesting – attempts to bring morality to bear on economics. In Frank’s and others’ 
work, morality is understood as a non-volitional preference, generally based on Adam Smith’s 
classic work on moral emotions.  Now,  I  agree  that  moral  emotions  exist  and  that  they  are  an  
important part of human action, but they are not the whole picture of specifically human morality 
(they may,  perhaps,  be  sufficient  to  explain  “animal  morality”,  so  to  speak).  What  they lack  is  the  
role of moral intelligence and will in the process of discerning what is truly good as opposed to only 
apparently  attractive.  Moral  emotions  provide  only  one  input  to  this  process,  and  they  may  be  
misleading in various ways. 
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correctly. Only a perfectly virtuous person will always choose optimally, 
whereas ordinary people are prone to a range of weaknesses of mind and will.  
Importantly,  the  classical  theory  holds  that  moral  vice  tends  to  distort  one’s  
perception of both one’s needs and one’s environment, thereby weakening and 
deforming the judgment of the intelligence.  
Reflecting these concerns, Maxine Udall (2010) writes: “When the 
assumptions [of standard rational choice theory] do not hold, the consumer is a 
preference maximizer, not a utility maximizer” (emphases added). In that case, he 
will  choose things that  he finds attractive (“e.g.  granite  counter  tops and large 
homes  with  en  suite  baths  purchased  with  no  money  down  and  pick-your-
payment mortgages”), but they are not those things that would actually make 
his  life  as  good  as  it  can  be.  On  the  other  hand,  Udall  continues,  “Assuming  
virtue in  economic models  of  individual  decision making is  much the same as  
assuming full-information. If the assumption is true, revealed preference 
probably approximates utility maximization.” 
Secondly, a similar relationship can be found between virtue theory and the 
standard economic assumptions concerning preferences. On the one hand, virtue 
theory implies that preferences are likely to embody some sort of stability, 
because one’s moral and intellectual character does not change overnight. In this 
respect,  the  notion  of  habits  (good  and  bad)  could  be  fruitfully  built  into  
economics, because it is not so prone to the accusation of ad hoc explanations.  
On the other hand, there are major differences. People do change, and thus 
their underlying preferences for different things will change also. More 
importantly, preferences are never entirely unambiguous: human motivations are 
very  complicated,  and  there  are  frequent  tensions  within  the  human  person,  
forces pulling into different directions. In particular, emotions and passions, and 
intelligence and will, may be leading into opposing directions – especially when 
certain  virtues  are  lacking.  Thus,  there  is  no  absolute  internal consistency, and 
consequently the notion of revealed preference becomes problematic. It may 
perhaps be suggested that virtues provide some inner harmony, and a virtuous 
person is able to harmonize different goods and ends (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006: 
604-606). Thus, again, it seems that the preference assumptions would be valid 
only for persons with perfected virtue. 
Thirdly, virtue theory is not compatible with a narrow form of self-interest 
(egoism or selfishness). People are capable of sacrificing their personal interests 
for others’, and many do so frequently. More importantly, one of the principal 
tenets of the classical theory is that human happiness or “flourishing” goes 
together with moral goodness, which again requires that one treats others with 
fairness and equity.18 In  other  words,  practicing  the  virtue  of  justice  is  a  
                                                        
18 This  is,  however,  not  the  same  as  J.S.  Mill’s  famous  dictum,  “it  is  better  to  be  a  human  being  
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Utilitarianism, 
ch. 2). Virtue theory does not depend on any quality comparisons between different kinds of 
happiness – even if they be valid. Rather, the point is that a human being cannot, deep down, be 
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building-block of a good life, even if many other goods are needed also.19 Thus, 
in  Socrates’  words,  a  person  who  does  injustice  is  “to  be  pitied”,  because  he  
cannot attain true happiness.20 The claim is not that people willingly choose to 
harm themselves, but that they can be mistaken not only about means, but also 
about the ends of a good human life. We do not always correctly perceive what is 
truly  good  to  us,  and  lack  of  moral  perfection  makes  us  prone  to  error  about  
ends, too.21 
On the other hand, it flows from this central principle that virtue and self-
interest in a deeper and truer sense go hand in hand. In order to differentiate this 
from narrower forms of self-interest, it would be helpful to use some other term, 
such as self-love (even if that, too, can be found wanting). People can be, and are, 
motivated by things others than pleasure, sentiments or duty: virtue (personal 
excellence) transcends them and includes them all.22 The compatibility between 
virtue and reasonable self-love is a fundamental aspect of the Aristotelian moral 
tradition,  and  it  was  held  by  later  authors  including  Aquinas  and  several  
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.23 
                                                                                                                                         
happy and satisfied, if he lives like a pig. The only way of attaining genuine human happiness is to 
live well as a human being, which includes the practice of the human virtues. 
19 Aristotle’s theory of happiness (or eudaimonia) nevertheless took it for granted that one may be 
unhappy  because  of  bad  luck  etc.  There  is  a  slight  difference  in  later,  Christian  versions  of  virtue  
ethics, which take into account the prospect of an afterlife and the idea that the practice of virtues in 
this life would, in any case, yield some form of compensation in the eternity. 
20 See Plato, Gorgias, 469; quoted in Pieper (1966: 48). 
21 Technically,  it  may be  helpful  to  speak about  instrumental and substantive rationality, referring to 
the discernment of means and ends, respectively. The cardinal virtue of prudence incorporates both 
of them. The statement that vices make us prone to error is implied in the unity of virtues. 
22 Rocha and Ghoshal (2006: 604) summarize their proposal: 
“The self-love view goes beyond a contingency approach because excellence [or virtue] is 
not a mutually exclusive fourth motivational category competing with pleasure, sentiments 
and duty; it is simultaneously present with them. […] For example, more excellence may end 
achieving more wealth, but it is also possible for excellences to go up while achievement of 
wealth  goes  down;  the  search  for  excellence  is  also  accompanied  by  good  sentiments  and  
pleasure, but it is not identified with them as in the case of smiling to a customer by the 
impulse of excellence when the feelings go in the opposite direction; finally, excellence, 
although different from duty, is intrinsically united to it, because one of the chief excellences 
is justice or the constant will of giving to others what is due. From the subject standpoint, 
excellence is specific to human beings and given their individual and social nature, 
excellence is beneficial to both the individuals who possess it and those who relate to them.” 
(in-text references omitted) 
23 See Aquinas (1920: II-II, 44, 8, ad 2; 26, 5) and Finnis (1998: 113), whom Gregg (2007: 46 n. 8) 
summarizes as follows: 
“if a person is truly a friend to himself, then he should want a superabundance of the goods 
of reason and virtue for himself. Moreover […], given that the goods of reason and virtue are 
goods for any human being, and that they include friendship and every form of harmony 
between persons, then this reasonable self-love helps to facilitate the realization of moral 
goods common to all.” 
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In  the  end,  we  get  a  new  triple identity: a perfectly virtuous person always 
chooses the best course of action available to him (maximization of utility), 
because he understands what is truly good to him and wants it with a constant 
will (stable and unambiguous preferences); this choice harmonizes the different 
human motives for action, and is thus compatible with his maximum well-being 
or happiness (self-interest or self-love). However, this triple identity is only 
valid for a perfectly virtuous person; others (which include all of us) depart 
from  it  in  various  ways,  according  to  their  degrees  of  moral  perfection  or  
imperfection. 
 
1.2.1.5 Integration 
A couple of points, finally, on the possibility of integrating virtue theory into the 
standard model. One possibility is to view virtues as constraints on choice. 
Instead of an external norm that controls and sanctions behavior, virtues would 
constitute an internal norm. In other words, persons with strong virtues would 
have  a  preference  for  continuing  to  practice  those  virtues,  and  unvirtuous  
conduct  would  imply  lower  utility.  The  general  challenge  with  this  kind  of  
assumptions  concerning  preferences  is  that  they  are  easily  seen  as  arbitrary  
postulates. However, notes Panther (2000: 1008), “as survey techniques have 
become more and more sophisticated in other social sciences and experiments 
have gained general approval in economics, evidence on preferences can be 
obtained and tested far more reliably.” 
This  kind  of  preference or “taste” approach works well for modeling moral 
emotions (or moral sentiments, as Adam Smith called them) including feelings 
of regret, remorse, shame, guilt or embarrassment (see Frank, 1987, 1988). 
However, it is less clear whether it is suitable for dealing with virtues and vices. 
Note, further, that the “self-love” view of motivation (self-interest understood in 
the deepest,  moral  sense)  is  one that  sees  “doing good” as  something attractive 
and motivating.  It is not a question of putting constraints on self-interest, but of 
understand the nature of goodness differently, and of pursuing the deeper 
human goods actively. 
A different approach has been developed by Dal Bó and Terviö (2008) in 
their recent working paper, which develops a formal model of self-esteem that 
incorporates some Aristotelian insights. The model is however cumbersome, as 
it builds on a secularized “Weberian” (actually, Calvinist) idea that people are 
either  “good”  or  “bad”,  but  they  do  not  know  which  ones  they  are;  however,  
they  want  to  appear  good  and  therefore  struggle  to  maintain  a  positive  self-
image.  The  Aristotelian  feature  of  the  model  is  that  the  actors  are  assumed  to  
have  “imperfect  free  will”:  they  can  choose  their  general  intent  (good  or  bad),  
                                                                                                                                         
On virtue and self-love according to Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, see Gregg 
(2007: 17; 2009) and Hanley (2009). 
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but  the actual  choice  is  subject  to  random disturbances  depending on whether  
one is good or bad by nature. 
The  model  by  Dal  Bó  and  Terviö  captures  some  of  the  insights  of  virtue  
theory, especially the idea of “moral capital”, which grows as one performs 
good acts repeatedly and is more likely to perform good acts in the future (and 
vice  versa  with  bad  acts).  In  the  authors’  words,  “the  model  accounts  for  the  
emergence of morality as a cumulative process of habituation through action, 
which parallels Aristotle’s account of the attainment of virtue” (p. 5). 
However,  there  are  also  weaknesses  with  the  model.  Many  of  its  
foundational  assumptions  are  foreign  to  virtue  theory,  including  the  notion  of  
innate goodness or badness of character, the assumption of time-consistent 
preferences, and the reduction of moral motivation to maintaining a good self-
image. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the implications of the model 
are problematic. For example, “bad individuals” may develop moral capital 
(only if they are so lucky as to never suffer “temptations”), but they will lose it 
completely if they perform even one bad act, after which they will only perform 
bad acts (pp. 16-17). In other words, bad guys cannot become good, and the idea 
of character development does not apply to them in any real sense. 
 
3.2.2 The Behavioral Model: Economics and Psychology  
Although the standard, rational choice model has persistently maintained its 
hegemony in economics, it has not been without challenges. North (1990: 18) 
summarizes: 
“In the past twenty years, this approach has come under severe attack […] 
from experimental economic methods, research by psychologists, and 
other  empirical  work,  all  of  which  have  revealed  major  empirical  
anomalies associated with this approach. Briefly, these fall into the 
following categories: violations of the transitivity assumptions, framing 
effect, where alternative means of representing the same choice problem 
can yield different choices; preference reversals, where the ordering of 
objects  on the basis  of  their  reported valuations contradicts  the ordering 
implied in direct choice situations; and problems in the formulation, 
manipulation, and processing of subjective probabilities in uncertain 
choices.” 
The branch of economics that studies economic behavior in light of 
experimental  psychology  is  commonly  known  as  behavioral economics (see 
Camerer,  Loewenstein  and  Rabin,  2004).  There  is  strictly  speaking  no  one  
behavioral theory, just as within the neoclassical paradigm there are many 
different ways of understanding and applying the notion of rational choice. The 
unifying theme of the behavioral approach can be summarized in two 
propositions (Rabin, 1998): (1) there are proven and empirically significant 
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departures from the simplistic rational choice model of behavior, and (2) these 
departures are systematic in the sense that they are non-arbitrary and hence (to 
some extent, at least) predictable and conformable to economic analysis. 
As  the  starting  point  of  behavioral  economics  is  not  deductive  theory  but  
empirical observation, there have been numerous different systematizations of 
the findings of behavioral research. One influential approach is to distinguish 
between bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest (Jolls, 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2000). In what follows, these are briefly described and then 
compared with the virtue-based perspective. 
 
3.2.2.1 Bounded Rationality 
The notion of bounded rationality is based on the fact that the cognitive abilities 
of human beings are obviously not infinite. This was first highlighted by Herbert 
Simon, who argued that people do not always engage in optimization behavior, 
because many decision-making situations are so complex that they cannot be 
modeled and solved in the human mind as if they were mathematical exercises 
(see Simon, 1947, 1955). Instead, people sensibly resort to simplifying methods 
and what Simon called “satisficing”, i.e. the search not for optimal choices  but  
good enough ones. 
Subsequent  research,  especially  by  Daniel  Kahneman  and  Amor  Tversky,  
elaborated on different ways in which human beings actually make choices (see 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974). People have imperfect memories and 
limited  brain  power,  and  they  resort  to  various  mental  shortcuts  and  rules  of  
thumb  (heuristics)  in  order  to  make  it  easier  to  cope  with  complexity  and  
uncertainty. These methods are entirely sensible – indeed very necessary – but 
under  identifiable  conditions,  they  tend  to  lead  to  systematic  departures  from  
the predictions of idealized optimization behavior. These departures are 
common called biases. 
Behavioral economics has identified a series of common biases (see generally 
Rabin,  1998).  Salience  bias  says  that  people  tend  to  give  undue  importance  to  
memorable  and  vivid  evidence,  and  too  little  importance  to  rationally  more  
weighty  contrary  evidence.  Optimism  bias  means  that  people  tend  to  
overestimate their chances of success, and underestimate chances of failure and 
risk to oneself. Overconfidence bias states that most people overestimate their 
ability to judge facts and circumstances. Hindsight bias says that people tend to 
give  too  much  weight  to  events  that  really  took  place  when  assessing  future  
probabilities. Confirmation bias means that people tend to emphasize 
information that supports their past decisions. Status quo biases denotes that 
people  are  attached  to  the  present  situation  and  demand  more  than  rational  
choice theory predicts to justify departures from it. And so on. 
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3.2.2.2 Bounded Willpower 
Bounded willpower refers to the idea that people do not always conform to the 
predictions of the rational choice model, however not because of informational 
complexity or similar reasons, but because they may not have enough willpower 
to carry out their premeditated plans. In other words, this captures the fact that 
passions  and  emotions  influence  our  choices  in  ways  that  we  cannot  always  
control. 
There  are  at  least  three  important  implications  of  bounded  willpower.  The  
first one is called projection bias, which means that people often falsely project 
current  transient  preferences  on  to  the  future  (Loewenstein  et  al.,  2003).  For  
example, we give too much importance to benefits available now and downplay 
later costs. Projection bias is a form of time-inconsistent preferences. It takes 
place especially when we are overcome by powerful but transient emotional 
states, which compel us to do something that we regret later on. 
The second implication is the procrastination bias, which is the tendency of 
people  to  leave  for  later  tasks  that  they  should  carry  out  now  (Akerlof,  1991,  
O'Donoghue  and  Rabin,  1999).  For  example,  we  often  delay  unpleasant  tasks  
until the last minute, even if we really do not have any other important jobs to 
do. In a sense, procrastination bias (costs now, benefits later) and projection bias 
(benefits now, costs later) are just two sides of the same coin. 
The third type of bounded willpower is addictive behavior, which is similar 
to the projection bias but seems to involve compulsiveness not present in 
ordinary  circumstances  (see  Skog,  2005).  Many  people  wish  to  adopt  healthier  
lifestyles in the interest of long-term well-being, but find themselves unable to 
quick  smoking,  eating  too  much  etc.  Some  economists  have  tried  to  reconcile  
addiction with rational choice (Becker and Murphy, 1988), but this is hardly 
convincing, because most cases of addiction violate such assumption as stable 
and unambiguous preferences (Skog, 2005: 119-124).24 
 
3.2.2.3 Bounded Self-interest 
Bounded  self-interest  means  that  people  do  not  always  act  merely  to  advance  
their personal well-being, but are also interested in the well-being others – even 
when this implies personal sacrifices (Frank, 1988). Departures from narrow self-
interest are also seen in so-called fairness behavior. For example, the famous 
“ultimatum game” experiments, which have been repeated under numerous 
variations,  show  that  the  far  majority  of  people  are  willing  to  share  resources  
                                                        
24 “[Fully rational, forward-looking utility maximizers] always do what is best according to their 
own utility calculus. They have no motive for changing their consumption behavior and should not 
struggle to cut back. If they think it is best to cut back, they will cut back. And if they do not, they 
will  simply  continue.  There  is  no  room  for  ambivalence  and  struggling  with  oneself  in  standard  
rational choice theory. […] In particular, Becker’s theory has no room for typical addiction-related 
phenomena such as repeated remission and relapse.” (Skog, 2005: 121) 
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with others even when they do not know each other and will not meet again (the 
average share given is 40%: see Oosterbeek et al., 2004). 
While fairness behavior is not entirely predictable, some general principles 
have  been  identified  (Rabin,  1993).  On  the  one  hand,  people  are  willing  to  
sacrifice more of their material well-being in order to help those who are or have 
been kind.  On the other  hand,  they are  willing to  sacrifice  their  material  well-
being in order to punish those who are or have been unkind. Thus, for example, 
evidence from ultimatum games shows that most respondents reject offers that 
they consider unfair. Finally, fairness-based motivation is stronger when 
material stakes are smaller, and weaker when material stakes are larger. 
 
3.2.2.4 Comparison and Integration 
The behavioral model certainly portrays a more realistic picture of real human 
action  than  the  simplistic  rational  choice  model.  It  also  incorporates  some  
features  that  are  implicit  in  the  classical  virtue  theory,  such  as  the  fact  that  
people not always choose optimally. The attempts to formally model the 
findings of behavioral economics also suggest a feasible approach to include the 
notion of virtues in mainstream economics. 
However,  it  seems  that  the  standard  version  of  the  behavioral  approach  
could  be  fruitfully  enriched  by  the  insights  of  virtue  theory.  In  terms  of  the  
classical cardinal virtues, we might say that bounded rationality is most closely 
related  to  the  virtue  of  prudence; bounded willpower is  related  to  temperance 
(projection bias especially) and fortitude (procrastination bias); and bounded self-
interest is concerned with the virtue of justice. 
Four differences and ideas for further development are outlined here. The 
first is that virtue theory may provide new insights to our understanding of the 
differences in individual-level behavior.  A  common  implicit  assumption  in  
behavioral economics is that people tend to act in the same way, or at least to be 
subject to the same biases. However, it is readily granted that the biases are only 
broad  tendencies,  and  one  cannot  make  strong  predictions  about  individual  
behavior. Virtue theory, on the other hand, implies that there may be significant 
– yet relatively stable – differences between individuals, depending on their 
good or bad habits (both intellectual and moral habits). 
For  example,  the  notion of  prudence implies  that  people  can learn to  make 
better choices. In the behavioral economics literature, there are different 
opinions  on  the  extent  to  which  people  are  able  to  learn  to  avoid  biases.  
Generally speaking, it seems that some biases can be mitigated through learning, 
but  with  others  it  is  not  clear;  sometimes  expertise  may  even  increase  biases  
such as overconfidence (see generally Rabin, 1998: 31-32). This is consistent with 
virtues. The classical concept of prudence implies that experience is necessary 
for  learning  to  choose  well,  but  the  mere  accumulation  of  facts  does  not  
constitute the virtue of prudence. Moreover, the overconfidence of experts may 
be understood as a byproduct of the professional pride,  a vice that often comes 
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along with expertise, causing a weakening of some aspects of prudence, such as 
the ability to ask for advice and to listen to the opinions of others. 
Secondly, virtue theory suggests a more nuanced theoretical framework for 
behavioral economics.25 It  seems  that  some  of  the  biases  are  caused  by  the  
unavoidable  fact  that  people  need  to  resort  to  heuristics  in  order  to  cope  with  
complex information, while others may be caused by bad moral and intellectual 
habits, i.e. vices. A detailed categorization would call for more extensive study, 
but for example, common errors in probabilistic estimation seem to be caused by 
natural, innate heuristics (although one may mitigate these errors by 
deliberately adjusting one’s estimates as advised by experimental findings). On 
the other hand, other biases seem to be linked to lack of virtue: salience bias is 
partly  caused  by  lack  of  systematic  and  rational  reflection  on  issues;  
overconfidence  may  be  caused  by  lack  of  experience  of  personal  mistakes  as  
well as lack of humility; and confirmation bias reflects undue emotional 
attachment to past decisions. The relationship between habits and biases seems 
to be strongest when it comes to bounded willpower: procrastination bias is 
almost  identical  with  lack  of  fortitude,  and  projection  bias  is  a  form  of  
intemperance.  However,  note  that  according  to  the  classical  theory,  lack  of  
prudence is often rooted in some moral vices: pride leading to overconfidence is 
only one example. 
Thirdly,  virtue  theory  may  improve  our  understanding  of  the  interaction  
between  passions  or  emotions,  habits,  and  choice.  The  language  of  behavioral  
economics sometimes suggests that people are forced to act in a certain way, as 
if  human  choice  were  the  deterministic  result  of  external  and  internal  forces.  
This  leaves  out  such  factors  as  of  rational  deliberation,  habit-formation,  and  
freedom. Preferences are not stable and unambiguous, but complex and 
changeable. 
Addictive behavior is one example. Some authors have argued that addiction 
should not be treated as a disease at all, but as a vice, a bad habit (Szasz, 1972). 
This is probably exaggerated, because addiction includes a peculiar element that 
goes  beyond  general  weakness  of  will;  the  “withdrawal  syndrome”  is  a  
physiological and neurological reality. On the other hand, it does not eliminate 
the possibility of free choice (Skog, 2000). There certainly are many people who 
have quit smoking or drinking. One way of seeing it is that addiction does not 
necessarily imply weakness of will (as in the vice of laziness), but the overcoming 
of  addiction  does  imply  strength  of  will  and  requires  the  formation  of  strong  
habits that counteract the psychological attraction of the addictive substance. 
Fourthly, virtue theory suggests a deeper understanding of unselfish 
behavior. Again, a distinction between habits and other factors seems relevant. 
On the one hand, one’s attitude and conduct towards others is in part rooted in 
                                                        
25 It is widely acknowledged that the theoretical framework is in need of significant development: 
see Choi and Pritchard (2003: 9-11) and the references cited therein. 
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habits, especially in the cardinal virtue of justice (or lack thereof), as well as non-
cardinal  virtues  related  to  justice,  such  as  honesty,  loyalty,  generosity  and  
charity. On the other hand, there are behavioral phenomena that do not seem to 
be rooted in acquired habits, but in innate moral emotions. For example, 
sympathy towards those who treat us kindly, and anger towards those who act 
unfairly are not based on habits but on emotions. 
Virtue theory emphasizes the role of intelligence and will (as well as acquired 
habits)  in  moral  behavior.  Moral  emotions  are  an  important  input,  but  they  
alone do not constitute human morality, because they, too, require deliberation 
about  what  is  truly  good  and  just.  Moral  emotions  as  such  may  be  good,  but  
they  may  also  lead  against  justice,  for  example  when  feelings  of  anger  grow  
strong  (causing  thirst  for  vengeance),  or  when  unconstrained  altruism  and  
sympathy lead one to neglect other responsibilities and prior commitments. 
Virtue implies that moral emotions are channeled and controlled, and that one is 
not dependent on them alone. A virtuous person will not be driven to injustice 
by bad feelings,  and will  treat  others  fairly  even when he does  not  experience 
feelings of sympathy.26 
 
3.2.3 Human, Cultural and Moral Capital 
A relatively novel approach that might fruitfully incorporate the idea of virtues 
is the study of non-materials forms of capital (see generally Becker, 1993; 
Schultz, 1971). In the analysis of human capital,  the  focus  is,  primarily,  on  
education and training in practical skills. This is not far off from classical virtue 
theory,  because  in  Aristotle’s  terminology,  useful  skills  are  another  type  of  
virtue, or excellence (arête). Moreover, it is interesting that, in the introduction to 
his Human Capital, Becker makes a passing reference to virtues: 
 “Schooling,  a  computer  training  course,  expenditures  on  medical  care,  
and lectures on the virtues of punctuality and honesty are  capital  too  in  the  
sense  that  they  improve  health,  raise  earnings,  or  add  to  a  person’s  
appreciation of literature over much of his or her lifetime.” (Becker, 1993: 
15-16, emphasis added) 
Within economics, the concept of virtues has not been systematically 
included in the study of human capital. However, there are various approaches 
that at least implicitly take notice of this concept. For example, the sociological 
concept of social capital is one which can be seen are indirectly related to virtues. 
In  the  simplest  terms,  social  capital  can  be  defined  as  “an  aggregate  of  
interpersonal networks” (Dasgupta, 2008). But taking a broader definition, social 
capital “refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the 
                                                        
26 As  an  aside,  it  would  be  interesting  to  conduct  a  longer-term  ultimatum  game  experiment,  
tracking the  behavior  of  specific  individuals  over  longer  periods  of  time.  This  would enable  us  to  
study the effects of habit-formation and virtue of justice (or lack thereof). 
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norms of one’s community and to punish those who do not” (Bowles and Gintis, 
2002: 419). In this sense social capital has both personal and communal 
dimensions, and includes certain habits that may be seen as virtues. Fukuyama 
(1995) also highlights the importance of social capital for the creation of trust, 
which in turn is necessary for wealth-creation and well-being: lack of social 
capital leads to higher transaction costs, legal expenses, increased legal 
regulation, and avoidance of cooperation. 
A related notion is  that  of  cultural capital. According to Sowell (1994, 1996), 
different peoples and cultures have their own particular characteristics, which 
may function as inter-generational transmitters of human capital. For examples, 
industriousness, thrift, appreciation of education and entrepreneurship are some 
of  those  characteristics  that  can  be  seen  economically  as  a  type  of  capital,  
because they facilitate long-term success and the productive capacity of a people 
or culture. The role of culture in explaining economic development was part of 
Weber’s famous work ([1905] 1958), and recent literature on economic 
development (or lack thereof) argues that culture plays a fundamental role (see 
Arias, 2011; Harrison, 1993, 2000; Harrison and Huntington, 2001; Landes, 1999). 
In leadership studies, classical virtue theory seems to have attracted more 
interest than in most other fields. The interesting thing for present purposes is 
the concept of moral capital, developed by Alejo Sison: 
 “Moral  capital  may  be  defined  as  excellence  of  character,  or  the  
possession and practice of a host of virtues appropriate for a human being 
within a particular sociocultural context. Nowadays, its meaning could 
also be expressed by the word ‘integrity’, a trait suggesting wholeness 
and  stability  in  a  person  as  someone  on  whom  others  could  depend  or  
rely. Having virtues or an excellent character may be considered moral 
capital not only because they are a form of wealth, but also because they 
are productive capacities or powers that accumulate and develop in an 
individual, through proper investments of time, effort and other 
resources, including financial ones.” (Sison, 2003: 31) 
However, the notion as developed by Sison is not elaborated in the context of 
economic theory, so more work is needed. 
 
3.3 Economic Benefits of Virtue (and Costs of Vice) 
I  now  proceed  to  discuss  some  of  the  economic  benefits  of  virtue,  and  the  
economic  costs  of  vice.  Naturally,  this  should  be  understood  as  a  sketch  of  a  
very large set of issues, which also calls for more detailed study.27 The following 
                                                        
27 An interesting proposition was once made by Pope John Paul II in an address to the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: 
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subsections discuss the link between economic efficiency and well-being, and 
each of the cardinal virtues. 
 
3.3.1 Prudence 
In  standard  economic  analysis,  as  was  explained  earlier,  it  is  assumed  that  
people make optimal choices (at least ex ante),  but  it  is  obvious that  this  is  not  
always so. The virtue of prudence is needed in order to make good choices. The 
classical notion of prudence is what philosophers call a “thick concept”.28 
Prudence  is  the  habitual  ability  to  make  good  decisions  in the widest sense – 
including morally good, and technically sound. A prudent person need not 
know everything, but one must be able to judge the situation correctly, find out 
the relevant information, consult competent people, and so forth. 
The  economic  benefit  of  being  able  to  make  good  decisions  is  perhaps  too  
obvious, so it is useful to consider the question in some more detail. Drawing on 
the classical literature, Gregg (2008) lists several “integral parts of prudence,” 
which highlight the different facets of this cardinal virtue. Prudence thus 
includes, among other things: 
(i) open-mindedness and the willingness to make use of the experience of 
others (docilitas or docility); 
(ii) the readiness to take risks while avoiding unnecessary and 
disproportionate risks (caution); 
(iii) the willingness to study and compare different options (discursive 
reasoning); 
(iv) the ability to anticipate future consequences and estimate the ability to 
particular actions to lead to the realization of our goals (providentia or 
foresight); 
(v) an accurate, objective and true-to-reality memory (memoria); 
(vi) the capacity to judge a situation quickly and by oneself when 
necessary (solertia or shrewdness); and 
(vii) the ability to take all the relevant circumstances into account without 
becoming paralyzed by indecision (circumspection). 
The contribution of the different parts of prudence to economic development 
and  efficiency  is  quite  obvious.  Any  investor,  business  executive  or  even  a  
                                                                                                                                         
 “The moral causes of prosperity [...] reside in a constellation of virtues: industriousness, 
competence, order, honesty, initiative, frugality, thrift, spirit of service, keeping one's word, 
daring – in short, love for work well done. No system or social structure can resolve outside 
of these virtues, as if by magic, the problem of poverty. In the long run, both the projects of 
institutions and their functioning reflect the habits of human beings—habits that are 
acquired during the education process and that form an authentic work ethic.” (John Paul II, 
1987: 775-776; quoted in Finn, 1998: 677) 
28 Thick  concepts  in  philosophy  are  ones  that  have  a  significant  degree  of  descriptive  content  and  
also are evaluatively loaded. See generally Putnam (2002: 34-43) and Williams (1985). 
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housewife will need these capabilities in order to make sound economic 
decisions. Of course, the economic significance of this virtue will depend on the 
context;  for  example,  an  entrepreneur  is  especially  in  need  of  such  prudential  
virtues as caution, foresight, shrewdness and circumspection in order to be 
successful. 
Deficiencies of prudence will imply real economic costs in terms of bad 
decisions, lost opportunities and wasted resources. Gregg (2008) argues that the 
global financial crisis of 2008-09 was in great part caused by lack of prudence (as 
well as other central virtues, including justice). Certainly there were institutional 
issues too, but standard economic analysis fails to capture the different ways in 
which bad policies were also caused by lack of virtue. For example, many have 
argued that monetary policies in the US and elsewhere were misguided during 
the  years  leading  to  the  crisis.  Gregg  goes  on  to  explain  how  these  mistakes  
related to lack of virtue: 
 “There is little doubt that the Federal Reserve contributed to the bubble 
in house prices by lowering interest rates earlier in the decade and 
keeping them low. […] It believed that interest rates could be lowered 
safely because the inflation rate was low. The problem, however, was that 
the Federal Reserve’s inflation figures were flawed. It is often said that 
good central bankers know to be skeptical of data and to keep questioning 
it, if only to force economists to keep verifying it. But because they failed 
to  do  so,  the  Federal  Reserve  kept  interest-rates  low  for  far  too  long,  
thereby  allowing  a  flood  of  cheap  money  to  enter  the  market,  much  of  
which  went  into  the  housing  boom.  This  was  not  simply  policy-
misjudgment in the sense that much monetary policy seems dominated 
today by the imperative of  avoiding recessions at  all  costs,  regardless  of  
the fact that recessions are sometimes necessary to correct imbalances of 
equilibrium and to allow resources to be invested more efficiently. It also 
represents, I submit, profound failures of foresight, caution, humility, and 
discursive reasoning on the Federal Reserve’s part.” 
A  similar  judgment  could  made  of  the  numerous  and  complex  policy  
mistakes leading to the European debt crisis that started in 2010 (see generally 
Wihlborg,  Willett  and Zhang,  2010).  It  is  sometimes said (as  also in  relation to  
the 2008-09 financial crisis) that “no one predicted it”, but that only masks the 
ignorance of the speaker; in reality, both crises were predicted by many, and the 
euro-area debt crisis was anticipated by some analysts even before the common 
currency got started (see Bagus, 2011; Feldstein, 1997). 
 
3.3.2 Justice 
Justice is often seen as an ethical end in itself, and certainly it is that in the virtue 
theory  too.  However,  justice  as  virtue  is  also  a  major  contributor  to  economic  
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well-being and efficiency. This is most evident when one considers the various 
costs  caused  by  injustice.  Writes  Kant:  “Man’s  greatest  and  most  frequent  
troubles depend on man’s injustice more than on adversity.”29 
In classical ethics, the notion of justice is often divided into three basic forms 
(Pieper, 1966: 71–72): commutative or reciprocal justice (relations of individual to 
individual), distributive or ministering justice (relations between the community 
and its individual members), and legal or general justice (the members’ relations 
to the social whole). What concerns us here is not so much the hard questions of 
what exactly justice requires in different situations, but the social consequences 
of the virtue of justice, i.e. the stable willingness of members of a community to 
treat each other justly. 
Each dimension of justice has its economic importance. Commutative or 
reciprocal justice is especially significant, because the moral questions that arise 
in  trade  and  business  are  principally  covered  by  commutative  justice.  Let  us  
briefly  look  at  each  of  the  three  basic  forms  of  justice  and  their  economic  
implications. 
 
3.3.2.1 Commutative Justice 
Firstly, commutative or reciprocal justice requires honesty, keeping one’s word, 
fulfilling contracts (or at least compensating for non-fulfillment), restitution of 
damages,  and  so  on.  It  is  evident  that  commutative  justice  lies  at  the  heart  of  
commercial society, which is very dependent on mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995). 
When promises are kept and contracts fulfilled, trade can operate smoothly and 
avoid significant transaction costs.  In  a  society  of  perfectly  just  members,  there  
would be no need the legal enforcement of contracts (although there might be a 
role for law to facilitate the peaceful making and settling of agreements). 
If the culture-based theory of economic development (mentioned earlier) is 
broadly  on  the  mark,  it  follows  that  the  long-term  economic  consequences  of  
justice (and injustice) are very significant. On the other hand, lack of reciprocal 
justice  implies  costs  in  individual  cases  too.  Discussing  the  failure  of  the  sub-
prime mortgage market, Gregg (2008) notes that not only did many borrowers 
act  imprudently,  but  both  lenders  and  borrowers  failed  to  practice  elementary  
commutative justice: 
“An early 2008 BasePoint Analytics report states, for example, that almost 
70% of mortgage early-payment defaulters made fraudulent 
misrepresentations on their original loan applications – that is, they lied 
about factors such as their income, assets, and liabilities. In other words, a 
good number of commercial arrangements, many of which were used as 
the foundation for an increasing number of securities and equities, were 
based on untruths about assets and untruths about persons.” 
                                                        
29 Kant (1925: 245); quoted in Pieper (1966: 43). 
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Likewise, many banks and mortgage brokers acted dishonestly to both their 
clients (giving misleading information about the risks of the contract) and their 
employers or investors (neglecting checks on some lenders’ applications, 
packaging toxic deals into seemingly-low risk securities, etc.). The same criticism 
could be leveled against many people working for credit rating agencies, 
accounting firms and other gatekeepers. 
It might be countered that emphasizing justice is misleading, because the real 
problem is the lack of prudence on the part of the counterparties, who were too 
gullible  when  they  should  have  made  the  necessary  checks  and  look  after  
themselves. That is partly correct, but it also directs our attention to the diversity 
of  mechanisms  to  deal  with  vice.  As  Gregg  (2008)  explains,  there  is  a  strong  
connection between a well-functioning financial market and virtues: 
“The word ‘credit’ is derived from credere – the Latin verb for ‘to believe’ 
but also ‘to trust’. Thus, whether it is a matter of giving someone a credit-
card  for  the  first  time,  or  extending  a  small  business  the  capital  that  it  
needs to grow into a great enterprise, providing people with credit means 
that you trust and believe in them enough to take a risk on their insight, 
reliability, honesty, prudence, thrift, courage and enterprise: in short, the 
moral habits without which wealth-creation cannot occur.” 
Naturally, business is possible even when people are not perfectly virtues. 
However, when people do not treat each other justly, a whole array of expensive 
procedures  and  mechanisms  have  to  been  invented  and  employed  in  order  to  
make commerce possible (see North, 1990: 11-16, 27-35). Besides, there are no 
mechanisms that completely eliminate the damaging effects of habitual or 
occasional injustice.  
 
3.3.2.2 Distributive Justice 
Commutative justice is particularly important economically, but the other two 
forms of justice should not be neglected either. Distributive or ministering 
justice includes the relations between the community and its individual 
members. It is useful, however, to note that distributive justice is not just a 
matter of the community qua community, but it must be exercised by all 
individuals  too  in  their  dealings  with  others.  The  difference  with  respect  to  
commutative justice is that it is essentially exchange-based or reciprocal, while 
distributive justice is about relations between members of a community. This 
includes, among many things, contributing to common expensive in accordance 
with one’s capacity, as well as voluntary charity to help those in need. 
In  terms  of  economics,  distributive  justice  is  relevant  not  only  for  the  
economic well-being of the least fortunate members of the society,  but  also  for  the  
functioning of the society as a whole. The creation and maintenance of such 
fundamental social and commercial institutions as secure property rights and 
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reliable  courts  of  law is  to  a  very large degree dependent  on the justice  of  the 
individual members of the society as voters, public intellectual, politicians and 
civil servants. In contrast, lack of distributive or ministering justice leads to a 
range of social costs, ranging from ill-treatment of the poor to corruption in public 
office and other forms of abuse of power.  The  latter,  in  particular,  will  be  a  major  
obstacle  to  the  efficient  operation  of  the  economic  system  and  therefore  to  
economic development. 
Some authors have claimed that “corruption” may be economically efficient 
when  it  means  that  senseless  or  harmful  regulations  are  not  enforced  by  the  
authorities (Mironov, 2005). However, it is fundamental to understand that the 
virtue of justice does not necessarily demand that one enforces all the laws that 
are formally valid, because some laws may be senseless or harmful. Justice does 
not imply blind obedience to the law, but the active promotion of the common good, 
which in some special cases may even demand that one disobey the law (Finnis, 
1980: 352-366). 
 
3.3.2.3 Legal or General Justice 
The third dimension, which is traditionally called legal or general justice, is 
closely related to distribute justice and can be seen as the other side of the same 
coin. It covers the members’ relations to the social whole, and one of its principal 
manifestations is respecting the legitimate laws and authorities of a community. 
General  justice  is  necessary  for  peaceful  and  stable  society,  while  lack  of  
justice leads to crime in various forms. The social and economic implications of 
this  form  of  justice  are  evident,  as  they  include  by  the  welfare  loss  caused  by  
criminal activity and also the costs of crime-prevention activity. 
 
3.3.3 Fortitude 
The remaining cardinal virtues – fortitude and temperance – are relevant both 
indirectly (in relation to prudence and justice) and directly. The principle of the 
unity of virtue implies that fortitude and temperance play a support function for 
prudence and justice, because cowardice, impatience, indulgence, greed and 
other forms of vice are the usual causes of poor judgment and mistreatment of 
others.30 
                                                        
30 An interesting  case  that  illustrates  the  effects  of  moral  virtues  on judgment  and prudence  is  the  
legendary investor Warren Buffett. There have been no systematic studies on Buffett’s moral 
character,  but  he  has  on  many  occasions  emphasized  the  importance  of  courage  and  patience  for  
value investing, because one’s judgment is not vindicated overnight and one must remain faithful to 
one’s investment strategy even when it does not work immediately (see Hagstrom, 2005: 163, 179-
181; Schroeder, 2008). In his own words, “We don’t have to be smarter than the rest; we have to be 
more disciplined than the rest” (quoted in Hagstrom, 2005: 180). Buffett also once said: “Investing is 
not complicated; you work to find pockets of value. You didn't need a high IQ to buy junk bonds in 
2002 – you needed to have the courage of your convictions when everyone else was terrified, and it 
was the same in 1974. People were paralyzed. You need to learn to follow logic rather than emotion, 
and  that's  easier  for  some  people  to  do  than  others.”  (Casterline,  2006).  In  terms  of  the  unity  of  
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Fortitude may not seem to relate to economics (it is more likely to make one 
think of war), but in fact this virtue has several positive economic implications. I 
would like to mention two of them. One is industriousness, which is fundamental 
for  economic  growth.  The  attitudes  that  people  have  towards  hard  work  is  an  
important determinant of actual labor market dynamics and social costs of 
different welfare policies (see Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; Lindbeck, Nyberg 
and Weibull, 1999). Other implications of fortitude include the courage to take 
risks and perseverance in  the  face  of  difficulties  and  obstacles,  which  are  
important determinants of successful entrepreneurship (see Sirico, 2001). 
 
3.3.4 Temperance 
Temperance, too, is necessary for prudence and justice, and it is easy to imagine 
different ways in which lack of temperance leads to injustice. For example, greed 
and avarice  (inordinate  love for  money)  lead to  criminal  activities  as  well  as  a  
range of principal-agent problems, which cause significant economic costs and 
often cannot be entirely eliminated through formal mechanisms. As the old 
wisdom has it, radix malorum est cupiditas, “love of money is the root of all evil” 
(1 Timothy 6:10; contrary to a common misquotation, the text does not say that 
“money is the root of all evil”). 
Temperance is also necessary for economic efficiency, because it helps to 
direct limited economic resources to their most important uses, and supports a 
culture of saving and investing, which is necessary for both personal and 
macroeconomic  financial  stability  as  well  as  long-term  economic  growth.  In  
contrast,  intemperance  leads  to  various  kinds  of  direct  economic  costs.  Gregg  
(2008) makes the interesting argument that the decline of temperance was an 
important contributor to the 2008-09 financial crisis: 
“The thrifty, even parsimonious Adam Smith would have been appalled 
by the ‘I-want-it-all-now’ mentality that has helped the personal savings-
rate  in  America  to  hover  around  0  percent  since  2005  –  the  lowest  rate  
since the Depression years of 1932 and 1933. It is arguable that the same 
mindset  encouraged  many  on  ‘Wall  Street’,  anxious  to  enhance  their  
bonus prospects, to sell securities they knew were based on collapsing 
subprime foundations to ‘Main Street’ buyers who themselves were 
blinded by the prospects of quick profits.” 
Intemperance  causes  numerous  other  costs  as  well,  including  the  costs  of  
addiction to drugs, alcohol or tobacco. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
virtues,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  “Oracle  of  Omaha”  is  also  famous  for  his  frugal  personal  
lifestyle and generous charitable donations (Schroeder, 2008: 487-488). 
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4 LAW AND VIRTUE: TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
This  part  of  the essay applies  the virtue-based theory of  behavior  to  economic 
analysis of law. There are two levels of analysis. One is labeled “static” analysis, 
which  assumes  a  fixed  “level  of  virtue”  (or,  putting  it  differently,  “level  of  
vice”). In other words, this type of analysis views virtue as an exogenous variable 
(an independent variable not affected by the model). It could also be called short-
term analysis: although the relevant time period cannot be determined precisely, 
one  feature  of  classical  virtue  theory  is  that  the  character  of  people  does  not  
change overnight, so that the shorter the time period in consideration, the more 
stable (and, hence, exogenous) the “level of virtue” is likely to be. 
The second level of analysis is to introduce variations of the level of virtue or 
vice  by way of  feedback to  the adoption of  legal  rules.  This  “dynamic” analysis 
focuses on the role of law in safeguarding and promoting virtue. In other words, 
it treats virtue as an endogenous variable (a variable whose value is affected by 
one of the functional relationships of the model). It could also be called long-term 
analysis, because moral character may change over time. 
Given the complexity of the topic as well as the scarcity of previous studies, 
the discussion is more of an impressionistic sketch rather than a robust model. It 
is intended to provide a basis for further, more detailed studies. 
 
4.1 Three Types of Economic Analysis of Law 
Economic analysis of law can mean a number of things, so a small clarification is 
in order. Ogus (2004: 383-385) makes a helpful distinction between three types of 
economic analysis of law: (a) positive law and economics, which is “the application 
of economic methodology to predict the impact of law and legal institutions on 
behavior” (p. 384); (b) normative law and economics, which gives guidelines for the 
improvement of law and legal institutions, following the criterion of allocative 
efficiency; and (c) “interpretive” or “explanatory” law and economics, which 
examines the prediction that the law – in particular, the common law – has an 
economic  function,  i.e.  that  many  legal  rules  can  be  interpreted  as  promoting  
allocative efficiency even if economic terminology is not used. This last type of 
analysis is what Richard Posner has, somewhat confusingly, called “positive law 
and economics” (see Posner, 1979, and Landes and Posner, 1981). 
This helpful categorization can be applied to the present topic, i.e. virtue-
based economic analysis of law, to highlight the intended contribution of this 
perspective to standard law and economics. Firstly, in terms of positive analysis, 
the  claim  is  that  the  virtue  perspective  gives  us  a  better  understand  of  why  
certain legal  and institutional  arrangements  yield certain economic (and other)  
outcomes. In other words, presence or lack of certain virtues is one of the factors 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  trying  to  predict  the  impact  of  law  and  legal  
institutions on behavior. 
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Secondly, normative analysis  looks  for  the  optimal  design  of  law  and  
institutions, but in this case, the virtue perspective also provides additional 
criteria other than allocative efficiency; for example, it may be argued that law 
should also promote the acquisition of moral virtues by citizens. In practice, as 
will be seen later, normative analysis generally presupposes some positive 
analysis, because prescription depends on description. 
Thirdly, “interpretive” or “explanatory” analysis is an attempt to understand 
existing legal rules. In Posnerian law and economics, the prediction is that the 
law reflects considerations of economic efficiency. From the virtue perspective, 
an alternative hypothesis may be formulated: namely, that existing laws also 
reflect  the  desire  to  promote  the  virtues,  and  that  sometimes  they  do  this  in  
opposition to  what  economic theory would advocate  following the criterion of  
allocative efficiency. If and when this hypothesis is correct, laws which seem to 
be at odds with standard economic theory may appear reasonable from a virtue 
perspective. 
In the following sections, all three types of economic analysis are employed, 
using  the  virtue  perspective.  The  emphasis  is  on  normative  analysis,  which  
however is intertwined with positive analysis, so that the latter cannot be 
entirely neglected. In specific places, interpretive or explanatory analysis is also 
introduced. 
 
4.2 Static Analysis: Optimal Law with a Fixed Level of Virtue 
The  key  idea  of  this  section  is  the  optimal  design  of  law  will  depend  on  the  
extent to which people possess certain virtues. Already Isidore of Seville31 in his 
Etymologiae argued that, in order to serve the common good, law must be made 
“according to the customs of the country” and “adapted to place and time.”32 In 
the following discussion, the complex reality of possession or non-possession of 
virtues by the citizenry is denoted with the simplifying term level of virtue(s). 
The  following  sections  look  at  the  issue  with  respect  to  six  dimensions  of  
legal  design:  (1)  the  amount  of  freedom,  or  alternatively,  the  extent  of  legal  
constraints  on  choice;  (2)  the  demands  of  law,  i.e.  the  extent  to  which  law  
demands virtuous behavior of the citizens; (3) the precision of legal commands, 
(4) the choice between narrow rules and broad standards; (5) the type of 
sanctions used to enforce the law; and (6) the process and locus of law-making 
and law-enforcement, especially with respect to participation by different 
individuals and groups. 
In this analysis, I will first make some simplifying assumptions, such as 
perfect knowledge of the level of virtue, homogeneity of citizens in terms of virtue, 
well-meaning law-makers, and the absence of other social control mechanisms. In 
later sections, I will relax those assumptions to see how the analysis if affected. 
                                                        
31 Bishop of Seville, died 636; an important theologian and “Father of the Church.” 
32 Cited by Aquinas (1920: I–II, 96, 2; 95, 3). 
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4.2.1 Virtue and Freedom (Legal Constraints) 
With  respect  to  freedom  and  virtue,  there  is  a  famous  statement  by  Edmund  
Burke: 
“Men are qualified for civil liberty, in exact proportion to their disposition 
to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in proportion as their love 
to  justice  is  above  their  rapacity;  in  proportion  as  their  soundness  and  
sobriety  of  understanding  is  above  their  vanity  and  presumption;  in  
proportion as they are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise 
and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist, 
unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, 
and  the  less  of  it  there  is  within,  the  more  there  must  be  without.  It  is  
ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate 
minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.” (Burke, 1791: 68-
69) 
Burke’s claim is intuitively correct in light of classical virtue theory. When 
people  are  virtuous,  they will  tend to  act  wisely,  justly,  temperately  etc.  When 
that is the case, there is relatively little need for the law to interfere. 
This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  there  need  be  no  law  at  all,  even  if  it  
were the case that all the citizens possess all the virtues to the extreme. 
Following a classical distinction, law may be divided into two principal 
categories: (a) law as coordinator and (b) law as educator (see Gregg, 2003: 59-62). 
For example, most traffic rules – such as whether one is to drive on the left or the 
right,  and  most  kinds  of  speed  limits  –  serve  a  merely  coordinating  function,  
helping members of society orientate their activities in a more harmonious 
fashion. In contrast, criminal law serves a more educational function, trying to 
impose  limits  and  deterrents  on  immoral  behavior  and  protecting  other  
members of society from unjust harm. The educational role of law is principally 
to provide negative incentives, but not solely, because laws also have an 
important expressive function, which has a bearing on collective notions of 
moral right and wrong (Sunstein, 1996). 
Most areas of law contain both coordinating and educational elements. The 
principal idea for present purposes is that if people were infinitely virtuous, the 
educational  role  of  law  would  become  unnecessary;  and  the  extent  to  which  
people  lack  certain  virtuous,  the  educational  function  gains  in  importance.  On  
the other hand, the coordinating role would remain, although even that would 
presumably become less important, given that prudent persons are more 
capable than vicious persons of finding just and harmonious solutions to 
coordination difficulties on a voluntary basis. 
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The first principle may then be formulated as follows: Virtue goes together with 
more freedom (and fewer legal constraints); lack of virtue calls for more legal constraints 
(less freedom). 
If we try to relate this principle to the existing literature on the economics of 
institutions,  one  way  of  understanding  it  is  to  refer  to  the  distinction  between  
external and internal constraints (see Panther, 2000). Taking it is given that some 
constraints must be placed on choice if people are to live and act in harmony, it 
follows  that  a  tradeoff  exists  between  external  and  internal  constraints:  when  
there are significant internal constraints, external constraints become less 
important; and vice versa. Law is one type of external constraint (although not 
at all the only type), and virtue might be classified as a kind of internal 
constraint.  It  should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  virtue  seems  to  imply  
some internal constraints on action, it cannot without difficulty be identified with 
such constraints: virtues are also a type of freedom, because virtues as such do not 
“impose limits”, but rather they are enabling characteristics of acting persons. In 
a  sense,  it  is  vices  that  impose  limits  on  choice,  making  it  more  difficult  to  
choose  well;  that  this  is  so  becomes  obvious  when  one  considers  cases  of  
pathological intemperance, such as drug addiction: overcoming such an 
addiction is subjectively speaking a liberating experience, not a constraining one. 
Here  are  some  further  examples  to  illustrate  the  principle.  It  may  be  said  
there  are  two  different  types  of  constraint  that  may  be  needed  if  people  lack  
virtue. One type of constraint is those which protect others from unjust harm. In 
this respect, the principal virtue that is lacking is justice. When people are prone 
to treat others unjustly, their actions must be constrained externally, at least to 
some extent. 
In  terms  of  law,  the  most  important  area  with  respect  to  lack  of  justice  is  
criminal law,  the  main purpose of  which is  to  protect  others  from unjust  harm.  
But the principle can be applied to others areas of law too, including contract law. 
If  people  are  highly virtuous,  the law can leave them free  to  make all  kinds of  
contracts, whereas more regulation and protective measures will be needed if 
some or all people are inclined to deal dishonestly, deceitfully or 
unscrupulously with others.  On the other  hand,  lack of  virtue may also advice  
against very complicated and demanding legal norms, as will be explained later. 
Many other examples could be given: in constitutional law, more limits need to be 
imposed on public authorities if they are inclined to abuse their power, whereas 
the politicians and civil servants of a highly virtuous society can be entrusted 
with more discretionary powers; in regulatory law, more regulation is needed if 
people do not freely act justly and taking into account the common good; and so 
on. 
The second type of constraint is those which protect the actor from his or her 
own weaknesses. Here, the principal virtue that is lacking is the cardinal virtue of 
prudence:  experience,  objectivity,  and  the  ability  to  choose  the  best  option  for  
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oneself. Of course, other virtues such as intemperance and lack of fortitude may 
also be present (consider, again, the case of addictions). 
Law may, and indeed does, respond to the lack of prudence in various ways. 
In the field of contracts, for example, consumer protection laws seek to defend 
apparently weaker and less skilful parties from entering into unfavorable 
contracts.  Some  aspects  of  consumer  protection  are  justified  on  the  basis  of  
“inequality of bargaining power,” but sometimes “courts do intervene in cases 
where  a  ‘poor  and  ignorant’  or  otherwise  disadvantaged  person  has  entered  a  
contract on manifestly one-sided terms” (Dnes, 1996: 73). Some aspects of the 
general provisions on contractual validity can also be explained using the 
assumption  of  lack  of  prudence:  the  very  young,  and  others  who  lack  the  full  
use of their reason, cannot enter into contracts other than very minor ones. This 
does  not  mean  that  restrictions  on  contracting  are  always  a  good  idea,  even  if  
the actors lack prudence: these restrictions impose costs, sometimes they are 
ineffective, and protective regimes may have a negative effect on character 
development, as discussed later in the dynamic analysis. 
Many  types  of  regulatory law also  protect  individuals  from  their  own  
foolishness. One example is the regulation of the market for drugs, alcohol, tobacco 
and other substances or activities which may harm the consumers themselves and, 
furthermore, impose negative externalities on others. The optimal level of 
restrictions depends on the aptitudes of the people: for example, in Nordic and 
other colder countries there seems to be a greater tendency to overdrinking, and 
the law responds by imposing higher taxes, more limits to advertising alcohol, 
and harsher penalties for drunk-driving. 
Advertising regulation generally is a way of limiting the potentially negative 
effects on consumer choices of the overabundance of invitations to consume. For 
example, restrictions on, and compulsory disclosures of, product placements in 
movies can be seen as an attempt to make people more aware of the advertising 
intent and thereby enhance the exercise of prudence on the part of the viewers. 
In terms of the virtue of prudence, advertising to children is particularly 
problematic, because children have less developed abilities of rational 
discernment. 
 
4.2.2 Virtue and the Demands of Law 
In a classic text, Aquinas (1920: I–II, 96, 2) asks “whether it belongs to human 
law to repress all vices?” And he answers in the negative, not because he thinks 
some vices are good for anyone, but because the “possibility or faculty of action 
is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is not possible to 
one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has.” Therefore,  
“many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would 
be intolerable in a virtuous man. Now human law is framed for a number 
of  human  beings,  the  majority  of  whom  are  not  perfect  in  virtue.  
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Wherefore  human laws do not  forbid all  vices,  from which the virtuous 
abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the 
majority  to  abstain;  and  chiefly  those  that  are  to  the  hurt  of  others,  
without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: 
thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.” 
Now,  Aquinas’s  response  raises  another  set  of  issues,  that  is,  what  law  
should do about  the fact  that  some people  are  more virtuous than others;  that  
will  be  discussed  later  in  detail.  For  the  present,  let  us  focus  on  the  narrower  
question of  how demanding the law should be –  assuming,  for  simplicity,  that  
the level of virtue is more or less homogeneous among the citizens. 
Following Aquinas, we may formulate the second principle: Virtue goes 
together with more demanding law; lack of virtue calls for less demanding law. The 
reasoning  is  simple.  If  the  law  strictly  prohibits  everything  that  falls  short  of  
absolute  perfection,  then  law  becomes  oppressive,  expensive  to  enforce,  and  
ultimately unhelpful  for  the development  of  virtue,  because it  leaves  no scope 
for genuinely free choice. On the other hand, the absence of any legal constraints 
will tend toward the law of the jungle if people are not highly virtuous. 
This second principle could be restated by saying that law cannot demand more 
than the subjects are able to give or bear. Thus it is a kind of philosophical 
interpretation of the ancient Roman legal principle, nemo dat quod non habet: no 
one gives what he does not have. 
The dilemma faced by law-makers with less-than-virtuous citizens can be 
understood  as  an  instance  of  toleration in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word.  
Toleration does not mean respect or moral acceptance of the beliefs or actions of 
others; rather, it “refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with 
beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still ‘tolerable’, such 
that they should not be prohibited or constrained” (Forst, 2007, emphasis 
added). One of the principal motives for tolerating moral wrongs is that greater 
evil would result from trying to prohibit the beliefs or actions in question. 
This idea is closely related to that discovered by Gary Becker in his seminal 
article  on  the  economic  approach  to  crime  and  punishment  (Becker,  1968).  He  
demonstrated the counter-intuitive principle that, when criminal activity is 
economically  attractive  and  the  costs  of  apprehension  and  conviction  are  
significant, the socially optimal level of crime is positive, not zero. Of course, Becker 
focused  solely  on  economic  costs,  while  there  are  also  other,  including  moral  
costs. The principal difference in the virtue-based approach is to include 
variation in the supply of crime, because that depends not only on the economic 
benefits of criminal activity, but also on the virtues and vices of the people. 
A classic example of the mistake of imposing too demanding constraints is 
prohibition laws,  which sought to do away with the problem of alcohol through 
its  legal  prohibition.  The intent  was presumably laudable,  but  the effects  were 
problematic,  because  the  attraction  of  alcohol  was  so  strong  and  drinking  so  
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widespread that enforcing the law became impracticable. Further, the illegality 
of  the  highly  profitable  alcohol  trade  fostered  criminal  activity.  On  the  other  
hand, it has been argued by revisionist researchers that the prohibition was 
successful in some respects: the principal mistake was to impose too sudden and 
drastic changes, and to dedicate too scarce resources to enforcing the laws (see 
Blocker, 2006). 
This second principle is especially interesting in light of the previous 
question concerning freedom and virtue, because it turns out that, if Aquinas’s 
classic  response  is  correct,  a  tension  emerges:  if  earlier  virtue  was  connected  
with freedom (fewer constraints), now it seems that virtue implies that law can 
be more demanding, while vice implies that law needs to tolerate more 
foolishness and injustice. This tension does not imply outright contradiction, 
because it is also a question of what kinds of constraints are imposed. Thus, in a 
“society of saints”, the law can allow more freedom, but it can also perform 
more detailed coordinating and pedagogical roles, for example by providing 
more abstract principles of fairness and equity, because the citizens are able and 
willing  to  follow  the  directions  of  the  law.  In  contrast,  a  “society  of  knaves”  
needs strict rules on fundamental justice, leaving people less discretion in terms 
of how to conduct their affairs, but the law will refrain from giving too detailed 
rules or guidance. In the case of the first principle, the question was whether it is 
necessary to impose certain legal constraints; in the second principle, it is 
whether  it  is  advisable to  impose them,  given that  greater  evil  may result  if  the  
law demands too much. 
 
4.2.3 Virtue and Legal Precision 
The second principle is closely related to a third dimension, namely the notion 
of the precision of law, i.e. “the degree of detail or differentiation involved” 
(Kaplow, 2000: 503). The general theory in economic analysis of law is that more 
precise rules are better in principle, but their downside is that they generate 
higher formulation, adjudication and information costs. Legal precision is also a 
major source of legal complexity,  which  is  usually  seen  as  something  to  be  
avoided. 
The question would merit a detailed treatment, but in simple terms, we may 
formulate the third principle as follows: virtue goes together with more precise laws; 
lack of virtue implies less legal precision. The reason is again quite obvious when 
one considers the fact that the various costs generated by more precise rules are 
systematically affected by virtue and vice: higher level of virtue implies lower 
formulation, adjudication and information costs, and vice versa. 
For example, if people are very prudent, that is, they are capable of making 
wise decision, it follows that they are better equipped (as law-makers) to 
formulate  good,  more precise  rules,  and similarly  they are  better  equipped (as  
adjudicators)  to  interpret  and  apply  those  precise  rules  in  concrete  cases.  
Furthermore, if people practice justice freely, they will live in greater harmony 
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and will have fewer disputes; this implies that the law will be invoked less 
frequently,  and  both  adjudication  and  information  costs  will  be  reduced  as  a  
result. In contrast, lack of virtue will produce the opposite effects: the quality of 
law-making and adjudication will be lower, resulting in precise rules of a lower 
quality and, in all likelihood, contradictory complexity; further, a higher 
frequency of  legal  disputes  will  increase  the costs  of  settling disputes  within a  
complex legal framework. 
This principle can also be used as an interpretive tool in legal history. Over 
time, legal systems have become increasingly precise – and complex. While 
there may be reason to criticize this trend, it may also be argued in light of the 
virtue  perspective  that  the  widening  and  deepening  of  education  (which  is  
closely linked to some virtues, especially prudence) has rendered legal systems 
better equipped to making well-specified demands and handling the resulting 
complexity. 
It might be felt that it is wrong to conclude that more virtue implies that the 
law  should  be  more  complex;  after  all,  it  was  said  earlier  that  if  the  level  of  
virtue is high, law-makers may issue more abstract commands of justice and 
fairness. There is no contradiction, however, because more abstract norms do 
result in more complex rules when applied in practice. This question is 
discussed next in detail. 
 
4.2.4 Virtue and Rules vs. Standards 
The tension between the first three questions is better understood when we 
consider another dimension of legal design, namely the choice between narrow 
rules and broad standards. In law as well as in other fields of thought, a balance 
must often be struck between concreteness and abstraction. Overly narrow rules 
leave no scope for  improvisation,  and the classical  virtue approach is  skeptical  
of  attempts  to  specify  beforehand the right  solution to  every possible  case  (see  
Pieper, 1966: 25-28). On the other hand, too broad standards are not helpful for 
those whose sense of prudence, justice and so on is less developed. In extremis, 
all norms could be reduced to a primary moral norm such as “do good and 
avoid evil”, but it would fail to provide sufficient guidance for most of us when 
we are faced with the complexities of life. 
If this is true in abstract thought, then even more in legal practice. Law is a 
crude and imperfect instrument, and narrow rules will tend to be either under-
inclusive (failing to regulate activities that should be regulated) or over-inclusive 
(regulating activities that need not be regulated). Broad standards, on the other 
hand, give rise to interpretation costs and may also be poorly enforced in practice. 
In economic analysis of law, there is a rich literature discussing the problem (see 
Kaplow, 1992, 2000; Schäfer, 2002; Schlag, 1985). 
In the relation to the concern raised towards the end of the previous section, 
Kaplow (2000: 508-511) points out that, in principle, both rules and standards can 
be precise and complex. The fundamental difference is that narrow rules provide 
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greater specification in advance (resulting in higher formulation costs), while 
broad standards have  to  be  specified  in  concrete  cases  (resulting  in  higher  
adjudication costs). In light of the informational difficulties of formulating 
accurate  rules,  broader  standards  may  seem  to  be  better,  but  in  practice,  
standards are often poorly applied to concrete cases (for example in negligence 
disputes in tort law), so that the precision of the law is diminished. The optimal 
choice between rules and standards depends on a range of factors; as a general 
principle, “rules tend to be preferable when particular activities are frequent, 
and  standards  do  best  when  behavior  varies  so  greatly  that  any  particular  
scenario is relatively rare” (Kaplow, 2000: 510). 
What the virtue perspective implies for this dimension of legal design is not 
entirely clear. Extending the discussion of the previous section, we may say that 
a  higher  level  of  virtue will,  on the one hand,  mean a  better  quality  of  narrow 
rules,  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  also  implies  a  better  application  of  broad  
standards and lower adjudication and information costs. Despite this ambiguity, 
it is likely that virtue goes together with broad standards (principles-based law); lack of 
virtues calls for narrower rules.  
This principle seems unavoidable when one considers the extreme cases. In a 
“society of saints”, few specific rules would be needed, because all behavior 
would be governed by the requirements of general justice – which, by definition, 
perfectly  prudent  citizens  would  know  how  to  apply  to  all  the  different  
circumstances. And, indeed, what general justice requires is much broader and 
more  demanding  than  what  ordinary  legal  orders  require.  In  fact,  a  perfectly  
virtuous person only needs to follow the so-called first precept of morality: “do 
good, avoid evil”. Thus in such a society, few resources need to be dedicated to 
law-making and law-enforcement. In contrast, a “society of knaves” needs 
narrower rules, because its citizens are not well-equipped to interpreting broad 
standards, either as private person or in public capacity. 
An example serves to illustrate the matter. In contract law,  a  higher  level  of  
virtue  implies  that  the  law  may  focus  on  enforcing  and  demanding  broad  
principles of fairness, good faith and so on; in fact, these will be followed freely 
by highly virtuous citizens. When the level of virtue is low, in contrast, the law 
will need to provide clearer guidelines and stricter rules. Naturally, in the latter 
case it should be borne in mind that broad standards may still be optimal when 
particular  scenarios  are  rare,  because  this  helps  to  avoid  unnecessary  law-
formulation costs. 
In financial markets regulation, there is a debate concerning principles-based 
regulation,  especially  as  practiced  in  the  UK  (see  Black,  2010;  Ford,  2010;  FSA,  
2007, 2009). Financial firms have generally favored this approach, as it has been 
felt that it generates lower compliance costs. This belief is not necessarily true if 
the enforcement regime is severe, however, because broader standards imply 
more uncertainty of application (Schwarcz, 2009). In light of virtue theory, on 
the other hand, one may argue that principles-based financial regulation should 
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also take into account the level of virtuous disposition among the regulated 
parties, that is, financial firms. 
The question of legal design is greatly influenced by the virtues and vices of 
public officials. The principle formulated earlier implies that broad standards are 
more advisable and workable when those applying them are virtuous, whereas 
narrower rules may be better if their level of virtue is low. This is consistent with 
the findings of other authors: for example, Sunstein (1995) has pointed out that 
broad standards give more discretionary power to  judges  and  officials,  and  this  
may be problematic if they are prone to prejudice and other types of injustice. 
Hans-Bernd Schäfer (2002) has also indicated that if politicians are prone to 
corruption, it may be better to entrust law-formulation to independent courts – 
as in the traditional common law system – because courts cannot be easily 
influenced by special interest groups (Schäfer, 2002: 4-5). This is supported by 
the fact that the judge-made common law system was traditionally quite free 
from rules favoring interest groups, and it was therefore more favorable to free 
market principles. On the other hand, a legal system that relies heavily on broad 
standards may fail  to  function well  when transplanted into a  lesser  developed 
country if the judiciary of the latter is poorly trained (lack of prudence) and also 
prone to corruption (lack of justice). 
 
4.2.5 Virtue and Legal Sanctions 
Another  important  factor  is  the type of  legal  enforcement  (sanctions).  It  is  one 
thing that the law demands certain kinds of conduct, but it is a separate question 
what happens if the demands of the law are not fulfilled. The variety of possible 
sanctions  is  very  high,  even  when  non-legal  sanctions  are  excluded,  but  for  
simplicity,  we can work with an abstract  scale  of  sanctions,  ranging from very 
harsh to no penalties for rule-infringement. 
The question of sanctions is closely related to the previous point on legal 
demands, because, if the punishments are too severe (imagine that the minutest 
violation of the most insignificant traffic rule leads to the death penalty), then 
the  entire  system  will  tend  to  break  down  and  become  unmanageable  for  the  
sheer cost of enforcing the law. On the other hand, the complete absence of any 
kind of penalties whatsoever would render the law practically meaningless, at 
least in terms of external incentives. 
Considering again the theoretical extremes of very high and very low level of 
virtue, we may formulate the fifth principle: virtue goes together with lighter 
enforcement/sanctions; lack of virtue calls for harsher punishments for rule-
infringement. This follows from the fact that highly virtuous citizens need law 
principally for guidance and mutual coordination, and they will fulfill the just 
demands of the law freely, simply because it is the right thing to do. In contrast, 
brutish  men  will  not  easily  follow  such  advice  and  need  strong  external  
incentives to abstain from foolish and unjust activity. 
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One specific example to consider is the so-called “comply or explain” model of 
regulation,  which  is  used  in  many  countries  (including  the  UK,  Germany  and  
Finland)  in  the  field  of  corporate  governance.  It  is  a  form  of  soft regulation, 
providing  a  standard  approach  which  however  is  not  binding;  but  if  it  is  not  
followed, an explanation must be publicized. “Comply or explain” provides 
flexibility and therefore may be the most efficient model when the financial 
stakes are not significant and when there is a sufficient level of virtue among the 
relevant  actors.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  work  poorly  if  the  regulatees  are  
unwilling to comply without clear sanctions (see generally Andres and Theissen, 
2008; Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud, 2010). 
Partnoy (2003) argues through several case studies that in the US regulation 
of financial markets, there has been a general failure to impose convincing 
penalties on individuals who seriously break the rules and inflict significant 
damage on others. One problem is that prosecuting complex financial fraud is 
terribly difficult. The other is that most of the actual penalties were a mere “slap 
on the wrist” in comparison with the profits, so that the resulting expected cost 
of penalty was very small, given very low probabilities of getting caught. 
The fifth principle could also be used as an interpretive tool in legal history. 
As  a  general  trend,  legal  systems  have  become  less  severe  over  time:  
punishments for criminal activity have become more humane, and groups such 
as  debtors  have  come  to  be  treated  with  more  understanding  and  forgiveness  
(for example, debtors’ prisons have been abolished). The causes of this evolution 
are inevitable complex. As an initial hypothesis, one might present a virtue-
based perspective: factors such as wider general education have enabled more 
people becoming civilized, and hence the nature of optimal punishments has also 
changed. Obviously, this hypothesis is only understood as a partial explanation. 
Moreover, one should not merely presume that the design of the law is always 
optimal, whether today or in the past. 
The  fifth  principle  is  again  in  tension  with  the  second  one:  earlier,  it  was  
argued that lack of virtue calls for more tolerant law, but now it is claimed that it 
demands harsher punishments. This tension is important, because it highlights 
the  fact  that  the  specific  design  aspect  of  law  should  not  be  considered  in  
isolation; it is their totality that matters. 
 
4.2.6 Virtue and the Making and Enforcement of Law 
We  have  already  made  various  allusions  to  the  task  of  making  and  enforcing  
laws,  but  this  may also be considered as  a  separate  dimension of  legal  design.  
The  relevance  of  virtues  –  of  prudence and justice in  particular  –  is  perhaps  
especially obvious in this context, because making good laws that serve the 
community well and applying them fairly and correct to concrete cases are 
activities that require plenty of experience, sound judgment, fairness, 
impartiality, and similar qualities. People who lack prudence and justice are 
quite clearly not fit to govern the society (and, indeed, they are only imperfectly 
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fit  to  govern  themselves).  This  simple  insight  can  be  translated  into  the  sixth  
principle: Virtue goes together with more participation in law-making and law-
enforcement; lack of virtue implies less participation. 
This principle coincides with the classical idea in political theory that the 
functioning  of  democratic  government  requires  a  certain  level  of  education,  
culture and virtue (see Aristotle’s Politics, 1988: III, 11). Of course, there are 
numerous variations of democratic governance, so one could say that, in light of 
virtue  theory,  a  higher  level  of  virtue  speaks  in  favor  of  more  direct  and  
complete participation, including popular referenda, while a lower level of 
virtue seems to imply that indirect (parliamentary) democracy is preferable, and 
in some cases democracy might not be a good idea at all. 
The same principle  could be used in  an interpretive way to  explain the fact  
that children cannot vote. It is a rough rule, which may be both over-inclusive 
and  under-inclusive  in  terms  of  the  level  of  virtue,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  
sensible rule of thumb to say that persons below a certain age have not 
developed a good capacity for judging complex matters of social life. Sometimes 
one hears demands for the setting up of a minimum education level for the right 
to  vote;  that  may  seem  to  correspond  to  the  demands  of  virtue  theory,  but  in  
practice  it  would  be  problematic  for  a  range  of  reasons,  and  probably  it,  too,  
would be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, because some people are 
highly virtuous without being formally educated, while others are not virtuous 
at all despite all their education. 
Apart from the question of democracy, the sixth principle can be extended in 
numerous ways. As an example, self-regulatory regimes may be the ideal solution 
when the relevant individuals have a high level of virtue and are willing to deal 
justly with others (on self-regulation, see generally Ogus, 2000). In contrast, self-
regulation may be a poor idea if the people in question lack certain virtues, 
because self-regulatory regimes are easily abused by unjust people. 
In many fields of private law,  there is also scope for a kind of self-made law. 
Contract law and the law of associations give persons significant power to make 
legally binding rules for themselves. In light of virtue theory, it is appropriate 
for virtuous persons to have more freedom to decide for themselves, including 
in the sphere of private law. In contrast, people with less virtue are less capable 
of governing themselves, and in the sphere of private law also they need – and 
benefit from having – more constraints on their choices (assuming, of course, 
that those constraints are well designed and genuinely helpful). Thus, again, the 
virtue perspective accounts for the limited legal capacity of infants, minors and 
other persons under special conditions. 
 
4.3 Some Difficulties and Responses 
There are at least two difficulties in designing an optimal legal regime that takes 
into  account  the  virtuousness  of  citizens.  One  problem  is  that  we  lack  
information concerning the possession or non-possession of virtues. The second 
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difficulty  is  that,  in  any  given  society,  people  are  different  and  it  may  be  
impossible to talk about a unified level of virtue. The following two sections 
discuss some possible responses to these concerns. 
 
4.3.1 Lack of Information 
The first major difficulty is that we do not have accurate information on the level 
of  virtue.  In  fact,  virtues  are  not  easily  amenable  to  measurement,  and even in  
our personal case, it can sometimes be difficult to determine to what extent we 
possess or lack certain virtues. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  virtue  approach  must  be  abandoned.  A  useful  
analogy is provided by so-called happiness studies (see generally Bruni and Porta, 
2006; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007). The idea of measuring happiness 
may have appeared as absurd some time ago, but empirical methods have been 
developed to make at least some sense of variations in subjective well-being. 
Arguably, the level of virtues could also be estimated empirically, especially 
with the help of suitable proxy variables (see Sison, 2003: 147-163). Writing in the 
context of management literature, Sison proposes that the moral capital of a 
company’s  workers  may  be  estimated  with  such  quantitative  indicators  as  
employee turnover rates, absenteeism, tardiness and the incidence of illegal 
activity (Sison, 2003: 150-151). Value-surveys and in-depth interviews may also 
be employed to obtain qualitative data on indicators as “quality of home-life, 
rest  and  leisure,  involvement  in  volunteer  work  and  community  out-reach  
programs, religious observance, and so on” (Sison, 2003: 152). 
For purposes of legal design, the focus is on the broader society; sub-groups 
may be relevant when it comes to targeted regulation. There are numerous 
possibilities  for  proxy  measures  of  the  level  of  virtue.  Such  factors  as  the  
corruption perception index and  the  general  amount  of  criminal activity give  a  
rough sense of the level of justice, while the general level of education provides a 
basic  idea of  the level  of  prudence among citizens.  Looking at  specific  virtues,  
one can go into greater detail and differentiation; for example, alcohol and drug 
abuse is principally related to intemperance, where white-collar crime is more 
linked to dishonesty and avarice. Ideally, specialized measurement techniques 
should be developed to gather more accurate and reliable data. Over time, such 
data would become useful for purpose of making better laws. 
When  it  is  a  question  of  active  regulation,  it  is  possible  to  design  the  
regulatory strategy in such a way that it takes into account the variation of the 
level of virtue, and our limited knowledge thereof. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) 
have  outlined  a  range  of  approaches  that  resonate  well  with  the  virtue  
perspective presented here. One of them is called the benign big gun approach. 
That  approach  to  regulation  acknowledges  the  fact  that  many  regulatees  are  
motivated to  do the right  thing and treat  others  justly,  but  there  is  always the 
danger  of  more  exploitative  actors.  Both  types  should  be  treated  differently,  if  
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optimal results are to be attained: the former need guidance and persuasion, 
while the latter need the threat of strong punishments. 
When the regulators do not know the motivational base of the regulatees, 
they can mitigate the problem through pyramid strategies of responsive regulation 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 35-41). In one variant, there may be a scale of 
rapidly escalating sanctions if rules are repeatedly violated; the sanctions would 
become systematically severer: (1) persuasion – (2) warning – (3) civil penalty – 
(4) criminal penalty – (5) license suspension – (6) shutdown or license 
revocation. Another variant focuses on the type of regulation, and it is relevant 
when  the  regulated  industry  is  quite  homogeneous  but  the  legislator  does  not  
know  its  motivational  base  (or  level  of  virtue);  the  regulatory  strategy  would  
become more restrictive if abuses are observed: (a) self-regulation – (b) enforced 
self-regulation – (c) command regulation with discretionary punishment – (d) 
command regulation with nondiscretionary punishment. In the second variant, 
changes would have to be executed by the government through legislation. 
According to the authors, it is however fundamental that the pyramid strategy is 
communicated  in  advance  in  a  clear  and  credible  manner,  and  that  the  
escalation  is  executed  rapidly  so  that  credibility  is  not  lost.  Note  that  in  the  
proposals  of  Ayres  and  Braithwaite,  the  change  of  enforcement  approach  
corresponds  to  the  principles  outlined  in  this  essay,  either  through  tougher  
sanctions (fifth principle) or more participation in rule-making (sixth principle).  
 
4.3.2 Heterogeneity: Legal Responses 
The other difficulty is that people are different. The level of virtue in any given 
society will  vary significantly  from person and community to  another.  Yet  the 
law must, at least ordinarily, treat all people equally. However, this does not 
mean that the virtue perspective is useless; it turns out under closer examination 
that even when the rules are formally the same for everyone, it does not mean 
that everyone is treated the same way in fact. Here are five reasons why. 
Firstly, the law can sometimes treat people differently. For example, a person 
who has been convicted of a crime will often receive more stringent treatment. 
The common policy that repeat offenders usually get harsher penalties than 
first-timers is explained and supported by the virtue approach:  one might commit a 
crime out of drunkenness or external pressure, but the fact of continuing to 
commit further crimes is a strong indication that the person in question has a 
serious character problem, and the law is justified in adopting severer measures 
in response.33 There may also be differential treatment in the process of criminal 
investigation. This type of “legal discrimination” of criminal persons seems to be 
supported by virtue theory:  people  rarely  change overnight  (if  at  all),  and it  is  
                                                        
33 Dal  Bó  and Terviö  (2008)  also  find that  harsher  penalties  for  repeat  offenders  are  justified  under  
their model. 
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reasonable – and economically efficient – that the law views certain persons with 
more suspicion or severity, given their past behavior. 
Secondly,  law  may  sometimes  be  designed  so  that  it  only  applies  to  specific 
groups of people.  A  particular  law  may  be  designed  to  address  conduct  that  in  
itself implies something about the actor’s level of virtue. In economic terms, this 
resembles the notion of adverse selection.  In  criminal  law,  for  example,  this  
happens  explicitly  because  criminal  acts  are  contrary  to  the  virtue  of  justice  
(assuming,  of  course,  that  the law itself  is  just);  therefore,  the  law does well  to  
treat present or past criminals with some more suspicion. 
There may also be implicit adverse selection: one example is so-called instant 
loans, which are generally used only by people who lack personal finance skills 
and hence are likely to lack prudence; therefore the market for instant loans may 
justifiably be regulated more than that of other types of credit. In the other 
extreme, one can consider the market for private placements, which is de facto 
only accessible for those with significant wealth; that market does not require so 
much regulation, because the fact that someone is wealthy normally implies that 
he  knows  how  to  take  care  of  financial  affairs  (perhaps  with  some  exceptions  
such as those who inherited their wealth). 
More  generally,  some  areas  of  law  are  targeted to specific activities, which in 
themselves do not imply anything specific about the level of virtue, but still the 
people in question will be more homogeneous than the society at large. One 
example is industrial regulation. Different industries tend to have different 
cultures and to attract people with certain backgrounds, interest and values. 
Moreover, some industries entail specific threats to the practice of virtue – one 
thinks of the vice of greed, present in financial markets in a special way – and it 
may be appropriate for law-makers to take that into consideration. 
Thirdly, some legal rules only apply to individuals who have certain qualities, 
such  as  education  or  experience.  For  example,  some  rules  imply  restrictions  
based  on  proxy  measures  related  to  the  virtue  of  prudence.  In  financial  
regulation in the more distant past, access to markets was limited in various 
ways,  such  as  knowing  the  right  people,  and  thus  there  was  plenty  of  de facto 
access control. Today, those markets are more widely accessible, but there are 
rules – explained by the virtue perspective – that limit the application of certain 
rules depending on client categorization; as a rule, non-professional clients are 
awarded more regulatory protection. In many markets, certain riskier activities 
such  as  options  trading  are  also  restricted  to  clients  who  have  a  specified  
numbers of years of experience as investors. 
Fourthly, some rules control entry to special social roles. In light of virtue theory, 
this  may  be  seen  as  a  way  of  simplifying  the  task  of  regulating  the  people  in  
charge of those social responsibilities that call for a higher level of virtue. The 
punishment  for  certain crimes is  simply the exclusion (perhaps for  a  period of  
time) from participating in some markets or other social activities. For example, 
financial crime may be punished by excluding the person from working in the 
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financial sector for a specific number of years, and persons guilty of company-
related  fraud  may  be  disqualified  from  starting  new  businesses  or  exercising  
positions of responsibility in other companies. 
More generally, the imprisonment of serious criminals is effectively a way of 
excluding them from participating in almost any kind of social life. In addition, 
the fact of having a criminal record may an impediment to entering certain 
professions or positions of authority. These kinds of negative entry criteria (“no 
criminal record”) can be interpreted as attempts to bar individuals with 
demonstrably bad personality traits from social positions in which greater 
power is exercised and the virtue of justice is especially important. For example, 
sexual offenders cannot, or should not, work with children. 
The  law  may  also  impose  positive entry criteria.  For  example,  the  
establishment  of  a  financial  services  company  in  many  countries  requires  that  
the board members are carefully scrutinized to ensure their trustworthiness, 
fitness and professional competence. The financial services industry creates 
many  opportunities  for  highly  profitable  fraud,  and  entry  control  is  a  way  of  
limiting access to important position to persons who are less likely to engage in 
fraud. 
Fifthly, as a broader policy issue, the virtue perspective may be seen as an 
argument in favor of a certain degree of social homogeneity. To put it differently, 
highly multi-cultural societies will run the risk of finding it more difficult to 
design efficient legal regimes, given that different cultures tend to emphasize 
and foster some virtues and neglect others. On the other hand, cultural exchange 
and variation may be beneficial  for  the development  of  virtue,  so  determining 
the optimal  balance would require  an extensive study.  At  any event,  the  point  
here  is  not  compare  the  goodness  or  badness  of  different  cultures,  but  to  
highlight the fact that different cultures may call for differing approaches to law, 
and it is easier to design suitable laws when they apply to a limited number of 
cultures. 
As a corollary of the previous point, the virtue perspective may be seen as an 
argument for decentralized law. Decentralization implies that the law will be 
applied to a relatively more homogeneous community, whereas increasing legal 
centralization will make it more difficult to address the characteristics of all the 
people affected. European Union legislation is a much-discussed case in point: 
given the highly different cultural traditions of EU member states, one-size-fits-
all legislation rarely functions well in all the countries, because – among other 
things – their cultures emphasize and foster rather different virtues. 
 
4.4 Dynamic Analysis: Safeguarding and Promoting Virtue 
In  the  static  analysis,  law-making  has  to  take  the  level  of  virtue  into  account,  
because the virtues and the vices of citizens influence the real outcomes and 
consequences of laws. In the dynamic analysis, law influences the level of virtue 
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itself.  In  other  words,  virtues  are  not  taken  as  a  given,  but  they  become  an  
endogenous variable. 
In terms of normative analysis, the starting point here is that virtues are 
something to be pursued – a normative objective – for two reasons. One reason 
is  that  virtue  is  a  social good which,  as  explained  earlier,  gives  rise  to  various  
positive externalities.  The  other  reason  is  that,  according  to  the  classical  theory,  
virtue is a personal good, an important determinant of personal well-being and a 
constituent aspect of a good life.34 
The argument develops as follows. The first section below discusses some of 
the ways in which law helps to safeguard and promote virtue. However, there 
are limits to the extent to which law is able to accomplish this, and the second 
section argues that law may sometimes have a negative effect on the virtues of 
citizens. The third section highlights other reasons why we should, in any case, 
be wary about giving law-makers too much power for the ostensible purpose of 
making men morally better. Finally, the role of factors other than law is briefly 
considered. 
 
4.4.1 Law and Virtue: A Positive Effect 
There is a long-standing tradition in social and moral philosophy which 
highlights the positive relationship between law and virtue. The chief proponent 
of this view is without doubt Aristotle, the most important developer of virtue 
theory in general. At the end of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1980) mentions 
the need to undertake another project on political theory rather than ethics: 
“while  [moral  arguments]  seem  to  have  power  to  encourage  and  
stimulate  the  generous-minded  among  our  youth,  and  to  make  a  
character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to 
be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility 
and goodness.” (Nic. Eth., X, 9: 1179b) 
The reason why moral argument is not sufficient to convince the multitudes 
is that “passion seems to yield not to argument but to force,” and many people 
“do  not  by  nature  obey  the  sense  of  shame,  but  only  fear,  and  do  not  abstain  
from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment” (ibid.). 
In other words, the deterrent effect of  the  law  is  necessary,  because  otherwise  
some people will simply follow their lowest instincts. Although one may 
dispute with Aristotle on the rather elitist tendencies of his view of the common 
man,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  many  people  need  something  more  than  mere  
words. 
                                                        
34 The use of law to promote virtue as a personal good raises important questions of legal philosophy. 
See George (1993) for an extensive discussion and defense against critics of the position advanced 
here. The promotion of virtue as a social good is philosophically less controversial, because it is the 
external effects of behavior that the law is primarily concerned with. 
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Another writer in the same tradition, Aquinas (1920) writes in his Summa 
Theologica that “man has a natural aptitude for virtue,” but the development of 
this  aptitude  requires  training,  and  for  some  people,  words  alone  are  not  
enough: 
“since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily 
amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by 
force  and  fear,  in  order  that,  at  least,  they  might  desist  from  evil-doing,  
and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated 
in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from 
fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels 
through fear  of  punishment,  is  the  discipline of  laws.  Therefore  in  order  
that  man  might  have  peace  and  virtue,  it  was  necessary  for  laws  to  be  
framed.” (I–II, q. 95, a. 1) 
A contemporary author in the same tradition, Robert P. George has 
summarized well the central idea in his book Making Men Moral (1993). In the 
language of economics, the principal reasons could be summarized in terms of 
incentives, externalities (negative and positive) and information: 
“Laws cannot make men moral. […] Nevertheless, the central pre-liberal 
tradition of thought about morality, politics, and law has maintained that 
laws have a  legitimate  subsidiary role  to  play in  helping people  to  make 
themselves moral. According to this tradition, laws forbidding certain 
powerfully seductive and corruptive vices (some sexual, some not) can 
help  people  to  establish  and  preserve  a  virtuous  character  by  (1)  
preventing  the  (further)  self-corruption  which  follows  from  acting  out  a  
choice to indulge in immoral conduct; (2) preventing the bad example by 
which  others  are  induced  to  emulate  such  behavior;  (3)  helping  to  
preserve the moral ecology in which people make their morally self-
constituting choices; and (4) educating people about moral right and 
wrong.” (George, 1993: 1) 
We might take examples from any field of law, but the relationship between 
law and virtue is most obvious in the case of criminal law, which in many ways 
upholds  virtuous  conduct  and  penalizes  vice,  even  if  this  terminology  seems  
old-fashioned today. Supposing that core criminal law would be entirely 
abolished (or would go unenforced), it is easy to picture the dynamic downward 
spiral  in  terms of  personal  morality  (assuming,  to  be  precise,  that  there  are  no 
non-legal sanctions on criminal acts either). Some, whose moral character is 
weak,  would be unconstrained to  engage in  highly iniquitous acts,  which they 
find attractive but which shape their moral character from bad to worse. Those 
of  a  more  upright  personality  would  feel  discouraged  by  the  failure  of  public  
authorities to punish the aggressors and put an end to rampant injustice. While 
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some might resist, others would yield to the temptation of injustice too. The lack 
of  criminal  prohibitions  would  also  be  perceived  by  many  as  an  indication  of  
common  morality,  so  that  their  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  would  become  
distorted  and  their  virtue  of  prudence  weakened.  In  the  extreme,  a  law  of  the  
jungle would arise where simply might is right. The only solution to such a state 
of affairs would be that some citizens rise up against the injustice, changing the 
laws of the society or at least setting up non-legal institutions to safeguard basic 
justice, and inspiring others through their moral example. 
The dynamic perspective implies an important difference with respect to the 
static analysis: namely, that people can chance.  In  the  static  analysis,  it  was  
assumed  for  simplicity  that  the  level  of  virtue  is  fixed.  However,  while  virtue  
theory supposes certain stability of character, it also implies the possibility of 
improvement (and, of course, the possibility of becoming corrupt). 
If  the  static  analysis  were taken too far,  two problematic  conclusions might  
be  made.  On the one hand,  it  might  be  argued that  “once a  criminal,  always a  
criminal”  –  and  therefore  law  should  treat  past  criminals  with  outmost  
suspicion; in fact, it would be hard to escape the argument for death penalty, at 
least  in  the  case  of  serious  criminals.  The  problem  is  that  the  assumption  is  
unrealistic and unjust, because it denies freedom of choice and even the ability 
to change. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  taken  for  granted  that  apparently  virtuous  
persons  are  entirely  incapable  of  unjust  acts.  This  could  lead  into  placing  too  
much trust in them and vesting them with powers that, if abused, would lead to 
significant injustice. 
These concerns have been noticed by Robert P. George, who takes issue with 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas  on  the  extent  to  which  it  is  appropriate  to  make  any  
fundamental distinctions between different people when it comes to the 
development of virtue. Although people certainly are different, their basic 
tendencies and challenges are similar: 
“[T]here is in normal circumstances no reason to suppose, as Aristotle 
did,  that  the great  mass  of  people  are  incapable  of  being reasonable  and 
need to be governed by fear. Nor is there any reason to believe in the 
existence of a moral élite whose members need only understand moral 
truth in order to live up to its demands. The fact is that all rational human 
beings are capable of understanding moral reasons; yet all require 
guidance,  support,  and  assistance  from  others.  All are susceptible to 
moral failure, and serious moral failure; and all are capable of benefiting 
from  a  milieu  which  is  more  or  less  free  from  powerful  inducements  to  
vice.” (George, 1993: 40) 
These concerns highlight the importance of appropriate law and its 
enforcement in all fields, not only in criminal matters. Ayres and Braithwaite 
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(1992: 26) cite evidence to the effect that the majority of people obey laws 
voluntarily – but voluntary compliance drops significantly if violators are not 
duly punished. Constitutional law and procedural law are especially interesting in 
this context, because they seek to uphold the virtues of prudence and justice in 
the making and administration of the law itself. In fact, Aristotle in his Politics 
(1988) argues that the rule of law is a safeguard of justice, because few men are so 
virtuous as to be completely free from the influence of passions, which render 
one’s judgments imperfect: 
“Therefore  he  who  bids  the  law  rule  may  be  deemed  to  bid  God  and  
Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; 
for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even 
when they are  the best  of  men.  The law is  reason unaffected by desire.”  
(Politics, III, 16: 1287a29–33). 
Aristotle admits that the law cannot provide for all the cases, but still the 
primacy of the rule of law remains: 
“Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which 
exists in law; and that is a better ruler which is free from passion than that 
in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must always 
sway the heart of man.” (Politics, III, 15: 1286a15–20). 
A range of principles and institutional safeguards have been developed to 
foster  the  exercise  of  prudence  and  justice  in  the  making  and  enforcement  of  
laws (see Finnis, 1980: 270-273). These include, among others, clear 
promulgation, coherence with other laws, prospectivity, possibility of being 
complied with, and stability; division of powers and of responsibilities in 
administering the law; independence of the judiciary; openness of court 
proceedings; the accountability of officials for not obeying the law; accessibility 
of the courts to all, including the poor; sounds rules of evidence; and many other 
procedural principles such as audiatur et altera pars, which is upheld by ensuring 
that both parties have sufficient time to make their case before their submissions 
are examined by the judge(s). 
Naturally,  the  starting  point  in  terms  of  the  level  of  virtue  has  to  be  taken  
into account in the dynamic analysis too. This implies a kind of gradualism in the 
promotion of virtue, as explained by Aquinas in a work commonly known as De 
Regno. There he submits that the objective of the law-maker is threefold: “first of 
all, to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him; second, to preserve 
it once established; and third, having preserved it, to promote its greater 
perfection.” (Aquinas, 1949: I, 16, [117], emphases added). 
A  recent  example  of  gradualism  in  practice  is  the  ongoing  anti-tobacco  
campaign. The anti-tobacco movement took to heart the lessons of the alcohol 
prohibition  acts,  and  did  not  try  to  impose  an  outright  ban  on  a  substance  to  
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which numerous people were deeply addicted. Instead, the strategy was to 
slowly steer social norms and public health perceptions against tobacco, and to 
push  for  laws  which  have  gradually  but  systematically  limited  the  sphere  of  
legal rights of tobacco smokers. 
The  static  analysis  provides  a  framework  for  several  dimensions  of  legal  
design which should change as society becomes more or less virtuous. Thus, if 
the level of virtue increases, the law should become gradually less constraining, 
yet  more  extensive  and  demanding;  more  precise  and  focusing  on  broader  
standards; opting for more persuasion than punishments; and providing for 
wider  participation  in  the  making  and  enforcement  of  the  law.  If  the  level  of  
virtue decreases, the movement should be the opposite; this corresponds to the 
insights of the enforcement pyramids of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). 
 
4.4.2 Law or Virtue: A Negative Effect 
Law is not always helpful for building up a virtuous society. The gradualism 
mentioned  above  showed  how  the  dynamic  view  too,  has  to  take  the  starting  
level into account. But it is not only the case that incorrectly designed law will be 
imperfectly effective: it may also be positively harmful. 
One reason is that if the law has some practical effect on people’s lives, they 
will respond to that law in one way or another, making either morally good or 
bad choices, and thus shaping their moral character for better or worse. This is 
noted by Aquinas in a famous response to the hypothetical objection that, if law 
should not repress all vices (as argued earlier), then surely our  theory  is  
neglecting the role of law in making men better. He answers by explaining that 
the issue is more complicated: 
“The purpose of  human law is  to  lead men to  virtue,  not  suddenly,  but  
gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men 
the  burdens  of  those  who  are  already  virtuous,  viz.  that  they  should  
abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear 
such precepts,  would break out  into yet  greater  evils.  [T]he precepts  are  
despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.” 
(Aquinas, 1920: I–II, 96, 2, ad 2) 
What Aquinas intuits is that law-makers need to strike a delicate balance 
between  demanding  too  little  and  demanding  too  much  –  which  is  why  
legislators need a great deal of prudence. If the law demands too little, failing to 
prohibit some important vices and iniquitous activities, then many will feel 
uninhibited to practice those vices, thus making themselves worse in the process 
and encouraging others to  follow  in  their  footsteps.  But  if  the  law  demands  too  
much, a rebellion may follow. Of course, one must remember that virtue theory 
is not mathematics, and acquired habits (virtues and vices) only condition choices 
– they do not absolutely determine choices. 
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It might be countered that, surely, people rarely rebel simply because the law 
is  too  demanding,  and  therefore  the  concern  is  exaggerated.  It  is  hard  to  
determine whether that is true, and a more detailed investigation would be 
needed. Whatever the truth is, there are other reasons why overemphasizing the 
law  may  backfire.  One  of  those  is  that  law as such cannot  turn  anyone  into  a  
virtuous person: 
“Laws cannot make men moral. Only men can do that; and they can do it 
only by freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right reason. 
Laws can command outward conformity to moral rules, but cannot compel 
the internal acts of reason and will which make an act of external conformity 
to the requirements of morality a moral act.” (George, 1993: 1, emphases 
added) 
One implication of this is that law is simply not enough. But there is more to 
it: forced outward conformity to virtuous behavior may sometimes be 
counterproductive if the corresponding development of internal attitudes is 
lacking. This idea can be found already in the writings of Confucius (2010): 
“If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by 
punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of 
shame.  If  they be led by virtue,  and uniformity sought  to  be  given them 
by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover 
will become good.” (Analects, 2, 3) 
The underlying problem is that law is a clumsy instrument. Firstly, by its 
very nature,  law focuses  on external acts, whereas the development of virtuous 
dispositions requires (in addition to external acts) education in the reasons for 
those acts. Secondly, law tends to be slow in its reaction to unjust conduct (the 
prosecution of  crimes may take months or  years),  whereas  education in  virtue 
calls  for  quick  responses  so  as  to  rectify  errors  in  time.  Finally,  the  disciplinary 
nature of law may have negative secondary consequences: 
“Wise  legislators  whose  goal  is  to  encourage  true  moral  goodness,  and  
not merely the outward behavior that mimics true virtue, will therefore 
seek to secure and maintain a moral ecology that is inhospitable not only 
to such vices as pornography, prostitution, and drug abuse, but also to the 
vices of moral infantilism, conformism, servility, mindless obedience to 
authority, and hypocrisy.” (George, 1993: 42–43) 
The latter vices cannot be prohibited by law. Rather, a highly restrictive and 
repressive  legal  regime  –  apparently,  perhaps,  conducive  to  the  avoidance  of  
vice  –  will  tend  to  foster  those  vices  by  failing  to  provide  an  atmosphere  of  
responsible freedom. 
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Freedom is also needed for moral development for the reason that there are 
many good acts which are only meaningful if people choose them freely. Think, 
for example, of the expressing of gratitude, gift-giving, or the acknowledging of 
achievements: compelling such acts by force would render them without 
meaning or value (George, 1993: 44). 
It  therefore  seems  that  an  atmosphere  of  confidence in human freedom is 
necessary  for  the  practice  and  development  of  virtue.  This  has  been  aptly  
pointed out by Barry Schwartz (2009), who argues that the virtue of practical 
wisdom  cannot  be  developed  without  an  environment  in  which  people  are  
allowed to make free choices – developing their moral skill – and in which the 
reason for acting is not merely external benefits but the good of doing the right 
thing to other people – developing their moral will: 
“When things go wrong,  as  of  course  they do,  we reach for  two tools  to  
try to fix them. One tool we reach for is rules. Better ones, more of them. 
The  second  tool  we  reach  for  is  incentives.  Better  ones,  more  of  them.  
What else, after all,  is there? We can certainly see this in response to the 
current financial crisis. Regulate, regulate, regulate. Fix the incentives, fix 
the incentives, fix the incentives... The truth is that neither rules nor 
incentives  are  enough  to  do  the  job.  […]  And what happens is that as we 
turn increasingly to rules, rules and incentives may make things better in the 
short run, but they create a downward spiral that makes them worse in the long 
run. Moral skill is chipped away by an over-reliance on rules that deprives 
us  of  the  opportunity  to  improvise  and  learn  from  our  improvisations.  
And moral  will  is  undermined by an incessant  appeal  to  incentives  that  
destroy our desire to do the right thing. And without intending it, by 
appealing to rules and incentives, we are engaging in a war on wisdom.” 
(Emphases added) 
These concerns are implicitly reflected in the principles outlined in the static 
analysis:  in  order  to  promote  the  development  virtue,  it  is  necessary  to  give  
people freedom; to opt for broader standards rather than narrow rules only; to 
persuade  with  reasoned  arguments,  not  compel  by  force  only;  and  to  provide  
opportunities for participation. To encourage virtue, the law must treat citizens 
as already (at least somewhat) virtuous. This means that the promotion of virtue 
implies  risks.  It  is  safer  to  impose strict  limits  and strong sanctions.  But  overly  
constraining  and  protective  legal  regimes  may  in  the  long  term  have  an  effect  
similar to that of “pampering” in child-rearing. Thus, for example, in contract 
law there has to be some degree of caveat emptor,  because  people  can  only  
develop their virtue of prudence by exercising their freedom and bearing the 
consequences. 
In  the  field  of  regulation,  it  has  similarly  been  argued  that  Ayres  and  
Braithwaite (1992) that too restrictive and suspicious regulatory approaches 
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foster an unhealthy compliance culture, in which participants fulfill the norms out 
of fear of punishment, but will violate the rules when no one is looking. Given 
the imperfection of any legal regimes, the overall consequences are suboptimal. 
An interesting example is the encoding of business ethics into law (see  the  US  
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations). While the intention of behind 
such legislation must be laudable, some experts claim that the effects have been 
counterproductive (see Toffler with Reingold, 2003). They argue that people 
have  started  to  “do  business  ethics”  as  a  way  of  getting  an  advantage  and  
avoiding legal problems, but the motivation has become distorted and, in the 
end, there is less interest in genuine business ethics based on the desire to do the 
right  thing.  Part  of  the  problem  in  this  case  is  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  
encode  business  ethics  into  law,  and  trying  to  do  so  will  easily  create  a  
superficial compliance culture. 
 
4.4.3 Beyond Law: Other Dangers of Legal Perfectionism 
It has been assumed for simplicity in the foregoing that when law-makers have a 
good reason to legislate something, they will indeed perform the task well. 
Naturally, that is an unrealistic assumption. Law may be imperfect in numerous 
ways, it tends to have unintended consequences, and legislators may simply be 
driven by less worthy goals than common good or the moral betterment of the 
citizens. This leads George (1993: 42) to submit that there are several prudential 
considerations which advice us to err on the side of freedom, and tolerate certain 
moral evils. These are: 
“(1)  the  need  to  avoid  placing  dangerous  powers  in  the  hands  of  
governments  that  are  likely  to  abuse  them;  (2)  the  danger  that  
criminalization of certain vices may have the effect of placing monopolies 
in the hands of organized criminals who will market and spread the vices 
more efficiently; (3) the risk of producing secondary crimes against 
innocent parties; (4) the risk of diverting policy and judicial resources 
away from the prevention and prosecution of more serious crimes; (5) the 
concern that the power to enforce moral obligations will be exploited by 
puritanical,  prudish,  or  disciplinarian  elements  in  society  to  repress  
morally legitimate activities and ways of life whose genuine value these 
elements fail to appreciate; (6) the danger of establishing too much 
authority and creating a situation in which people relate primarily to a 
central authority whom they must constantly work to avoid offending, 
thus discouraging them from building genuine relationships with each 
other to the point of true friendship and valuable communities.” 
As to the last point raised by George, it was already Aristotle who recognized 
the importance of families and other intermediate associations for the education 
of virtues. Children have a natural affection for their parents, and as parents 
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know them well as individuals; each person has his or her challenges and 
weaknesses, and parents are better able to treat individuals as individuals than 
political authorities are (see Nicomachean Ethics, X, 9: 1180b). The same principle 
has been developed by many others: 
“In the end, no amount of regulation – heavy or light – can substitute for the 
type  of  character  formation  that  is  supposed  to  occur  in  families,  schools,  
churches,  and  synagogues.  These  are  the  institutions  […]  which  Adam  Smith  
identified as primarily responsible for helping people develop what he called 
the ‘moral sense’ that causes us to know instinctively when particular courses of 
action are imprudent or simply wrong.” (Gregg, 2008) 
This is not to deny the fundamental role of law. Indeed, law is important for 
upholding what some have called the moral ecology of the society (Gregg, 2003: 
53-55). This role includes, among others, supporting and maintaining the 
institutions of marriage and family, which are so important for the education of 
virtues  and  which  are  also,  as  history  and  common  sense  teach  us,  under  
constant threat due to the passions of men. 
Some authors have argued that an undue focus on law may corrode valuable 
social norms, which are maintained by informal dealings that cannot be 
fruitfully  regulated by law (Pildes,  1996).  It  has  also been pointed out  that  the 
language of rights – so typical of law, and especially of human rights law – may 
create new kinds of conflicts and have a harmful effect on the virtue of justice, as 
it overemphasizes the individual at the expense of the community, fostering self-
centered “maximization” behavior instead of search for the common good 
(Glendon, 1991). 
 
4.4.4 A Synthesis 
How  do  the  static  and  dynamic  perspectives  work  together?  I  argue  in  what  
follows that they form a harmonious system. The challenge is always to identify 
the correct starting point and then, according to the gradualism identified 
earlier,  help  towards  greater  virtue.  But  the  way  of  helping  towards  virtue  is  
precisely to adopt those legal strategies, which would be appropriate for 
virtuous people. 
This  is  most  evident  in  the  case  of  freedom generally (see  principle  1  in  the  
static  analysis).  Persons  who  lack  virtue  need  limits  on  their  choices,  whereas  
the  highly  virtuous  can  be  given  more  freedom.  But  the  unvirtuous  too  need  
freedom in order to develop their character. Having more freedom (fewer 
external constraints) is a condition sine qua non for the growth of virtue, because 
virtue ultimately requires the making of right choices, for the right reasons, and 
freely. A virtuous disposition is not based on mere prohibitions, but on the moral 
goodness of the choice. Prudence cannot develop if people are not able to make 
choices, to “improvise” and “learn from their improvisations” (Schwartz, 2009). 
And the virtue of justice cannot develop if people are merely guided by stick 
and carrot. Likewise, fortitude and temperance as virtues will only develop 
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through personal  choices.  Of  course,  the  right  balance must  be  found,  because 
freedom is challenging and can also become destructive for oneself and others: 
“All  [human  beings]  require  freedom  if  they  are  to  flourish;  and  unlimited  
freedom is the enemy, not the friend, of everyone’s well-being” (George, 1993: 
40). 
The same seems to be true of the other dimensions of legal design. Law can 
impose greater demands on the virtuous, whereas those who lack virtue cannot be 
asked for what they cannot give. However, demanding more is necessary in 
order  to  pull  others  towards  virtue.  In  the  famous  words  of  Goethe:  “Treat  a  
man as he appears to be, and you make him worse. But treat a man as if he were 
what he potentially could be, and you make him what he should be.” 
Likewise, the virtuous can be governed with broad standards, while those who 
lack  virtue  need  more  specific  rules.  But  the  use  of  standards  is  also  a  way  of  
helping people to develop their moral skill, because broader norms have a closer 
connection with the principles of justice, and they are an invitation to personal 
reflection on one’s  choices.  In  contrast,  trying to  write  a  narrow rule  for  every 
situation leads into the trap of an excessive casuistry, which is inconsistent with 
true moral wisdom (Pieper, 1966: 26–27).35 In legal scholarship, it has also been 
argued that broader standards might encourage a culture of honesty, thus 
helping to develop the virtue of justice (Partnoy, 1997; 2003: 409). The use of 
standards,  when  possible,  is  also  consistent  with  Lawrence  Kohlberg’s  famous  
theory  of  moral  development,  which  goes  all  the  way  from  obedience-based  
morality to universal ethical principles (Kohlberg, 1973). 
As far as sanctions are concerned, it again turns out that the more persuasive 
approach, which is suited to the virtuous, is also conducive to the development 
of the virtues. Harsh penalties may be needed when nothing else works, but 
they  are  not  likely  to  foster  genuine  virtues.  In  contrast,  sanctions  based  on  
guidance,  information,  and  soft  and  informal  penalties  are  educationally  more  
effective, because they are more likely to appeal to the intrinsic motivation to do 
the right thing. 
In law-making and enforcement, a greater level of virtue implies that more can 
be trusted to self-governance. But again, self-governance seems to go hand-in-
hand with the development of virtue, because it fosters a sense of responsibility 
for oneself and others. Ultimately self-governance is just one manifestation of 
freedom. 
In  addition  to  these  dimensions  in  the  static  analysis,  it  was  argued  in  the  
dynamic part that the development of virtue greatly depends on other factors 
than law: strong families, good educators, a thriving civil society, and moral 
exemplars. Yet these, too, are connected with the other principles: healthy family 
                                                        
35 Pieper  (1966:  27)  writes:  “Casuistry  […]  must  be  regarded  as  no  more  than  a  highly  useful,  and  
probably necessary, aid; certainly not as an absolute standard for making ethical judgments and 
performing concrete ethical actions. To confound model and reality, to put too great a valuation on 
casuistry, is equivalent to misunderstanding the meaning and rank of the virtue of prudence.” 
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life  and a  thriving civil  society are  only possible  in  an atmosphere of  freedom, 
trust  and  personal  initiative;  the  task  of  law  is  to  create  a  sound,  broad  
framework in which the other institutions can flourish. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has demonstrated the fruitfulness of classical virtue theory in the 
context of law and economics. It has argued that the notion of virtues can be 
imported into economic analysis, and that the practical significance of the virtue 
factor in economic life is potentially significant. It has also outlined a general 
framework for the analysis of law from a virtue-based perspective, showing 
how optimal legal design depends on the level of virtue of the citizens. 
Six general principles were identified: (1) virtue goes together with more 
freedom, while lack of virtue calls for more legal and regulatory constraints; (2) 
virtue goes together with more demanding law, while lack of virtue calls for less 
demanding law;  (3)  virtue goes  together  with more precise  laws,  while  lack of  
virtue calls for less legal precision; (4) virtue goes together with broad standards, 
while lack of virtue calls for narrow rules; (5) virtue goes together with lighter 
enforcement  and sanctions,  while  lack of  virtue calls  for  harsher  punishments;  
and  (6)  virtue  goes  together  with  more  participation  in  law-making  and  law-
enforcement, while lack of virtue implies less participation. 
It was also pointed out that there are various ways in which one could gather 
information about the level of virtue in society, and laws and regulations may be 
designed  in  ways  that  account  for  the  moral  heterogeneity  of  the  citizens.  
Finally, it was found the law plays a major role in promoting and safeguarding 
virtues, but legal perfectionism may be counterproductive.  
The  argument  and  framework  developed  here  is  but  a  sketch,  and  much  
more  work,  both  theoretical  and  empirical,  remains  to  be  done.  Let’s  get  to  
work. 
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